CRIMINAL JUSTICE in Extremis: ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE DURING THE APRIL

1968

CHICAGO DISORDER*

INTRODUCTION

One result of recent incidents of urban violence is that increased
attention has been focused on the goals and operation of the lower
criminal courts. The purpose of this study is to examine the functioning of the Cook County, Illinois criminal justice system in response to
the mass arrests made during the riot which followed the assassination
of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. on April 4, 1968.
This inquiry was initiated by persons who observed the Cook
County criminal system during the April riot. Outward indicia-including conditions in the jails, the inability of arrestees to contact
friends, relatives, or lawyers, or to post bail, the authorities' refusal
to conduct bond reduction hearings until days after the riot was
officially proclaimed to be over, and the system's hostility toward volunteer lawyers and law students-suggested that under stress the lower
criminal courts of Chicago had allowed the rights of defendants to be
seriously abused.
Our study has indeed revealed serious deficiencies in the operation
of the criminal process in April 1968. But many of these deficiencies
are not unique to times of civil disorder; they are rooted in serious
structural infirmities in the criminal process.
It is unfortunate that so much attention has focused on the lower
criminal courts only in response to civil disorders. One recurring theme
of this study is that in some respects the goals and operation of the
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The study was prepared under the supervision of Roger K. Warren, Projects Editor of
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criminal system during a riot are no different than in ordinary times.
In fact, Chicago had a virtually complete, though unarticulated, plan
for dealing with mass arrest situations. That plan was an attempt to
normalize the impact of riot cases on the criminal system and to normalize, to some extent, the impact of the criminal process on riot
arrestees.
In other respects the goals and operation of the Cook County
criminal system were altered to meet the particular exigencies of riot
conditions. There is cause for concern that during the riot the criminal
justice system may have seriously deviated from the standard of an
independent, guilt-determining process. But there is cause for even
greater concern in the possibility that ordinary arrestees are ultimately
treated little differently from riot arrestees.
In this study we examine, in particular, charging policy, the bailsetting process, and the disposition of riot cases. We explore the
problem of preventive detention and the tension between due process
and efficient judicial administration. Wherever possible we make use
of relevant information on the operation of the Cook County criminal
system under normal conditions, and during past mass arrest situations.
Our analysis of the administration of justice during the April 1968
riot is based primarily on a statistical analysis of the official arrest and
court records of 2,189 adults1 arrested between 7 p.m. on April 4
and 7 p.m. on April 11 and processed through the emergency branch
of the Municipal Division of the Cook County Circuit Court

I- It is difficult to ascertain the exact number of adult riot arrestees. Chicago Police Department statistics show 2,574 adult riot arrests, but their figure apparently refers to the
total number of charges, not defendants. Memorandum from William J. Martin, Assistant State's Attorney, to John J. Stamos, State's Attorney of Cook County, May 22, 1968.
Our own sample includes 2,189 defendants: the 2,160 defendants for whom charge information was available were charged with a total of 2,489 offenses. It appears, therefore, that
our sample includes approximately 100 fewer arrestees than the Police Department statistics. We have no reason to believe that our sample is biased in any respect.
Although this study is limited to an analysis of adult riot arrestees, approximately
1,200 juveniles-males under the age of 17 and females under the age of 18-were also
arrested during the ten days following Dr. King's assassination. More than half were
processed through Central Police Headquarters, rather than through district police stations. But 61% were released after police processing. Of those required to appear in
court 268 were released to the custody of a responsible adult and 186 were detainedmost at the Audie Home, Chicago's juvenile detention facility. Delinquency petitions
were subsequently filed in approximately 350 cases. We have no information on the final
disposition of juvenile cases. Chicago Riot Study Committee files [the Chicago Riot Study
Committee is hereinafter cited as Austin Committee]; interview with Walter P. Dahl,
Presiding Judge, Juvenile Division, Circuit Court of Cook County, September 17, 1968;
letter to Nelson Soltman from Judge Dahl, August 28, 1968.
2 Included in the sample, in addition, are approximately 350 defendants whose court
records did not expressly indicate that they were processed through the emergency branch
but who appear-based on such information as the charge, location of arrest, arrest report, and magistrate at the bail hearing-to have been arrested for riot-associated offenses.
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The records were not always complete. Our findings are based on
those cases where relevant information was available. Variation in the
number of arrestees reported in particular tables reflects that fact.
We also rely on other sources. Some information, including data
on the riot itself and police arrest policies, is derived from the Report
and files of the Chicago Riot Study Committee. In addition, we analyzed a sample of 202 adult bail hearing transcripts, furnished through
the courtesy of the Chicago Bar Association, in order to explore more
fully the nature of the bail-setting process. We hired experienced black
community interviewers to locate and interview, individually and in
groups, a sample of riot arrestees selected at random from official court
records. Within the limits of time and funds available for these interviews, our interviewers were able to locate and interview fewer than
twenty arrestees. While the responses of those interviewed provided
insights we could not otherwise have obtained, we have not, in recognition of the inadequacy of the sample, generalized about their attitudes.
Other sources of information include interviews with defense attorneys and other persons who had firsthand experience in public and
private capacities with the administration of justice during the April
riot, newspaper accounts, and the testimony of informed participants
before the Illinois Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights.

I.

THE COOK COUNTY COURT SYSTEM

In this study we will consider in some detail the processing of riot
arrestees by the criminal justice system. Before doing so, however, it is
necessary to outline briefly the organization of the Cook County courts
and its procedure for handling of criminal defendants.
In 1964, a new judicial article of the Illinois Constitution went into
effect.3 It established a single Circuit Court for Cook County to replace
161 separate trial courts which had previously served the Chicago metropolitan area.4 The Cook County Circuit Court is the largest municipal court system in the United States; it serves a population of nearly
six million people, 707 of whom live in the City of Chicago. Organization of the Circuit Court is the responsibility of the chief judge, who
is elected from among the circuit judges by the circuit and associate
circuit judges and serves at their pleasure. The chief judge has "general administrative authority in the court, including authority to
provide for divisions, general or specialized, and for appropriate times
and places of holding court," subject only to the rule-making power of
the Illinois Supreme Court. Supreme Court Rule 21(b) empowers the
chief judge of each circuit to enter "general orders" in the exercise of
his broad administrative authority.6
Judge John S. Boyle was elected chief judge of the Cook County
Circuit Court in 1964 and reelected in 1967. As his first official act as
chief judge, Judge Boyle issued General Order No. 1, providing for
the division of the Circuit Court into two departments, Municipal
and County.7 The Municipal Department is further divided into six
geographical districts; the City of Chicago constitutes the First District.
The jurisdiction of the Municipal Department is limited to "criminal
and quasi-criminal actions and prosecutions commenced by complaint
or information"-misdemeanor and ordinance violation cases and preliminary hearings in felony cases."
The County Department has seven subject-matter divisions-Law,
Chancery, Divorce, Probate, County, Criminal, and Juvenile. The
Criminal Division, which hears "criminal actions and prosecutions
3 ILL. CoNsT.
4

art. VI.

Id. § 8.

5 Id.

6 ILL. Sup. CT. R. 21(b).

7 General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 1-2, §§ 2.1, 2.2 (1964, revised
1966) [hereinafter cited as General Order No. 1-2].

8 General Order No. 1-2, § 2.2(e).
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commenced by indictment,"9 has jurisdiction over all felonies from
the time an information is filed, if the defendant waives indictment,
or from the time the grand jury returns an indictment.
Figure 1 indicates the ordinary course of criminal prosecution in
Cook County. A person charged in a police complaint and not arrested
FIGURE 1
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on a warrant, must be brought "without unnecessary delay" before the
"nearest and most accessible" judge or magistrate.' At the appearance
the defendant is advised of the charge against him and of his right to
counsel." In misdemeanor cases trial is often held immediately in the
Municipal Department. If the defendant does not waive jury trial, or
if the case is continued and the complaint is not dismissed, bail is set
for the defendant.12 Where jury trial is not waived, the case is transferred to the Jury and Non-Jury Court of the Municipal Department. 13
9 General Order No. 1-2, § 2.1 (VII).
10 ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(a) (1967).
11 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(b)(1), (2) (1967).
12 ILL REv. STAT. d. 38, § 109-1(b)(4) (1967).
13 The name reflects the prevalence of bench trials even among those defendants who
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In felony cases, whether initiated by an arrest on a warrant or
without a warrant, a preliminary hearing must be held to establish
the existence of probable cause to believe a crime has been committed
and that the defendant committed it.14 Although magistrates in the
Municipal Department are not authorized to try felony cases, they are
empowered to conduct preliminary hearings in such cases.15 Unless the
case is disposed of at the preliminary hearing, bail is set on the defendant by the presiding magistrate. 6
Under the rules of the Cook County Circuit Court, preliminary
hearings in the First District (Chicago) are held in one of the branch
courts of the District. Normally, cases are assigned to six of the 37
branches for preliminary hearing. Two Boys' Court branches handle
all cases involving males between the ages of 17 and 21 and all auto
theft cases (since such offenders are usually in this age bracket). The
Narcotics Court hears all narcotics cases and non-narcotics cases involving defendants who have a history of narcotics arrests. Rackets Court
has jurisdiction primarily over gambling and weapons offenders, and
Women's Court handles all cases involving females over the age of 18.
Felony Court handles all other preliminary hearings, including those
involving murder, burglary, and robbery.
In felony cases defendants are bound over to the grand jury if the
presiding judge or magistrate finds probable cause at the preliminary
hearing. If the grand jury indicts a defendant bound over to it (and
only in a small percentage of cases does it fail to do so) by returning a
"true bill," the defendant is formally arraigned in the Criminal Division. At the time of arraignment, the defendant enters his plea before
the presiding judge of the Criminal Division. 17 If he pleads guilty, he
is usually sentenced immediately by the presiding judge; if he pleads
initially request a jury trial. Many defendants make the request only in order to gain
time to pay their lawyer, avoid a particular judge, obtain the benefit of more experienced
judges and prosecutors in the Jury and Non-Jury Court (making plea bargaining more
likely), or gain access to full-time criminal lawyers. Once defendants get into that court,
the jury request is usually waived. See D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CfINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 15-16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as OAKs & LEHMAN].
14 ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(b)(3) (1967) requires the judge or magistrate to "hold
a preliminary hearing in those cases where the judge (or magistrate) is without jurisdiction to try the offense"-when the charge against the defendant is a felony. § 109-3(a) directs the judge (or magistrate) to "hold the defendant to answer to the court having
jurisdiction of the offense if from the evidence it appears there is probable cause to believe an offense has been committed by the defendant."
15

ILL.

RaV. STAT.

ch. 37, § 624(d) (1967).

16 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1(b)(4) (1967).
17 ILL. RFV. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-1 (1967).
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not guilty, his case is assigned to one of the judges of the Criminal
Division for trial.18
In many instances felony defendants are neither dismissed nor held
over to the grand jury at the preliminary hearing, since they agree to
plead guilty to a misdemeanor charge or to waive their right to grand
jury indictment and to be tried by information in the Criminal Division. In all felony cases the prosecution is also authorized to seek
arrest warrants based on a direct grand jury indictment against a
defendant, in which case the defendant's first appearance is in the
Criminal Division.19
The chief judge's administrative authority under the 1964 Judicial
Article is far-ranging. Judge Boyle described his responsibilities in
testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee:
As chief judge ... , it is my responsibility to direct the activities of the various departments, divisions, and districts of our
court utilizing the increased judicial manpower provided by
the new judicial article ....

In addition, I am required to

hire all officers and employees of the court; prepare and administer the budget of the court; maintain all accounting
and property control records; purchase law library supplies
and equipment for the judges and supporting personnel; and
represent the court in its negotiations relative to the establishment and maintenance of courtrooms, chambers, and
20
office facilities.
In addition, under Section 8 of the Judicial Article, the chief judge
assigns judges and associate judges to the divisions he creates. Judge
Boyle told the Senate Subcommittee:
You see, this Judicial Article becomes very flexible. We can
move judges around and we assign one judge to divorce for 2
weeks and I can sign an order transferring him to the criminal court of Cook County....
In this one division we have the criminal court with 11
judges and we only use full circuit judges in the criminal
court.2 1

Under the Judicial Article, the Cook County Circuit Court is
18 The defendant may still change his plea to guilty before the trial judge; in fact,
plea bargaining occurs frequently at the trial stage.
19 OArs & LEIHmAN 16.
20 Hearings on S. 1033 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1967).
21 Id. at 11,
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allocated 62 associate judges and 76 circuit judges. 22 Although both
circuit and associate circuit judges have jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters, in practice the chief judge and the presiding judges of the
various courts usually assign the more important matters, such as
criminal trials and civil litigation involving large amounts of money,
to full circuit judges.23
The 1964 Judicial Article abolished justice of the peace and police
magistrates, and provided for appointed magistrates.24 Under a statutory allocation formula, the Cook County Circuit Court is entitled to
114 magistrates. 25 Magistrates have jurisdiction in civil cases involving
not more than $10,000.26 Their criminal jurisdiction is limited to
misdemeanors and ordinance violations with a maximum punishment
not exceeding a fine of $1,000, imprisonment in the county jail for
one year, or both. 27 Magistrates are authorized to preside at preliminary
hearings to determine probable cause, to commit defendants prior to
28
trial, and to set bail.
The Cook County Circuit Court has established the procedure for
the selection of magistrates in Rule 0.8.29 Under the provisions of that
order, a lawyer 30 seeking the position must apply to the chief judge; a
committee of five circuit judges (presently, three Democrats and two
Republicans) may recommend the application for appointment only
after the Chicago Bar Association has approved his selection; and,
finally, the full body of-circuit judges must approve the appointment.
Each magistrate serves for a term of one year, and is eligible for reappointment. Four magistrates were not reappointed at the end of the
first year of operation of the Circuit Court in 1965; all magistrates
have been reappointed each year since that time. The office of the
chief judge reports that over 400 applications for magistrate positions
are presently on file.
22 ILL. CONsr. art. VI, § 8.

23 Cook County Circuit judges are paid $32,500 per year; associates judges, $29,000.
ILL. CONsT. art. VI, § 17 authorizes these salaries, which are established by law in ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 53, §§ 3, 3.9 (1967). Illinois uses a retention system for the election of

judges. After a judge is initially elected, the electorate can only vote for or against his
retention at the expiration of his six year term. Il.. CoNsT. art. vi, § 11.
24 IL. CONST. art. VI, § 12.
25 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 160.2 (1967). Magistrates receive $15,000 from the state and
$4,500 from Cook County. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 53, § 3.2 (1967).
26 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 622 (1967).
27 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 624 (1967).
28 ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 37, § 624(d) (1967).
29 COOK COUNTY Cm. CT. R. 0.8.
80 Under COOK COUNTY Cm. CT. R. 0.8(a), "All appointees shall be persons of good
moral character and reputation, and shall have been actively engaged in the practice of
law for at least six years immediately preceding their appointment."
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Nearly 30% of Cook County magistrates held other jobs in the
judicial system, primarily in the State's Attorney's or Public Defender's
office, before their appointment. 31 Nearly 40% held an appointed,
non-judicial position before their selection as magistrates. Only five
of the 114 magistrates are black. While state law requires that appointment of magistrates be non-partisan, 32 it is impossible to determine whether this is in fact the practice in Cook County.
Of the 62 associate judges, 85% are Democrats. Nearly three-fifths
were with the office of the State's Attorney or the Public Defender or
held a non-judicial appointed position before they went on the bench.
Five are black. Eighty-five per cent of the circuit judges are also
Democrats. One-third were state's attorneys; 44% held non-judicial
appointed positions. There are five black circuit judges.
Judicial reform has greatly increased the efficiency of the Cook
County courts. Reforms initiated in 1964 have resulted in the gradual
diminution of case backlogs and radical increase in court-collected
revenue.33 Nevertheless, caseloads are still prohibitive. Judges and
magistrates handled an average of 6,898 cases each during 1967. 34
Nearly 210,000 misdemeanor cases were begun, and over 205,000
terminated during the year.35 There were only one-fortieth as many
felony cases: 5,323 were commenced and 4,508 disposed of in 1967.38
But mass arrest cases-particularly mass arrest felony cases-are
perceived as a threat to the increased efficiency of the Circuit Court.
In the event of emergency, the chief judge is authorized to convene a
special branch court, known as Branch 47, to handle the heavy docket
associated with mass arrests. Almost all cases arising from the April
1968 riots were heard in Branch 47. In order to coordinate preliminary
hearings in mass arrest cases, a general order was issued in June 1966
by the presiding judge of the First District.3 7 Under this order, a mass
31 This data was supplied through the courtesy of Mr. Wesley Skogan, Ph.D. candidate,
Department of Political Science, Northwestern University.
32 COOK COUNTY Cm. Cr. R. 0.8(a).
33 In 1963 the suburban area of Cook County collected a total of $512,000 in fines and
costs; by 1967 this amount had increased to $4,881,000. In Chicago the collection of fines
increased from $9,230,000 in 1964 to $12,048,000 in 1967. The addition of $10,000,000 for
various fees (filing fees, sheriffs fees, bail bond forfeitures, etc.) brought the total Chicago
court revenue to $22,048,000 for 1967 or over $27,000,000 for the entire county for the
same year. This remarkable increase is attributed to a centralized and computerized accounting system; the income from the Cook County courts in 1967 was $10,000,000 more
than the state's cost of the entire court system. AD mrRATIvE OrFIC or THE ILLINOIS
CoUrTs, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT To THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS 19-20.
34 Id. at 56.
35 Id. at 61.
38 Id.
37 General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 66-12 (1966).
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arrest was defined as the arrest of 50 or more persons, excluding juveniles, "in any one incident." A detailed schedule for the conduct of
preliminary hearings, according to the number and time of arrests,
was established.
As a result of delay in the processing of arrestees brought to 11th
and State for bail hearings during the April 1968 riots, this order was
redrafted. 38 The detailed schedule of court locations and times has
been eliminated and the presiding judge of the First District has been
given the responsibility for opening as many bond courts as may be
needed, as well as for designating magistrates to sit in these courts and
notifying various city and county officials that a "mass arrest program"
has been initiated by the court system.
Court officials frequently speak of the impact of riot cases on judicial
administration in terms of the sheer volume of mass arrests. Commenting upon the administration of justice during the Detroit disorders of 1967, William Cahalan, Chief Prosecutor of Wayne County,
said, for example:
The situation in Detroit, so far as the administration of justice was concerned during the riot was "normalcy" except that
there was a lot more of it to cope with. The prisoners of the
riot were processed in exactly the same manner as the arrestee in "normal" times. The only difference was a "lot more."
This "lot more" was what really gave us our difficulty.3 9
In contrast to Cahalan's suggestion that judicial administration in
Detroit was hindered by a "lot more" cases, Chief Judge Boyle remarked after the April riots:
If we had to do it again tomorrow, I think we would handle
it in the same fashion, because we could have handled an
unlimited number of defendants. We could have taken care
40
of two or three thousand more if necessary.
And the Chief Judge's Administrative Assistant denied that even the
mass arrest of 9,300 persons would have presented a processing problem
for the courts. 41
Although the optimistic projections of Chicago officials regarding the
processing of the April rioters are doubtful in light of this study's
findings, the difference of view between Detroit and Chicago officials
is undoubtedly a result in part of the different charging policies imple38

General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 18 (1968).

39 Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 THE PROSECUTOR 430, 433 (1967).
40 Austin Committee files.

41 Id.
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mented during the two civil disorders. As we shall explore more fully
in the next section, a much higher proportion of Detroit riot arrestees
than of their Chicago counterparts were charged with felony offenses.
During the week of April 4-11, about 1,800 persons were arrested on
riot-associated misdemeanors in Chicago and processed through the
First District, Municipal Department. Approximately 850 persons were
arrested on one or more riot-associated felony charges and initially
processed through the same court. (See Table 1.) Since the First District
disposed of an average of approximately 4,300 misdemeanor and ordinance violation cases cases a week during 1967, the volume of
misdemeanor cases entering the criminal courts during the week of the
riot was not dramatically greater than normal, even assuming, which
is unlikely, that non-riot associated misdemeanor arrests continued at
normal rates during the riot. If the impact is measured simply in terms
of volume of misdemeanor cases the Cook County Court officials appear to be correct.
TABLE 1
CHARGE CATEGORY BREAKDOwN OF APRIL 1968 CHICAGO RIOT ARREsTEs

Curfew
State Disorderly Conduct
Property Misdemeanors
Petty Theft
Criminal Damage to Property
Control of Stolen Property
Criminal Trespass to Vehicle
Attempted Theft
Resisting Arrest

582
453
139

34

Resisting Arrest
Obstructing Police Officer

Personal Misdemeanors
Battery
Aggravated Assault
Reckless Conduct

12

Unlawful Use or Discharge of

Weapons*
Vice Crimes*
Possession of Drugs

Gambling

42
34

Prostitution
5
Keeping a Disorderly House
2
Property Felony
Burglary
521
Grand Theft
40
Attempted Burglary
4
Robbery
Armed Robbery
8
Robbery
4
Attempted Robbery
3
Personal Felony
Aggravated Battery
4
Rape
2
Attempted Murder
2
Murder
1
Arson-Possession of Explosives
Other*
Two Charges*
Three or more charges*

565

15

9

7
23
215
28
2,158

* This charge category encompasses crimes which under particular circumstances may
be either misdemeanor or felony offenses.

But the impact of 850 felony arrests initiated in one week is staggering. In 1967 the First District held 16,589 preliminary hearings and
transferred 8,338 defendants to the Criminal Division under indictment, an average weekly load of 319 and 64 respectively.4 Thus, the
42 ADMINISrRATIVE OFFICE OF THE ILLINOIS COURTS, 1967 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SU-

PRFNE COURT OF ILLINOIS 71.
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input of 850 felony cases in one week, normally necessitating an equal
number of preliminary hearings and, in many cases, leading to subsequent prosecution through the grand-jury and Criminal Division
(perhaps including jury trial), poses a distinct threat to the efficient
operation of the criminal system.
The Cook County criminal courts attempted to alleviate the burden
of mass arrests by granting continuances en masse in all criminal cases
regularly scheduled for hearing at the Municipal Department courtrooms where riot arrestees were being processed during the week of
April 4-11. Attorneys simply lined up at designated tables to receive
automatic continuances, often of two months or longer.43 Except for
the necessity of setting bond in non-riot cases, magistrates were thus
freed to hear only riot arrest cases during the week of April 4-11.
43

Austin Committee files.

II. THE APRIL RIOT: ARREST AND CHARGING POLICIES
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., died of bullet wounds at 7 p.m.,
Chicago time, on Thursday, April 4, 1968. As the news of the assassination spread through the black neighborhoods of Chicago, 44 residents began to file into churches or gather around television sets
to watch newscasters repeat the same story and narrate hastily prepared film biographies of the slain leader. Although thoughts of
violent revenge were articulated by a few militant groups, 45 all areas
of the ghetto were abnormally quiet throughout the evening.
By 8:30 p.m., city officials were in contact with Police Superintendent Conlisk, Cook County Court officials, and representatives of
the State's Attorney's and Public Defender's offices to discuss precautions to be taken in preparation for the possibility of civil disorder.
The police department had taken immediate precautionary measures. At 7:45 on Thursday night all days off for members of the
Field Services Bureau (containing 7,500 sworn members) were cancelled. Beginning with the first watch (12 midnight to 8 a.m.), extra
men were assigned to the 2nd, 3rd, 10th, l1th and 21st districtsthose areas with a history of riot activity. In addition, special threeand four-man prowl cars began patrolling those parts of the ghetto
where people were likely to gather on the streets. Department officials
also contacted the commanding officer of the Emergency Operations
44 Much of the black ghetto in Chicago is in the form of a broad band which surrounds the Loop on three sides (the fourth is Lake Michigan). Within the Loop are located the city's major banks, businesses, and department stores, as well as the world's
largest commodity exchange. Those who travel between the inner city and the western
suburbs use the Eisenhower Expressway, which stretches directly west from the lake
and Grant Park. It is approximately eight miles from the center of the Loop to the
western edge of the city. Four to six miles from the Loop, the Eisenhower runs directly
through the middle of one of the most impoverished areas on the West Side. Within
six blocks to the north (along Madison Street) and eight blocks to the south (along
Roosevelt Road) of the Eisenhower the worst property damage during the riot occurred.
The preponderance of this damage was inflicted during the afternoon and evening of
April 5.
45 As reported by the Austin Committee, "these groups were small in number, small
in membership and were informal and ad hoc." REPoRT OF TnE CHICAGO RIoT STUDY
COiMrrT= 5 (1968) [hereinafter cited as AUSTIN CoMMIrr REPORT]. Much of the material in this section is taken directly from Chapters II, III, and IV of the AUSTIN COMMrrrEE REPORT. We have also relied upon reports and interviews which were prepared
by the committee staff but not published in the report. Although our conclusions conflict at times with those of the Austin Committee, the part of the report dealing with
the disruption of the schools and the activities of the police department has proved a
valuable guide to the analysis in this section.
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Headquarters of the Illinois Army National Guard. Since the City
remained calm throughout Thursday evening and the early hours
of Friday morning, however, it was decided not to call out the Guard
immediately.
Actual disturbance began with the opening of the City's schools
on Friday morning. One police officer reported that those students
arriving at black high schools were met by "persons passing out
handbills urging them to stay out of school." 46 Many schools did
manage to hold the memorial services suggested the previous evening
by School Superintendent Redmond, but the atmosphere was tense
and often charged with anti-white feelings. False fire alarms, various
forms of vandalism, and other disruptions by students and outsiders
caused the dismissal of school after school in the black communities.
By 1 p.m. only four black high schools were still in session. Those
released from one school would often move on to disrupt those
schools still open, breaking windows and stopping cars along the way.
In some cases, groups formed to march on white schools on the
perimeter of the ghetto and, in one case, on the downtown area
itself.
In the two-hour period from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m., four separate and
serious incidents occurred: (1) about 1,000 students left Marshall
High School and marched toward predominantly white Austin High
School on the far West Side (about eight miles west of the Loop);
(2) two to three hundred students from Hyde Park High School (eight
miles south of the Loop) marched toward Mt. Carmel High School, a
predominantly white private school six blocks away; (3) students from
Cooley High School (two miles north of the Loop) disrupted classes
and then marched to Waller High School, where more students
joined them in harassing white motorists and breaking windows along
Division Street; (4) several hundred students gathered at Crane High
School (four miles directly west of the Loop) and marched east on
Madison, directly into the downtown area and toward City Hall.
This last demonstration alarmed both the police and shoppers
in the Loop area, even though few of the students ever reached City
Hall, and police protection was sufficient to force dispersal of the
students after a small number of arrests were made. As a result of
the widespread disruption of schools and the demands for protection
of the Loop area, police reinforcements were sent to the perimeter
46 All statements attributed to the police are taken from a written interview which
was prepared and administered by the staff of the Austin Committee. 476 officers who
had been on riot duty between April 4 and April 7 answered nearly 30 questions concerning composition of crowds, activities of the rioters, police procedures, and the prevention of future riots.

Criminal Justice in Extremis

1969]

of the inner city area in the early afternoon. From this central staging area, police personnel were equidistant from potential trouble
spots in the ghetto.
During the course of Friday afternoon, the focus of the disturbances shifted from the schools and the student marches to the West
Side, where looting and arson began. At 2:30 p.m. the district commanders of the Chicago police were instructed to order the closing of
all liquor establishments and to prohibit the sale of gasoline in containers. But these measures did little to stem the disturbances, and
by 3 p.m. the looting on the West Side was so widespread that police
in the area were unable to take effective action against the offenders.
People began to gather in the streets and to encourage each other
to participate in the looting in an increasingly open fashion. The
looting activity at this time, and throughout the weekend, tended to
concentrate upon clothing, appliance, general merchandise, and liquor
stores and pawnshops operated by whites.
As the afternoon progressed, a pattern developed. After a store was
emptied of its contents, it would be set ablaze. Fire department
records reveal that the first alarm in this area was sounded at 3:45
p.m., for a fire in a furniture store at 2235 West Madison. A molotov
cocktail had been thrown through the front window. By 5 p.m. several more fires had been set and were burning as far as a mile apart;
at 5:15 the fire commisisoner placed his department on emergency
footing. Fire department officials later testified that a stronger wind
would have brought the entire West Side into danger.
In the early period of rioting, several store owners attempted to
bargain with the looters. One policeman reported the unsuccessful
attempt of a clothing store owner on the West Side:
He told the people that they could take anything they
wanted, but he asked that they not burn the store. They
emptied the store and then they burned it.
Several police officers later stated that much of the inital breaking
and entering was by young men between the ages of 15 and 20. One
witness observed that there was a "carnival" atmosphere in the air,
and the Austin Committee noted that those blacks who lost their
homes in fires were not uniformly bitter: "Some apparently felt that
their homes were already so substandard that little was lost." 47

The degree of organization among the looters was unclear. Several
policemen reported seeing adults direct juveniles into stores to loot,
supposedly on the theory that any children arrested by the police
47 AusTIN

CommIx
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would be excused because of their age. Other police officers thought
that juvenile gangs directed their youngest members to loot in order
to avoid arrest of those members with long prior arrest records.
Between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m., many ghetto residents realized that
the police department was temporarily unable to bring reinforcements
into the West Side. A large cross-section of the community-often
including entire families-joined in the looting. Nearly three-fifths
of the policemen interviewed by the Austin Committee thought that
fewer than 5% of the looters were arrested. This would indicate that
over 30,000 people actually took part in the looting. The figure is
probably inflated, but it does suggest the perception many policemen
serving on the West Side had of the riot-a small rebellion in which
ghetto residents were able to overwhelm the stores of their choice.
By 6 p.m. the participation of black citizens in the riot probably
reached its highest level. Police witnesses generally agreed that it "was
all youth on the afternoon of April 5th but the majority were adults
that night." As the older residents returned from work and the
students became exhausted, the composition of the crowds changed.
The Austin Committee suggested that "significant errors in command judgment" may have been made "in stationing more police
manpower in the Loop than was necessary during the day of April
5 while less was put into the West side." 48 This criticism may reflect
an unrealistic assessment of the dilemma facing the police department. Because of the widespread disruption of ghetto schools, as well
as the unpredictable nature of the crowds which subsequently
formed around the schools, department supervisors did not realize
that the West Side would become the focus for serious riot activity
until the middle of Friday afternoon.
In the area surrounding the Cabrini-Green housing complex on
the Near North Side, looting and burning occurred on a much
smaller scale than on the West Side. Once again, both the looting and
the arson were directed toward white-owned and white-operated stores.
On Friday afternoon, sniper fire from a building near a fire house
at 1044 North Orleans (about one mile north of the Loop) prevented
firemen from reaching a fire in a grocery store about three blocks from
the fire house before the building was completely destroyed. The
most serious sniping incident of the three-day weekend occurred
about 1 a.m., Saturday morning, when firemen came under rifle fire
from the roof of the Cabrini-Green housing complex. 49 It took police
at 43.
49 Generally, news media reports of sniping incidents have been grossly overstated, as
a recent study at Brandeis University has revealed. Lemberg Center for the Study of
48 Id.
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and National Guard forces several hours to rout the snipers from
the buildings. On both the West Side and the Near North Side,
firemen were hampered by residents who threw rocks and bottles or
turned on hydrants to reduce water pressure, although department
officials later testified that many residents helped them fight the fires.
Only one fireman was wounded by sniper fire.
The South Side remained relatively calm at this time, although
some store windows were broken during the evening along 63rd
Street, mostly near the intersection with Halsted, about eight miles
southwest of the Loop.
As the disturbances began to assume riot proportions, the police
department adopted emergency measures in an attempt to meet the
challenge. By 4 p.m. on Friday, the department had mobilized
nearly 6,000 policemen-about half the entire force. Those officers
on the eight-hour shift normally terminating at 4 p.m. had their
duty extended four hours, as all members of the force began operating on 12-hour intervals. All off-duty days were cancelled and many
non-uniformed personnel were shifted to uniformed police duty. Because this order was not given until after the beginning of the 8
a.m. to 4 p.m. shift (at which time there was no sign of trouble),
there was no significant increase in police manpower until 4 p.m.
And since heavy traffic both prevented police personnel from reaching
their district stations on time and delayed their deployment immediately thereafter, there was no significant increase in manpower on
the West Side until after 5 p.m.
By 9:20 p.m. on Thursday evening, more than 800 officers of the
Task Force had been assigned to patrol in the ghetto areas. At about
the same time, ten "incident control" teams were formed for the
purpose of bringing special attention to situations which had the
potential of becoming serious disturbances. 50 These efforts proved
effective on the morning of April 5 when the schools were disrupted.
From 6 p.m. Thursday to noon Friday, 35 arrests were made in conViolence, Brandeis University, "Sniping Incidents-A New Pattern of Violence?" Riot
Data Review No. 3, February 1969.
50 Each police district maintains two or three "tactical force" teams which consist of
one sergeant and ten patrolmen who have received training in riot control techniques.
In addition, the police department maintains a Task Force (about 500 men) which is
normally used to break trends in crime-often in response to complaints that a par-

ticular area of the city is getting insufficient protection against a particular trpe of
crime, such as burglary, rape, or prostitution. The members of the Task Force have also
received training in riot control. Under the Mobilization Plan of the police department
(see text at page 472 infra), a particular district will appeal to the Task Force or
other districts for additional aid only after its own tactical force teams have been unable to quell a particular disturbance.
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nection with the school disturbances. But when the schools were dismissed, the focus of the disturbances was lost and the number of
reported "incidents" increased sharply, as the students roamed the
streets in an unpredictable manner. The incident control teams were
unable to keep track of their activities.
It is impossible to determine whether any identifiable "Mobilization
Plan" ever became operative. In 1960, early in the superintendency
of Orlando W. Wilson, an "Immediate Emergency Plan" had been
developed to deal with potential disturbances in the city. Under
this plan, certain "mobile forces" were designated in each district,
so that one district would exhaust its riot-oriented personnel before
calling upon an adjacent district to help. After serious racial disturbances in the summer of 1965, a new "Mobilization Plan" was
prepared. It was felt that the emergency personnel should be drawn
from districts far beyond the district of incidence, so that adjacent
districts would be fully staffed in case there was a "spillover" from
the primary district. But during the April disturbances the traffic
problem was so severe that many officers were simply told to report
to the district station nearest their homes. And once it was determined
that the West Side would be the center of the riot activity, department officials may not have known how many police officers were
already in the area. Finally, coordination between various teams or
groups entering the West Madison area was often non-existent. Communication by car radio was haphazard. As one officer noted:
Better communication between command and live personnel
is needed-officers received assignments which had to be
abandoned when arriving on the scene. An approach of
securing a certain . . . riot area could be an improvement

over the ill effect of moving to a new location, and passing
looters on the way.
At any rate, in addition to those officers transferred to the West Side
under the Mobilization Plan, there were 300 Task Force members
and 53 tactical teams (623 men) operating in the affected districts
by 8 p.m. Friday evening.
The disturbances reached their peak late Friday evening. Although
between 9 p.m. and midnight 116 arrests were made (see Table 2),
and the fire department was fighting the largest number of fires for
any one period during the riot, the looting activity began to diminish.
Close to midnight on Friday evening, approximately 1,600 National Guardsmen joined the Chicago police. These troops had been
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mobilized by Governor Shapiro at the request of Mayor Daley following an emergency meeting of the City Council at 2 p.m. on Friday afternoon. The Commander of the Emergency Operation Headquarters for the the Illinois National Guard was contacted in Bloomington at 2:45, and the mobilization began. Adverse traffic conditions
prevented the Commander from reaching the Chicago Avenue Armory
until 6:45 p.m. At this time, he received a mission order signed by
Mayor Daley indicating those areas (in the Loop, Near North Side,
and West Side) where Guard personnel were to be stationed. Other
Guard personnel had difficulty reaching the armory. in their cars.
Most of the organization and briefing of the men was not completed
until 11 p.m.
The arrival of the National Guard on West Madison after midnight coincided with the arrival of a new shift of policemen. The
number of arrests dropped significantly in the next six hours (92
between midnight and 3 a.m. and 48 between 3 a.m. and 6 a.m.), and
it is clear that the arrival of the Guard deterred many of the people
remaining in the streets. The use of armored personnel carriers and
the sight of heavy weapons proved an effective method of restoring
order to the area. Furthermore, all Guardsmen carried gas masks
and each company had authority and training to use tear gas wherever
it was needed. The distribution of duties between the Guard and the
police caused some difficulty, however. Several officers made arrests
on the basis of information provided by a Guardsman who either
did not give his name or later failed to appear to testify at the trial
of the defendant. As in the case of one police district, where a single
officer signed all the complaints, convictions were clearly jeopardized
by this type of arrest.
No further fires were set after the arrival of the National Guard
on Friday night. Major fires were either set or continued to spread
until 11 p.m. By that time there were more than 2,000 men and 100
pieces of equipment on the West Side alone. At 4 a.m. on Saturday
morning, the fire commissioner declared the situation under control.
Saturday morning, a limited amount of looting occurred on the
West Side, and a few more fires were set. National Guard and police
responded to these minor incidents with a massive number of arrests.
Between 6 a.m. and 12 noon on Saturday, 115 arrests were made.
Over the weekend, arson activity was generally limited to the West
Side, although both looting and vandalism were reported on the
Near North and South Sides. The worst looting occurred in the
vicinity of 63rd and Halsted, where isolated incidents of window
breaking in the morning were followed by widespread looting in
the early evening.
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On Saturday afternoon, General Dunn ordered the mobilization of
1,000 additional Guardsmen. This mobilization was accomplished
in five hours-about half the time it had taken for the preparation of
6,000 men on Friday. By Saturday evening, nearly 4,000 Guardsmen
were patrolling the streets of Chicago. At 11 a.m. Mayor Daley had
announced the imposition of a curfew from 7 p.m. to 6 a.m. for
all residents in the city under the age of 21.
In a final effort to secure the city, Mayor Daley also requested
acting Governor Shapiro to seek the aid of federal troops. At 4 p.m.
President Johnson signed an executive decree which federalized the
Illinois National Guard and ordered Army troops to the City of
Chicago. The transportation of Army troops from Fort Hood, Texas,
and Fort Carson, Colorado, began immediately. A total of 4,000
Army troops had arrived in the city by Sunday morning, but many
never left their bivouac areas at O'Hare Field and Glenview Naval
Air Station, both several miles to the north of the downtown area.
The largest contingent of Army troops was located in Jackson
Park, 12 miles to the south of the Loop on the Lake Shore and only
a few blocks east of the University of Chicago campus. Jackson Park
was the staging area for patrols in the South Side area. These patrols
proved effective in crowd control, with squads of 20 or 30 soldiers
routinely clearing sidewalks under the commuter "L" tracks which
straddle 63rd Street. Army personnel participated in very few arrests.
At 11:15 a.m. on Sunday, the fire commissioner declared that the
fire emergency was over and companies were ordered to return to
their normal work schedule. As fire equipment was withdrawn from
the West Side, city sanitation crews began to demolish burned-out
buildings and to remove debris from the streets. At the same time,
attempts were made to restore gas, water, and electricity to this part
of the city.
The most serious property damage of the riot occurred before
midnight on Friday. Yet, while there were 380 arrests on Friday, there
were 632 on Saturday. (See Table 3.) The riot activity on Saturday
was much more widespread, with the action on the South Side drawing some police from the Cabrini-Green housing complex on the
North Side and the Madison Street area on the West Side, but it was
also much less intense than on Friday. Thus, it is possible that many
of those individuals who initiated the looting and arson on Friday
were never arrested, while those who joined the riot activity on Saturday were much more likely to be arrested.
The combination of police and National Guard (as well as the
Army after Sunday) permitted the city to regain authority in the
streets, although nightfall on Saturday again brought this control
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into question. The 230 arrests made between 6 p.m. and 12 midnight
reflecf the new riot activity on the South Side. Less than one-fifth
were for property felonies. By comparison there were 256 arrests for
the same period Friday night, of which almost one-half were for
property felonies. But while property felony arrests were declining,
arrests for disorderly conduct increased. Less than one-fifth of all
arrests on Friday night were for disorderly conduct, but this proportion rose to over a third on Saturday night. This trend may reflect
the policy set by the State's Attorney's office (see discussion below),
but it may also indicate that the police were in a position to arrest
persons whom they thought were preparing or threatening to break
into stores-as opposed to Friday night, when more people were
arrested inside stores and were, therefore, charged with a property
felony. A final distinction between the two nights lies in the 61 arrests
made for violations of the newly imposed curfew on Saturday (for
the five-hour period between 7 p.m. and 12 midnight).
Sunday afternoon, nearly all looting and arson in the city had
ended. The number of arrests dropped to 383. Property felony arrests
dropped from 246 on Saturday to 77 on Sunday. Once again the most
active period was between 6 p.m. and 12 midnight, when 224 arrests
were made. Over half of these arrests were for curfew violations; only
24% were for property felonie's or disorderly conduct.
Although schools were open on Monday, April 8, attendance in
the ghetto areas was much lower than usual. Some schools held the
memorial services which had been scheduled for the previous Friday.
Many ghetto residents returned to work. While the number of arrests
dropped to 243, the number of curfew arrests rose to 140 for the
six-hour period from 6 p.m. to midnight, over 80% of all arrests
made during that period. Tuesday was declared a day of national
mourning by President Johnson, and the entire city school system
suspended operations. Because of fears that Dr. King's funeral would
cause new unrest, the curfew was left in effect Tuesday. Of the 182
arrests made between 6 p.m. and 12 midnight, 83% were for curfew
violations. On Wednesday Mayor Daley lifted the curfew and announced that the emergency was over. The departure of federal troops
and the demobilization of the National Guard began. Police returned
to normal eight-hour tours of duty.51
51 During the course of the riot, 90 policemen were injured, none seriously; 48 persons

were wounded by gunfire-20 by shots of undetermined origin and 26 by shots fired by
persons in the riot area.
another claimed that he
persons were arrested for
more than $80,000 worth

One person was shot by a police officer in self-defense, and
was wounded by shots fired by the National Guard. Eight
shootings. During the course of the riot the police recovered
of merchandise, only $14,000 of which was identified and re-
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Table 3 shows arrests by day and hour throughout the riot. The
peak arrest period for each day was between 6 p.m. and 12 midnight.
Our data also indicate that 28% of all riot arrests were for curfew,
26% were for property felonies, and 21% for disorderly conduct.
TABLE 3
DIsMIBurlON or ARROrs BY DAY AND HouR FRom FRIDAY, ApRIL

5TH,

THROUGH

TUESDAY, APRIL 9TH

Day
Friday
Saturday
Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
TOTAL

Midnight to 6 am.
No. %*
14
140
65
30
30
279

Hour
6 am. to 6 pan.
No. %*

6 p.m. to Midnight
No. %*

Total
No. %"

7
3
2
2

110 6
262 14
94
5
43
2
33 2

256
230
224
170
182

14
12
12
9
10

380 20
632 34
383 20
243 13
245 13

15

542 29

1062

56

1883 100

-

* These per cent figures are based on the total number of arrests from Friday through
Tuesday. Percentage totals in this table and in tables throughout the study are subject
to slight variations due to rounding of subtotals.

In summary, the pattern of arrests for the entire week was as
follows: the peak arrest period for each day was between 6 p.m. and
12 midnight. (See Table 3.) Seventy-five percent of all arrestees were
charged with property felonies (26%/), disorderly conduct (21%,) or
curfew violations (28%). Property felony arrests reached a peak on
Friday night and diminished continuously thereafter. Disorderly conduct arrests peaked on Saturday night. By contrast curfew arrests
increased continuously from Saturday through Tuesday. (See Table
2.) In short, the data reflect the reassertion by Saturday of control
over the community by the combined forces of the police, Army, and
National Guard. It should nevertheless be noted that the police department continued to make large numbers of arrests after Sunday30%o of all riot arrests were made after Sunday.
A. Observations on Police Strategy
During the April riot, traditional training in riot control proved
ineffective. Since looting had already begun by the time the police
entered West Madison in force, keeping the crowds off the streets
was no longer possible. The people simply entered stores or alleys
whenever the police attempted to use a "wedge" (for breaking up
turned to the owners. AusTIN CoMMrrrE REPORT 37. Throughout the riot, participants
concentrated upon both looting and arson. In most cases, police were simply ignored
by the rioters and there were few instances of armed conflict between ghetto residents

and police.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

crowds) or a "diagonal" (for moving crowds away from buildings
and into an open area) or a "skirmish line" (a holding action to
block entrance to a street or other area).
Just as in the first few hours of the afternoon there had been
no discernible focus to the unrest in the city as a whole, in the late
afternoon and early evening the lack of a single identifiable crowd
or group on the West Side to which supervising officers could direct
themselves complicated the problems of the police: "People were
everywhere-they were not in one place advancing in one direction."
The number of troublemakers was not small enough to permit
police to make "symbolic" arrests with the expectation that cooler
heads would prevail as a result.5 2 In addition, almost all members
of the force were aware that aggressive acts on their part might intensify the riot, as in the case of the "blind pig" raid in Detroit,
the traffic arrest in Newark, or the "pregnant woman" arrest in Los
Angeles. Police did respond to snipers with the use of gunfire but were
unable to disperse looters with the use of riot control formations,
which are described in the police bulletins as a "last resort" crowd
control technique.
Another problem of the police is illustrated by their difficulty in
implementing the following directive issued hourly beginning Saturday morning:
Supervisors will insure that their personnel take aggressive
action against all law-breakers.
Once the center of the riot was finally located, the residents of the
area were either oblivious or hostile to the presence of the police.
As a result, it was very difficult to detect those "law breakers" who
deserved "aggressive action." No crowd would yield up an. arsonist
or a looter and, as one officer explained:
Naturally, as many looters as possible should be arrested,
but only if you are sure they are looters. Many people were
carrying items from burning homes and stores for safety
52 As
mended
rests of
arrested

a result of its study of the police department, the Austin Committee recomthe use of "symbolic arrests" in case of further disturbances in Chicago: "arpersons in clear violation of law who are in leadership positions and who are
under circumstances which may have a sobering or subduing effect on numbers

of other persons in the same area."

AUSTIN Cormrr-EE REPORT

47. As is indicated below,

the mass arrest of offenders, as well as innocent bystanders, may have been the only
way to restore order in the area along West Madison. Since the police were outnumbered
by the looters during the latter part of Friday afternoon, isolated arrests had little impact on the rioters. Furthermore, the influx of police unfamiliar with the people and
the area made the identification of leaders (if such persons did exist) that much more
difficult.

1969]

Criminal Justice in Extremis

479

and it was impossible to distinguish them from some of the
looters.
Furthermore, many shopkeepers did not remain in the ghetto areas, so
that police were deprived of the encouragement and aid which these
individuals might have provided them in their attempt to protect
property. Even when the merchants remained, their actions, such
as the sale of merchandise at cost without receipts (thereby leading officers to think the goods were stolen), often created more confusion than their presence cured. One policeman told the following story about a clothing store owner on the West Side:
While loading several trailers with clothing, he told the
crowd to let him get the trailers loaded [and they could
have] what was left in the store. We stopped and arrested
numerous people who were carrying clothing down Pulaski
and Madison. Several minutes later the police radio informed
us that these people who were coming from Pulaski and
Washington were not looters, but that clothes were given
to them. This was one of the most demoralizing acts to the
policemen assigned to this area that I have ever witnessed.
Since symbolic arrest was clearly ineffective, the individual policeman was forced to weigh the amount of time it would take to get a relatively small number of arrestees to the district station-a process often
delayed by insufficient transportation, traffic.jams, and the necessity of
booking each individual and signing a complaint-against the value
of his continued presence in the area. Many probably concluded that
an arrest should not be made. One officer thought the looting was reduced significantly wherever police remained in the area:
Where policemen on foot walked through an area without
making many arrests-breaking crowds and attempting. to
shag looters from stores-only about 20-30 per cent of the
crowd would loot. In other areas, where cars with police were
passing through, it was 65 per cent or more.
When the police department finally obtained enough manpower and
vehicles to begin clearing the streets with large numbers of arrests, it
was getting dark and most policemen were already very tired. An indiscriminate use of the arrest power may have been caused by a combination of fear and frustration. Policemen unable to identify the
"real" rioters may simply have arrested everyone in sight. The Austin
Committee noted:
There may also have been a tendency on the part of the police
to make arrests later on April 5 and particularly on April 6
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in a less discriminating and more sweeping way than is desirable so that a number of persons who were on the streets on
legitimate business, including efforts to discipline others,
including children, were incarcerated along with actual vio53
lators of the law.

This criticism seems to be supported by the number of arrests made
by the police. Between noon and 3 p.m. on Friday, only 33 arrests were
made for riot-related activity. For the next three-hour period, this
number increased to 64, and from 6 p.m. to 9 p.m., 140 arrests were
made for riot-related activity-the largest number of arrests made in
any three-hour period during the entire riot.
Random release of prisoners was as common as random arrests. Even
as late as 8 p.m. on Saturday, the transportation to district stations was
still uncertain, so that police officers continued to release prisoners
if no vehicles were available. The random nature of the arrests reflected neither department policy nor effective police practices. As one
guideline of a police training bulletin puts it:
Mass arrests made by many police in a helter-skelter manner
will serve absolutely no purpose as far as maintaining law
and order is concerned.
Several policemen said that the department had no arrest policy
until Saturday evening, April 6, when the National Guard was available to "secure" certain areas and the police were therefore able to
pursue looters and arsonists more aggressively. One patrolman reported
that he was unable to arrest looters on Friday afternoon because he
had "his hands full protecting himself from objects thrown at him by
the crowds that gathered." The Austin Committee asserts that upon
reporting for duty on April 5, all police personnel were told to "take
aggressive action against all offenders." 54 But one policeman noted:
On the first day, we were told not to bother with the looters
but to protect the firemen. We were not near any stores that
still had merchandise. But we could see the looters carrying
things about V/2 block away.
Another officer observed:
In the first days of the riot most command personnel were
asking us to hold back and not to act, for fear that overt action
would be detrimental to the Department. On the subsequent
days (when most stores had already been burnt out) orders
came down to the effect that we should become aggressive and
now make more arrests-what does one do?
53 AusTIN Co?,anyrEE REaPoT 43.

54 Id. at 38.
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After the disturbances were over, police spoke of the ineffectiveness
of traditional arrest procedures:
Arresting them doesn't seem to help because they don't care
and will do the same thing when the next riot starts. . ..

I

personally no longer have any desire to arrest the looters.
It's been my experience that they beat me out of the court
back onto the street. I believe one good crack on the head
does more good. If you give them a headache they go home
and usually stay there.
This may sound all wrong, but you first must understand
that they have no fear of being arrested or locked up. When
you understand that they do not have the same fear as you
and I you will finally be meeting the problem. Their values
of right and wrong are quite different. Only education will
help them.
Most of these people knew that police would not shoot, but
if deadly force was used-the word gets around. Some of
them would pass by you, and say sarcastically, "We know you
can't shoot, why do you carry the gun"--"The police won't
shoot, so we gonna loot."
Aside from the frustration experienced by officers forced to watch
riot activity without being able to take "aggressive action," the greatest
pressure on the police department was caused by the dramatic increase in the number of arrestees who were processed in certain police
districts. The total number of arrests by the Chicago Police Department
was 6% higher in 1968 than in 1967. The total number of arrests
between March 20, 1968, and April 23, 1968 (the reporting period
during which the Chicago riot occurred) increased 25% over the
number of arrests effected during the comparable period in 1967.
Riot arrests were made in most of the 21 Chicago police districts, but
65% were made in the five districts listed in Table 4.
TABLE 4
NuMBER OF RIOT ARRES.IES BY POLICE DISTRICT or ARREsT

Police District

Number of arrests

3

7

10

11

18

201

188

246

416

172

TOTAL
1,349

Police department arrest reports for the period from March 28,
1968, to April 24, 1968, indicate a dramatic increase in the number
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of arrests handled by these same districts in comparison with the
preceding reporting period (February 29 to March 27). (See Table 5.)
TABLE 5

7

Police District
10

11

18

City-Wide

22%

41%

22%

78%

28%

17%

Per cent increase in
Non-Index Crimes over
previous reporting
period
52%

66%

27%

39%

38%

24%

3
Per cent increase in
Index Crimes over
previous reporting
period*

* Index crimes include homicide, forcible rape, robbery, serious assault, burglary,
theft (over $50), and auto theft. Non-index crimes include less serious offenses.

Much of this increase was registered in the first two days of the riot.
Some districts unable to handle all the arrestees sent them directly to
police headquarters at 11th and State, where magistrates were available
to set bond. Our data indicate that 199 of the 1,856 arrestees for whom
we have relevant information (11%) were taken directly to 11th and
State. The vast majority of the 199 were arrested in the 10th and
l1th police districts, which are immediately adjacent to police headquarters.5 5 The influx of arrestees at llth and State began Friday
evening at 6 p.m., and continued until the middle of Saturday afternoon; the arrival of prisoners caused oveicrowding in the lock-up
facilities, and difficulty in locating arrest records created further delay
in the period between arrest and appearance before a magistrate.
The direct transportation of arrestees to l1th and State eliminated
any chance for "screening" at the district stations to release individuals
known to be responsible members of the community. Although station
adjustments of juveniles continued to be made (both at district stations
and at l1th and State), the influx of emergency personnel made the
arrest procedure more rigid than usual. Officers from other districts
were unable to check out alibis or explanations for a person's presence
or behavior in a particular area. With reference to the arrestees, one
officer concluded: "They lived in the area of the looting but they were
strangers to us as arresting officers."
Not only were traditional police strategies ineffective, but normal
55 It is possible that many more riot arrestees were actually taken to l1th and State
for final police processing after initial processing at local district stations. Initial arrest
reports were our only basis for determining where prisoners were transported after their
arrest.
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indices of police efficiency were not applicable during the riot. The
primary concern of arresting officers was with the restoration of order
and not the "clearance" of reported crimes. Many merchants later
complained that those police officers coming into the area under the
Mobilization Plan were not as assiduous in their law enforcement
duties as were those police normally stationed in the district.5 6
After the disturbances were over, many merchants probably could
not or did not make specific, detailed police reports of lost merchandise. Many of the crimes committed during the riot therefore never
entered police records. And if such entries were made, the number of
arrests and convictions was probably sufficient to cancel out the registered complaints. As a result, no individual officer or detective had to
worry about meeting his quota during the disturbances. The more extreme the riot became, the less relevant were the traditional methods
of measuring police efficiency.
As will become evident in the discussion below, the curfew was a
very effective riot-control device 57 for both the police and the prosecutor. It provided the police with a swift and effective means of removing juveniles from the street 8 and it gave the State's Attorney
a misdemeanor offense which could be quickly tried and which involved a relatively light burden of proof.
B. The Decision to Charge
The initial, and perhaps the most crucial, determination in the criminal justice process is whether to file charges against an arrestee and,
56 General deterioration of district authority is demonstrated by the death of four
black men on the evening of April 5. All four died within the space of three and onehalf hours and within an area of two square blocks on Madison Street. The Austin
Committee reported that all four died as the result of rifle fire directed into stores and
alleys:
None was resisting arrest . . . . Allegedly two police cars containing two to
four white policemen in each car . . . were seen shooting on the level into
stores . . . and . . . the alley in question. AusriN CoMMrrrEE REPORT 36-37.
Such use of deadly force is in direct contradiction of police department policy and
state law on the use of deadly force. The most important element of this tragedy is
the statement by the commander of the Fillmore Police District, where the murders
took place, that neither of the police cars in question was under his authority. In the
confusion of the riot, these policemen were simply "lost" within the deployment of
men under the Mobilization Plan.
57 Although the curfew proclamation was of city-wide scope, it was enforced only in
the riot area. We located the place of arrest of 2,112 riot defendants on a grid constructed of 10 block squares. Sixty-five per cent of non-curfew arrests were made in one
of 28 such areas. Curfew arrests made in those areas, however, account for almost 90%
of the total number of curfew arrests.
58 Even though almost all juvenile arrestees were released on recognizance, they were
usually kept in jail overnight in order to prevent them from being rearrested for curfew violation.
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if so, for what offense. As we have seen, the sudden influx of arrestees
in certain police districts, as well as the arrival of police unfamiliar
with the area and its residents, virtually eliminated any screening of
arrestees at the district stations during the first 24 hours of the riot.
Nevertheless, someone (usually the desk sergeant in conference with the
arresting officer) had to determine the offense with which the arrestee
was to be charged. This decision marked the input boundary of the
criminal justice system for riot arrestees in Cook County.
In many American jurisdictions, the prosecuting attorney screens
arrestees and disposes of doubtful cases. In Los Angeles, for example,
the District Attorney refused to issue felony complaints against 34,000
of 77,000 felony arrestees over a two-year period. 59 In Washington,
D.C., the U.S. Attorney's office "no-papered" 1,300 of the 9,500 felony
and misdemeanor arrests by the Metropolitan Police Department in
1965.60

Under normal conditions in Cook County, however, the police
department performs the preliminary screening role performed elsewhere by the prosecutor. As Oaks and Lehman observe, "the state's
attorney is in the relatively unusual position of having, as a practical
matter in most criminal cases, virtually no discretion in who is to be
charged or what charge is to be filed." 61 The criminal complaint is
prepared by the arresting officer or his supervisors at the district station.
The State's Attorney rarely refuses to proceed on a police-drafted
complaint and intercedes only to achieve the reduction of a felony
charge to a misdemeanor.
During the riot, the normal pattern was broken, as the State's
Attorney's office played a more active role in charging defendants.
His office was deeply involved in the development of contingency plans
for the prosecution of riot arrestees.6 2 On February 19, 1968, the State's
Attorney and William J. Martin, the Assistant State's Attorney who
subsequently directed the prosecution of the April riot cases, attended
a meeting of the National District Attorneys Association Committee
in Chicago. The prosecution of Detroit, Newark, and Los Angeles riot
arrestees was discussed at length. The following day, the Detroit prosecutor met with the State's Attorney's staff to discuss the prosecution of
rioters in more detail. He recommended that misdemeanor, rather
9 Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, TBm CoURTS, THM
PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85, 108 (H. W. Jones ed. 1965).

60 H. SUBIN, CRIMNAL JUSTICE IN A M ErROPOLITAN CouRT 6-7 (1966).
61 OAKS & LEHMAN 28-29.
62 Except where otherwise noted the following discussion of the role of the State's
Attorney in the prosecution of riot cases is based on information in the Austin Committee files.
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than felony, charges be used. He reported that of the more than 7,000
persons arrested during the Detroit riot, only 4,881 were prosecuted.
Of this number, 3,800 were prosecuted for felonies (primarily for
looting) and 1,000 for misdemeanors (primarily for violation of the
governor's curfew order). The Detroit prosecutor noted that felony
charges cluttered trial dockets and imposed heavy evidentiary burdens
on the prosecution (his staff had filled several warehouses with evidence
relating to the felony cases).
On March 22, 1968, command personnel from the Chicago Police
Department met with the Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago
and Mr. Martin to discuss arrest procedures to be used during civil
disorders. On March 26 Mr. Martin addressed command personnel
of the police department on the problem of substantive charges for
riot arrestees. He told the police officials that assistant state's attorneys
would be available during civil disorders to aid in the charge decisions. In particular, it was pointed out that "looting" under Illinois
law requires several elements of proof not necessary to obtain a conviction on the charge of burglary.6 3 Furthermore, it was noted that the
offense of "mob action" 64 required proof that the arrestee was "assembled" or "acting" with at least one other person and that he had
heard a peace officer command him to "withdraw" from the area.
As a result, it was recommended that the charge of disorderly conduct 65
be used instead.
Finally, Mr. Martin advised police personnel to avoid multiple
charging, and, in particular, to avoid mixing misdemeanor and felony
charges, or city and state charges. On April 3, 1968, Mr. Martin met
with the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Judge of the Circuit
Court of Cook County and the Corporation Counsel to suggest additional plans for the processing of arrestees during a riot. The following
day-the day Dr. King was assassinated-the State's Attorney contacted the Clerk of the Circuit Court and suggested the use of special
form complaints, as well as the elimination of personal appearances
in court by arresting officers to file complaints in the case of on-view
arrests during civil disorders.
When the Chicago riot began on the 5th, the State's Attorney's
office mimeographed 60,000 complaints, which incorporated the pertinent language of several Illinois statutes, in order to save time in the
processing of arrestees. Assistant state's attorneys were assigned to cen03 Compare, ILL. REv.

STAT. ch. 38, § 42-1 (1967), with ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 19-1

(1967).
64 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 25-1 (1967).

65 IL.. RE v. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1 (1967).
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*tral police headquarters at 11th and State and the 3rd, 7th, 10th, 1lth
and 18th districts to aid in the charging and processing of arrestees.
The State's Attorney's office performed this service 24 hours a day
through April 7. Virtually none of the riot arrestees was charged
with violation of a city ordinance. As the result of appeals from convictions arising from disturbances in Chicago in 1967, the city disorderly conduct ordinance and part of the state "mob action" statute
had been declared unconstitutional." Although a new city disorderly
conduct ordinance had been enacted, it was not to go into effect until
April 15. After the evening of April 5, it was therefore decided to
charge riot arrestees with violations of the state disorderly conduct
statute, unless more serious charges were required.
At 8 a.m. on Saturday April 6, a meeting was held at 11th and
State. Among those in attendance were an assistant to the mayor, representatives of the State's Attorney's office, the Corporation Counsel,
National Guard officers, and police and detention facility personnel. At
11 a.m., apparently at the behest of those attending this meeting,
Mayor Daley announced the imposition of the curfew. Curfew arrestees also were formally charged with state disorderly conduct. The
curfew did not go into effect, however, until Saturday evening, and
during the period between Saturday morning (when the assistant state's
attorneys began to arrive at the district police stations) and Sunday
night, the office of the State's Attorney continued to exercise considerable influence over the charging of arrestees.
One important consequence of the decision to rely on state statutes
was that the burden of prosecuting riot arrestees fell exclusively on
the State's Attorney's office, rather than the Corporation Counsel.
The Corporation Counsel had been extensively criticized for the bail
and charging policies implemented during earlier mass arrest situations
in Chicago. Shortly before the February meeting of the National
District Attorneys Association in Chicago, a Riot Control Unit was
established in the State's Attorney's office to coordinate riot arrest
preparations and procedure. Chicago Police Department personnel
were assigned to this unit. The State's Attorney later remarked in an
interview that the State's Attorney's office should be the coordinator
of riot control operations because it is the only public office in direct
contact with the variety of public and private bodies concerned with
the problem.
Nevertheless, according to the Administrative Assistant to the Chief
Judge of the Cook County Circuit Court, the Corporation Counsel
undertook to act as a liaison between the State's Attorney's office and
the police, and observed court proceedings as an attorney for the
66 Landrey v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938 (mob action), 968 (disorderly conduct) (1968).
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Police Department. There is some evidence that the Corporation
Counsel exerted pressure for high bond amounts during the first two
67
days of the April disorders.
A second important result, in part, of the inability to prosecute for
violation of city ordinance was a drastic cutback in multiple charging.
In the summer of 1967, there were four minor racial incidents in
Chicago. Taken together these incidents resulted in the arrest and
detention of 166 persons. Eighty-one per cent of the 166 arrestees
were booked on two or more charges. In one incident 49 of the 52
persons arrested were booked on four charges.6 8 The unavailability of
the city disorderly charge, as well as the questionable status of the state
"mob action" statute, made multiple charging much more difficult
during the April disorders in Chicago. Only 11% of the April
arrestees were booked on more than one charge, and almost all of the
multiple-charge defendants were booked on only two charges.
Multiple charging provides the prosecution with a great deal of
leverage in its dealings with the defendant. A defendant charged with
more than one offense will receive a higher bond, resulting in longer
periods of predisposition custody and greater vulnerability to plea
bargaining. The prosecution can obtain high conviction rates by agreeing to drop all charges but one, to which the defendant agrees to
plead guilty. Harsh treatment of a few offenders, as in the 1967 disturbances, might have been intended to prevent small incidents from
escalating into serious disturbances. But, as we have seen, riot activity
on the West Side in April was widespread before large numbers of
arrests were made, thus undermining the basis for an early preventive
or deterrent effect.
Since the city disorderly conduct ordinance was unavailable, the
assistant state's attorneys could not have charged defendants with
multiple offenses unless more severe crimes had been alleged. But the
State's Attorney was intent upon avoiding the high dismissal rates
which were associated with the prosecution of riot felony defendants
in other cities, a result criticized by the Kerner Commission.69 Maxitext at note 124 infra.
68 Data concerning the 1967 mass arrest incidents are based on information gathered
67 See

and supplied to our staff by Mr. Isaac D. Balbus, Assistant Professor of Political Science,
Princeton University, through the cooperation of the Chicago office of the American
Civil Liberties Union. For a comparative study of the response of three different local
criminal court systems, including Chicago's, see Mr. Balbus' forthcoming doctoral dissertation to be filed in the University of Chicago Library. Mr. Balbus' research in
Chicago was undertaken in collaboration with our own; his contribution to our project
included not only the 1967 data but also consultations with our staff throughout the

course of our research.
69 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISoRDERs 184-5 (1968) [all

citations are to the official edition, hereinafter cited as

KERNER CoammsassioN REPORT].
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mum use of misdemeanor charges, as had been suggested by the Detroit
prosecutor, was more likely to result in high rates of conviction because
the evidentiary problems are less severe than in felony cases. Furthermore, by limiting the number of felony complaints the staff of the
State's Attorney's office was free to concentrate on the evidentiary
problems of a smaller number of felony cases. Since assistant state's
attorneys were influencing the charge at the district station, arrestees
on the second and third days of the riot were more frequently charged
according to the evidence possessed by the arresting officer than on the
basis of evidence which might be gathered later. And, as we noted in
Section I, the impact of a large number of riot misdemeanor cases
on already overcrowded court dockets is less severe than the threat of
a large number of felony cases.
Once the curfew was put into effect, the demands of the police for
the restoration of order were met since all those under 21 could be
arrested if they were found outside after 7 p.m. The curfew also
enabled the court system to operate efficiently without the intervention
of the State's Attorney or his assistants since there is no prosecutorial
discretion in a curfew violation. As the Chicago Sun-Times reported,
the curfew was instituted to "quell rioting." 70 Discretion by the arresting officer was nearly eliminated, as the Corporation Counsel announced that there would be "no exceptions" to the enforcement of the
curfew-"even if the person under 21 is accompanied by a parent or
has a job that requires them out after 7 p.m." 7 1 In effect, the widespread use of the curfew arrest returned control of the city streets exclusively to the police department. Even though the Austin Committee
concluded that by "late in the morning and during the afternoon of
April 7, it became increasingly apparent that relative calm was being
restored to the city," 72 police personnel made nearly 800 arrests after
that time, 60%, of which were for curfew violations. Although there
is some doubt that the subsequent curfew arrests were necessary for
the maintenance of order, court authorities apparently did not discourage mass curfew arrests, probably because curfew cases had a minor
impact on the court system. Since evidence of age and of time of
arrest were the only relevant factors, these cases could be easily disposed of on the merits.
The large number of curfew arrestees obviously affected the aggregate age and employment status statistics of riot arrestees in general.
Identifiable characteristics of the arrest population are discussed in the
next section.
70 Chicago Sun-Times, April 7, 1968, at 4 (four star edition).
71 Id. at 60.

72 AusnN CommrrE_

REPORT 18.

III. CHARA=CRISTICS OF THE RIOT ARRESTEES
The Austin Committee found that "participation in the riots and
disorders was limited to a small fraction of the city's total population,
to a small fraction of the city's black population and to a small minority of the residents of the immediately affected areas." 73 In this
section, we examine the characteristics of those adults (males 17 years
or older, females 18 or older) who were arrested for riot-connected
offenses. Our data are derived from court and police records of 2,189
adults processed through the Municipal Department. We have no
demographic information on the approximately 900 juveniles who were
arrested during the riot.
Detailed data on the characteristics of the adult arrest population
are presented in Table 6. Our data indicate that 94%/ of the adult
riot arrestees were black, and 92%/ were male. The median age of
arrestees was 20; 70%y were 25 years old or younger; 57% were employed, 29% unemployed, and 11% in school. Two-fifths were unskilled laborers, 15%o were semi-skilled; 38%/ were born in Cook
County and another 5%/ elsewhere in Illinois. Half were born in the
South-250 in Mississippi, 8%0 in Arkansas, 6% in Alabama, and
13% in the twelve other southern states. Only 29% had been arrested
before; 17%/ had previous misdemeanor arrests and 20% had a felony
arrest record. Seventeen per cent had previous convictions; 10% had
been convicted more than once.
These data must be interpreted cautiously. Much of the information
is based on police-recorded responses on arrest records. In a significant

number of cases, data on employment status, occupation, and state of
birth were not recorded. Occupation data represent our classification of
widely differing terminology employed by police personnel. Data on
prior criminal records are taken from prior arrest forms maintained
by the Police Department. It is possible that the tabulation understates the number with criminal records because prior arrest records
were not available for all defendants.
Comparable data about riot arrestees in Washington, D. C. in
April 1968 and Detroit in August 1967 indicate that the Chicago
arrestees were younger, more often unemployed, and less often had
prior criminal records. Summary comparative data are presented in
Table 7.
These data are useful only for the most general comparisons. It is
probably true, as these figures suggest, that there were differences in
73 AusTIN COMMNrrEE REPORT

3.
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TABLE 6
CnARActERisTxcs or ADULT ARREsTEES
Sex
Male
Female

Age

%
92
8

Number= 2128
Race

%

Black
White
Other

94
5
1

Place of Birth

%

13
17
18
15
19
12
11
20
21-25
19
26-30
12
8
31-35
4
36-40
5
41-50
2
over 50
Number= 2027

Number= 2042

Illinois
Cook County
Elsewhere in Illinois
South
Mississippi
Arkansas
Alabama
Tennessee
Louisiana
Missouri
Other
Other
Number= 1998

Employment Status

Occupation
Professional
Clerical, Sales
Community Service Worker
Craftsman
Semi-skilled
Service
Household Service
Unskilled
Other
"Other" employment status
Unemployed and no
occupation recorded

Employed
Unemployed
Other
Student
Military
Housewife
Other
Number= 1947

Number= 1883
Prior Criminal Record
Number of Prior Total
%%
Arrests/Convictions*
None or
no record
1
2-3
4-5
6-10
11 or more
Number=

71
9
9
5
4
2
2189

City
Ordinance

Prior
Convictions

83
8
6
2

97
2
1
-

83
7
6
2

1
2189

2189

Felony

Misdemeanor
%

80
8
7
3
1

1
2189

-

1
I
2189

* The first four columns refer to percentage figures for prior arrests and the fifth
column refers to percentage figures for prior convictions.

the characteristics of riot participants in each city. But there are also
differences among the population in the riot areas in each city which
are undoubtedly reflected in the composition of the arrested group.
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TABLE 7
CHARAcrEISTICS OF ADULT RIOT

Race
White
Black
Other

ARRESTEES: CHICAGO,

'WASHINGTON,

DETor

ChicagoApril 1968

WashingtonApril 1968a

%

%

%

2
98

10
90

5
94
1
Number= 2042

DetroitJuly 1967b

--

775

= 5967

92
8
Number= 2128

= 793

= 5967

51
19
12
8
4
5
2
Number= 2027

= 855

-

sex
Male
Female
Age
Under 21
21-25
26-30
31-35
36-40
41-50
over 50
Employment Statuse
Employed
Unemployed
Student
Other

57
29
11
3
Number= 1947

82
11
5
2

10
7
31
52
Numnber= 1502

16

5967

80
20
n.a.
n.a.
= 837

-

995

Occupation Typed
White Collar
Skilled
Semi-skilled
Unskilled
Place of Birthe
In-State
South
Other

43
52
5
Number= 1998

Prior Criminal Recordf

I

10
11
29
50

84

= Unknown

=693

36
59
6
= Unknown

= 798

%

No Prior Arrests
71
No Prior
Misdemeanor Arrests
No Prior
Felony Arrests
80
Number= 2189

51t
n.a.
n.a.
= 852

79*

=

79**
t
Unknown
865
** 876
*
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TABLE 7 (continued)
a Data in this table concerning the April 1968 Washington arrestees are taken from
TEN BLOCKS FROM THE WHITE HOUSE 226-35 (B. Gilbert ed. 1968).
b Data in this table concerning the August 1967 Detroit arrestees were drawn, except
as otherwise indicated, from a report of the Detroit Police Department published in
J. LINCOLN, THE ANATOMY OF A RIOT 128-30 (1968).
a Some modification of the source table for the Washington 1968 arrestees was necessary to conform to the format of the Chicago study; see Gilbert, supra note a. The
estimate for the 1967 Detroit riot is based on a survey of Detroit riot arrestees incarcerated in the Southern Michigan State Prison. See Colista & Domonkos, Bail and Civil
Disorder, 45 J. URBAN LAw 815, 832 Table 6 (1968).
d The figures given in this category for the 1968 Washington arrestees were compiled
from the same table as were those in the previous category; see note c supra. The data
in this category for Detroit, 1967, were drawn from Fogelson & Hill, Who Riots? A Study
of Participationin the 1967 Riots, in SurriM NTAL STUmS ro THE NATIONAL ADVISORY
CorMissioNor
CvIL DISOPDERS 219, Table 7 at 236. The source did not include numerical totals.
e The percentages in this category for Detroit, 1967, were taken from Fogelson & Hill,
supra note d, Table 6 at 235. No numerical figure was available.
f The prior arrest records for the 1968 Washington riot arrestees were not reported
in terms comparable to the felony-misdemeanor classification employed in the Chicago
study. See Gilbert, supra note a at 233. The percentages for the Detroit, 1967, arrestees
were taken from

KnP.NER COMMISSION

REPORT 190 n.17;

Colista & Domonkos, supra

note c, Tables 12, 13 at 834.

Even more significantly, there were differences in arrest and charging
policies in each city. The Chicago curfew applied only to those under
21, while Detroit and Washington had curfews applicable to the entire
population. Our data suggest, however, that the high proportion of
young arrestees in Chicago, in comparison with Washington and
Detroit, does not fully account for the relatively small number of employed persons or persons with no prior arrests among Chicago
arrestees.7 4

Our own data on Chicago arrestees shed some light on the arrest
process during the riot. The preponderance of arrests occurred on the
street, or in or around stores, and relatively near the arrestee's home.
More than a third were unaccompanied when arrested, and another
45% were arrested in groups of five or less. To be more specific, of
2,058 arrestees for whom police arrest records show the nature of the
arrest premises, 32% were arrested at stores, 60% on the street, 5% at
residences, and only 1% in automobiles. Of 1,960 arrestees for whom
home address and arrest location are recorded, nearly 30% were ar74 Assuming that the proportion of arrestees in each age group who are employed or
have no prior criminal record is the same in Washington and Detroit as in Chicago, the
different age distribution of arrestees in the former two cities accounts for less than half
the difference between those dties and Chicago in the incidence of prior arrests, and for
less than one-third the difference in employment status statistics,
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rested within two blocks, 50% within five blocks, 65% within ten
blocks, and 77% within twenty blocks of their homes.7 5 Of 1,832 for
whom information is available, 35% were arrested alone, 20% with
one other person, 12% with two others, 13% with three or four others,
and 19% in groups of more than five.
In the preceding section we presented data on the time of arrest for
those charged with various offenses. It is also possible to compare other
characteristics of suspects arrested at different stages of the riot. Table 8
shows the percentage of those arrested during each stage of the riot
who had prior arrest records. A significantly higher percentage of those
arrested Friday night and Saturday had prior arrest records, in each
charge category, than did those arrested early in the riot or on Sunday.
Except for arrests on property misdemeanor charges (of which there
were only 14 after Sunday), the percentage with prior arrest records
peaked duing this early period of the riot. Table 8 also demonstrates
that the proportion of arrestees with prior criminal records varies directly with the severity of the charge.
It is possible, however, that the relatively large number of persons
with prior arrest records arrested on Friday night and Saturday merely
reflects different demographic groups arrested during each time period.
Table 9 shows, for example, that persons under 21 constituted an
increasing proportion of the arrest population over the riot period,
while the percentage of the arrest population comprised of persons over
21 generally declined. And Table 10 demonstrates that the proportion
of arrestees who were employed peaked on Friday night and Saturday,
while the proportion of student arrestees gradually increased over the
75 We also computed data on this variable for selected charge categories. The results

are as follows:
Distance
from

Property

Prop-

Misdemeanors

erty
Felonies

Home to
Arrest

All
Charges

Curfew

Disorderly

0-5 blocks
6-20 blocks

50%
27

57%
23

45%
30

48%
23

45%
34

55%
21

23
100%

20
100%

25
100%

30

22

25

100%

100%

546

414

128

499

100%
189

Multiple
Charges

Over 20
blocks
Number =

1960

As might be expected, a greater proportion of curfew arrests occurred within 5 blocks of
home than did arrests for other charges. Less expected is the relatively high percentage

of property felony arrests within 20 blocks of the arrestees' homes.
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TABLE 8
PRIOR ARREST RECORDS BY TimE OF ARREST FOR VARIOUS CHARGES
Per Cent of Those Arrested Who Had Prior
Arrest Records

6 pm
FridayMidnight
Saturday

Charge

7 pm
Thursday6 pm
Friday
-

Curfew (555)

25%

Sunday
3%

After
Sunday

Total

17%

15%

Disorderly conduct

(415)

7%

Property misdemeanors
(125)
Property felonies (517)
Multiple charges (193)
Total-all charge
categories (1975)

48

16

23

33

27
38
47

46
48
51

30
25

50
25
24

40
42
38

23

46

15

20

31

riot period. 6 The pattern of arrests over time is undoubtedly attributable in part to the curfew proclamation which went into effect on
Saturday.
But the large number of persons with prior criminal records arrested
during the peak riot period cannot simply be attributed to their age
TABLE 9
AGE BY TIME OF ARREST
Age (in years)
Under 21
21-25
26-35
Over 35
Number

-

7 pm Thursday6 pm Friday

6 pm FridayMidnight Sat.

Sunday

After
Sunday

30%
27
24
19

37%
24
28
11

56%
18
15
11

71%
11
10
7

100%
135

100%
877

100%
378

100%
585

and employment status. Although only 20% of the student arrestees
had prior criminal records in comparison to 35% of the employed
arrestees, 32% of the unemployed arrestees also had a prior arrest
76 Even when we controlled for age we found that the percentage of arrestees who
were employed was generally greater during the peak riot period than during earlier and
later phases. This may, in part, reflect the fact that the riot peak occurred over a weekend when employed persons were more likely not to be working. But the gradual increase
in proportion of student arrests over the riot period primarily reflects the increased proportion of arrestees who were under 21 during the later stages of the riot.
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history.77 And, as Table 11 demonstrates, the percentage of arrestees
with prior arrests is substantially higher during the peak riot period
in each age category than during earlier or later phases of the riot.
TABLE 10
EMPLOYMENT STATUS BY TIME OF ARREST

7 pm Thursday6 pm Friday

6 pm FridayMidnight Sat.

Sunday

After
Sunday

Employed
Unemployed
Student

51%
37
7

65%
25
7

51%
35
11

52%
29
18

Number

95%"
123

97%
842

97%
355

99%
570

Employment
status

* Totals do not equal 100% because those whose employment status was "other" are
omitted.
TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE OF ARREsTEES wrrH PRIOR ARREST RECORDS BY AGE AND

Age (in years)
Under 21
21-25
26-35
Over 35

TIME

OF ARREST

7 pm Thursday6 pm Friday

6 pm FridayMidnight Sat.

Sunday

After
Sunday

33%
24
16
15

38%
51
53
47

9%
21
28
12

20%
24
23
14

These data show that the police were apprehending different groups
of the population at different times during the riot. As the previous
section indicated, however, there was no planned police arrest policy;
to the contrary, arrests tended to be random. It can be hypothesized,
therefore, that the characteristics of the participants in those activities
which led to arrest-whether in a crowd on the street, in or near a
store which was being or had been looted, or simply near a police
officer in the riot areas-changed over time. Indeed, the Austin Committee suggested that this was the case:
Especially during the first hours of the disorders on April 5
the followers of ["a relatively small number of so-called
'natural leaders' "] were predominantly young people. Later
on April 5 and on April 678many older residents of the riot
areas joined in the looting.
Nothing in our arrest data disproves this finding.
77 Only 14% of those arrestees for whom no employment status information was available had prior criminal records, which suggests that many of those persons may have
been students. If this inference is correct our data on employment status may understate
the proportion of student arrestees.
78 AUSTIN COuMITrEE REPORT 3.
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Our primary concern, however, is not with hypotheses about the
characteristics of riot participants based on arrest data. Rather, it is
with what happened to those who became involved in the criminal
justice process. It is unclear how many of those arrested actually
participated in the riot, and whether those arrested were typical of the
riot participants. But the characteristics of the riot arrest population
are obviously important in assessing the character of the criminal
process. We will consequently be dealing in later sections with many
of these characteristics, as they affected bail, time spent in pretrial detention, formal disposition, and sentencing.
The fact of arrest during the riot resulted in hardship to arresteesoften including incarceration for prolonged periods before trial in
inadequate detention facilities. Some of those thus punished were obviously guilty of criminal acts; but others were not. The bail policies
implemented during the April disorders constituted the primary sanction of the criminal process for many arrestees. In the next section we
shall explore those policies and their consequences in some detail.

IV.

POST-ARREST DETENTION AND BAIL

Most adults arrested during the April disorders were booked by police officers at district stations, and then transported to the temporary
detention facilities at l1th and State Streets, central headquarters of
the Chicago Police Department and location of the courtrooms of the
Cook County Circuit Court, First District, Municipal Division. Over
200 adult arrestees, however, were transported directly from the site of
arrest to 11th and State to be booked by police.
The temporary detention facilities at 11th and State rapidly became overcrowded as prisoners were brought in from police district
stations and awaited preliminary examinations and bailsetting. Consequently, as the First Assistant Public Defender of Cook County acknowledged, in many instances it was necessary "to speed up [the
preliminary examination] so that they could then be moved from l1th
79
and State out of that building to make room for the next prisoners."
The overcrowding at l1th and State, and hurried bond hearings,
could have been avoided. The Circuit Court of Cook County made
inadequate use of existing judicial personnel and courtroom space.
Although, effective April 5, Chief Judge Boyle designated 14 courtrooms at 26th and California for emergency bond hearings, few were
ever used.s0 On the evening of April 5, only four courtrooms were
open for bond hearings at 11th and State, one of them for juveniles.8 '
After the Mayor's Emergency Proclamation instituting the riot curfew
was announced at 11 a.m., April 6, two additional bond courts were
opened at 26th and California in the Criminal Court Building.8 2
But less than 50 defendants were transported from l1th and State to
26th and California for bond hearings on Saturday evening and Sunday
morning.8 3 Thus, throughout the disturbances adult bond hearings
were confined overwhelmingly to three courts sitting in approximately
eight hour shifts at l1th and State.
On April 5, Chief Judge Boyle assigned all judges, associate judges,
79 Open Meeting Before the Illinois State Advisory Committee to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights 218, 223 (June 12, 1968) (Testimony of Thomas Cawley)
[hereinafter cited as Cawley Testimony].
80 Special Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 68-37 (1968); see also AUSTIN
COM~rIrEE REPORT 87.

81 AUSTIN Comm=rrr REPORT 85.
82 Id. at 87.
83 The Administrative Assistant to Judge Boyle noted that few cases were heard at 26th
and California on April 6. Austin Committee files.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:455'

and magistrates of the Circuit Court to the Juvenile Division as a precautionary measure.8 4 But only magistrates were in fact assigned to
bond courts. According to Boyle's Administrative Assistant, magistrates
rather than judges were assigned because they had experience in
setting bond and conducting preliminary examinations, were generally
younger, and had the physical stamina to handle mass arrest cases.8 5
Twenty magistrates of the Cook County Circuit Court conducted over
90% of the initial bond hearings for approximately 2,200 adult defendants.
The Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure requires that a person
arrested without a warrant be taken "without unnecessary delay" before the "nearest and most accessible" judge where he shall be informed
of the charge against him and admitted to bail in accordance with
law.8 6 Persons charged with non-capital offenses must be admitted to
reasonable bail.8 7 The Code of Criminal Procedure provides that the
amount of bail shall be:
(1) Sufficient to assure compliance with the conditions set forth in
the bail bond;
(2) Not oppressive;
(3) Commensurate with the nature of the offense charged;
(4) Considerate of the past criminal acts and conduct of the defendant;
(5) Considerate of the financial ability of the accused. 8
Bail for a misdemeanor punishable by fine only cannot exceed twice
the amount of the maximum penalty.8 9 Thus, for state disorderly conduct-with which curfew violators, as well as those arrested for disorderly conduct, were charged-maximum bail under this provision is
1,000.90
Illinois has a 10% cash deposit provision. A defendant may obtain
his release by executing a bail bond and depositing 10% of the amount
84 Special Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 68-32 (1968).
85 Austin Committee files. It is also possible that magistrates, rather than judges, were
chosen for court duty during the bond hearings because magistrates in Chicago are less
politically independent than judges. Unlike judges, for example, magistrates are reappointed annually. See text and notes at notes 22-80 supra.
86

ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (1967).

§ 7; ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-4 (1967); People ex rel. Smith
v. Blaylock, 357 MI1.23, 191 N.E. 206 (1934).
88 ILL. REv . STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1967).
89 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110(b) (1967).
90 "A person commits disorderly conduct when he knowingly does any act in such unreasonable manner as to alarm or disturb another and to provoke a breach of the peace."
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1(a)(1) (1967). "A person convicted of violation of subsection
26-1(a)(1) . . . shall be fined not to exceed $500." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 26-1(b) (1967).
87 ILL. CONsr. art. II,
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of his bail with the clerk of the court. 91 Alternatively, he may secure
92
his bond by offering stocks, bonds, or real estate in the full amount.
Any sheriff or other peace officer may accept bail set by a judicial
officer for a particular offender or offense. 93
The Code of Criminal Procedure encourages the use of release on
recognizance, in lieu of the setting of a cash bond:
When from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion
that the accused will appear as required . .

.

. the accused

may be released on his own recognizance.9 4
This provision is to be "liberally construed to effectuate the purpose
of relying upon criminal sanctions instead of financial loss to assure
the appearance of the accused." 95
In addition, the Supreme Court of Illinois is authorized by statute
to prescribe a uniform schedule of amounts of bail for specified misdemeanor and other cases by rule or order of the court. The 10%
cash deposit provision need not apply to bail amounts established in
accordance with uniform schedules for misdemeanors punishable by
a fine only.9 0
Pursuant to that authorization the Supreme Court has adopted bail
schedules applicable to offenses with which many riot arrestees were
charged. Under Rule 528, bail for misdemeanors punishable by fine
only "shall be $50 cash," except for disorderly conduct, for which bail
"shall be $25 cash." 97 The 10% provision does not apply to these
amounts. 98 Bail for misdemeanors punishable by fine or imprisonment
in a penal institution other than the penitentiary, or both, is set at
$1,000, to which the 10% provision is applicable. 90 Any police officer
or designated deputy sheriff or circuit court clerk is authorized to accept cash bail under the preset schedules. 00
The preset bail schedules do not apply to arrests on warrant, or
where an offender is brought before a judge.' 0 ' The schedules were
intended to "avoid undue delay in freeing certain offenders when, because of the hour or the circumstances, it is not practicable to bring an
91 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7(a) (1967).

92 Id. § 110-8.
93 Id. § 110-9.
94 Id. § 110-2.
95 Id.

98 Id. § 110-15.
97 Id. cl. 110A, § 528(b) (1967) (Supreme Court Rule 528(b)).
98 Id. § 530 (1967) (Supreme Court Rule 530).
99 Id. §§ 528(c), 530 (1967) (Supreme Court Rules 528(c), 530).
100 ILL. REv. STAT. cl. 16, § 81 (1967).
101 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10A, note following § 525 (Smith-Hurd 1968).
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offender before a judge." 10 2 Whether or not it is "practicable," under
any given circumstances, to bring an offender before a judge is, according to the draftsmen's comments, "a matter of judgment for the
arresting officer."' 03 The defendant always has the right, however, to
insist upon being brought before a judge for a bail hearing.10 4
A. Bail Policies During the April Civil Disorder
The preset bail schedules were not used at any time during the
April disorders. Indeed, 35% of those charged with disorderly conduct
(including those arrested for curfew violation) had bail set above $250.
Over half those charged with misdemeanors for which preset bail of
$1,000 is established by the schedules (resisting arrest, misdemeanors
against a person, and misdemeanors against property) had bail set at
a higher amount.
The statutory authorization of release on the defendant's own recognizance was initially applied in only one-quarter of the riot arrest
cases, although over half of the riot arrestees were charged with a
single misdemeanor. And in a few disorderly conduct cases, bail was
set above the statutory limit of $1,000.
Bail policies during the April riot in Chicago, however, were more
lenient than they had been during earlier mass arrest incidents in the
city and than they were in cities where riots occurred in the summer of
1967. Bail amounts set for felony arrestees were not higher on the
average than they normally are. 105 In fact, our data indicate that the
median bail amount for property felonies (primarily burglary charges)
was $3,830, compared with a normal average bail of $4,300 for burglary.10 6 Median bail for riot property misdemeanors, most of which
102 Id.
103 Id. (Committee comments).
104 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16, § 83 (1967).
105 Comparison with normal bond amounts is hazardous because riot arrestees undoubtedly include a much higher percentage of persons without prior criminal records than
normal arrestees.
In 1962, an American Bar Foundation survey found that 78% of initial bonds in a
sample of 249 felony cases were set at $5,000 or more, and that 64% of these bonds remained at $5,000 after reduction hearings. Kamin, Bail Administration in Illinois, 53
ILL. B.J. 674, 686 (1965). A 1954 survey of 118 felony cases revealed that 75% of the initial
bonds and 52% of the final bonds were $5,000 or more. Kamin, supra at 686. The Chicago
Citizens' Committee for Employment survey of 239 defendants awaiting trial in Cook
County Jail in 1964 revealed that 69% had initial bonds set at $1,000 or more. C. O'Reilly
& J. Flanagan, MEN IN DETENTION: A STUDY OF CRITERIA FOR THE RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE OF PEasoNS IN DETENTION 4 (1967). A 1965 survey of 54 persons in jail showed that
74% had bonds set at $1,000 or more. Id. at 7. It should be noted that the surveys discussed above do not include any persons with recognizance bonds,
106 The Roger Baldwin Foundation of the American Civil Liberties Union, Preliminary
Report and Evaluation on the Bail Procedures in Chicago's Looting Cases-Winter, 1967
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were petty theft charges, was $2,430, compared with a normal average
of $1,500 for petty theft. 07 Higher bail than normal was used for
relatively minor misdemeanors. Median bail for arrestees charged with
disorderly conduct was $770, more than three times the normal
8
amount.10
Data are available on bail policies during seven mass arrest incidents
in Chicago in the two years prior to the April 1968 riots. For arrestees
from the earliest incidents during the summer of 1966 in the West
Side ghetto and the Division Street Puerto Rican community, bail was
generally set at $250 or $400 on misdemeanor charges, and $5,000 or
$7,500 on burglary charges. 0 9 Most defendants secured release on
bond."10
By contrast, high bail was utilized in January 1967, when approximately 250 persons, mostly residents of the West Side, were arrested
for looting during a crippling snowstorm. According to the American
Civil Liberties Union, 10% bail deposit requirements averaged $1,400
in these cases; I ' the Chicago Daily News reported that bond was
$20,000 in three-fifths of the cases. 112 These amounts were substantially
higher than those normally set by the Circuit Municipal Court. Most
of those arrested were unable to make bail; many were held in jail
for more than three weeks."18 After indictments were obtained, the
Criminal Division redetermined bail. Bond was reduced to amounts
which most defendants were able to make. One ACLU attorney concluded that, since the same bond rules were applied by the Criminal
Division and the Municipal Division, "the inference is clear that the
imposition of bail in the first instance was erroneous and excessive.""u 4
In the summer of 1967, a high bail policy was again utilized during
four separate incidents on the South Side. During these disturbances,
166 persons were arrested. Their average bail was over $9,600; 38%
were held on $5,000 bail, requiring a $500 deposit for release. Many
were kept in jail for substantial periods before trial, although most of
the cases were tried within 10 to 14 days after arrest.
Illinois Special Legal Project 7 (August 1967) [hereinafter cited as ACLU Snowstorm
Arrest Study].
107 Id.

108 John Stamos, State's Attorney during the disorders, noted that normal bail for disorderly conduct was $250. Austin Committee files.
109 See note 68 supra.
110 Open Meetings Before the Illinois State Advisory Committee to the United States
Commission on Civil Rights 178 (June 12, 1968) (testimony of Jay Miller).
Ill ACLU Snowstorm Arrest Study 2.
112 Chicago Daily News, February 9, 1967, at 2.
118 ACLU Snowstorm Arrest Study 3.
114 Id. at 4.
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These defendants, it should be noted, were not charged with felonies; for the most part, they were charged with multiple misdemeanors. Nonetheless, the proportion of defendants unable to make bail
was as high as the normal rate among felony defendants. Seventy-three
per cent of those arrested during the summer incidents never made
bond;" 5 in 1962, 75% of a sample of 231 felony defendants in Cook
County were unable to make bond."16 In 1964, 60% of a sample of
felony defendants did not make bond before trial. 117
The Kerner Commission had criticized the use of high bonds in
those cities where riots occurred in 1967.118 At the meeting of the
National District Attorney's Association in Chicago in February 1968,
prosecutors from these cities recommended that bail be set at normal
levels during a riot.119 The State's Attorney's office in Cook County
apparently accepted this advice. After the April riot, the State's Attorney testified that he established limits for bond amount recommendation of $10,000 for arson, $5,000 for burglary, $2,500 for grand theft
120
and serious misdemeanors, and $1,000 for state disorderly conduct.
Recommendation of lower bonds than those used in previous mass
arrest incidents also reflected local conditions. The Chicago office of
the ACLU had severely criticized the earlier high bail policy. In addition, jail facilities were limited; 121 massive numbers of arrestees could
not be detained for long periods, while detention of arrestees for
several days during a riot could be obtained without setting bonds so
high that they would appear obviously excessive. Despite the statement
of one magistrate that $100 cash bail today is as easy to put as $25
some years ago, 122 a significant number of riot arrestees had difficulty
posting $100 cash. In the April riot, unlike earlier mass arrest incidents, prosecutions were for violation of state laws rather than municipal ordinances. 123 The City of Chicago Corporation Counsel, who
124
nevertheless urged the use of high bail during the April disorders,
had no formal control over the prosecution of riot arrestees. Finally,
on March 26 the State's Attorney's office notified police personnel
115 See note 68 supra.
116 Kamin, supra note 105, at 681, 685.
117 Id. at 674, 681.
118 KEPNER COMMISSION REPORT 185, 195.
119 Memorandum from William J. Martin, Assistant State's Attorney, to John J. Stamos,
State's Attorney of Cook County, February 20, 1968.
120 Austin Committee files.
121 See text at notes 162-9 infra.
122 Austin Committee files.
123 AusTIN ComImrrr

REPORT 92.

124 See A. Platt, The Administration of Justice in Crisis: Chicago, April 1968, at 7
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Platt Report].
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not to use multiple charging which in earlier incidents had been used
25
to justify high bonds.
The effect of the bond policy used during the riot was the temporary detention of many riot arrestees. Bail amounts were set high
enough to detain 42% of those arrested for three days or longer in
overcrowded detention facilities. On April 14, almost a week after the
riot ended, one-fifth of those arrested remained in custody in Cook
County Jail or the City of Chicago House of Correction. 1 26 By June
12, 60 defendants still were in custody in the County Jail;127 by
28

July 3, 40 remained.1

The use of bond amounts for detention is suggested by the remarks
of the authorities themselves. An Administrative Assistant in the
Cook County Circuit Court stated in a June interview that being held
129
in jail for a week during an emergency "is not such a great tragedy."'
One magistrate in an interview frankly admitted that the "spirit" behind the setting of bonds was one of preventive detention especially
during early hours of the riot: "by that I mean to say that the idea
was clearly to get as many people off the street as possible."' 30 Another admitted to being consciously more harsh in setting bonds during the disorders than he would have been in normal circumstances,
believing that policy helped "squelch the riots."' 31 A third magistrate
expressly resolved any doubts in favor of higher bond, since people
would otherwise go back into the streets. 132 At least one magistrate,
purportedly concerned with the defendant's safety as well as public
order, also was expressly less "liberal" than usual in releasing juveniles,
especially when no responsible adult relative was present. 133
One magistrate remarked that high bonds are "exemplary" to people in the neighborhood, and another noted that low bonds or ROR
would have "amounted to a mere slap on the wrist."' 34 A magistrate
who felt that charging minors with state disorderly conduct for violating the Mayor's curfew proclamation was unauthorized, still admittedly
detained curfew violators overnight and set $1,000 bonds on 41 of
125 Interview with William J. Martin, April 26, 1969.
126 AUsTiN CoNirrrEE REPORT 20.
127 Open Meeting Before the Illinois State Advisory Committee to the United States

Commission on Civil Rights 207 (June 12, 1968) (testimony of Winston Moore) [hereinafter cited as Moore Testimony].
128 AUSTIN CoMsirrrEE REPORT note at 20.
129 Austin Committee files.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
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the 182 curfew defendants he processed. The following is taken from
the transcript of one of the bond hearings, for a group or four persons arrested on curfew charges on the evenings of April 7, at which
he presided:
The Court: Now, gentleman, I want you to understand I am not
conducting a hearing as to the guilt or innocence of
the charge which is disorderly conduct based on violation of curfew. This proceeding is solely for the purpose of setting bond so that you may avail yourself of
the bond if you can make it. Because of the situation
which we have, I am setting a bond of $1,000 which
means that if you pay $100, you can be released on
bond, but you will have a hearing tomorrow morning
in branch 57.
This violation is based on an order, executive order,
which was issued two days ago. There is no reason
why you fellows should not have complied with it. It
pains me to set a bond of $1,000 for you guys because
it means that you will have to be in jail until your
hearing, but I don't have any choice because of the
terrible situation that prevails in our city.
On the afternoon of the 6th, after the special riot curfew had been
proclaimed but before it went into effect, Chief Judge Boyle suggested
that magistrates release as many curfew violators as possible on their
own recognizance. 3 5 Seventy-one per cent of the curfew violators were
initially released on their own recognizance. However, even those released on recognizance bonds were detained in jail overnight. According to judicial authorities, release at night was impossible because such
persons would have been picked up again for curfew violation as
soon as they were released. 3 6
Only 8% of non-curfew arrestees were initially released on ROR.
The unwillingness to release these defendants on ROR bonds extended predisposition custody. Ninety-five per cent of those given
ROR bonds were released the same day they were arrested or the following day, but over 20% of those required to put up only $25 cash
were not released until after they had spent at least two days in jail.
Over 85% of those with bond set over $250 spent three or more days
in jail before disposition of their case. Table 12 shows that length of
predisposition custody varied directly with amount of bond set.
135 AusTIN Cofmm
13a Id.-

REPORT 87.
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TABLE 12
LENGTH OF PREDISPOSITION CUSTODY BY AMouNT OF BAIL INITIALLY SET"

Predisposition
Custody
(in days)b
0-2
3-10
11-30
Over 30
Number of
Cases

Released
Without
Bail

$26-50

1
2

79
8
6
6

67
17
7
9

61
21
9
9

41
21
18
21

16
25
29
30

9
26
26
39

58
15
13
14

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

(494)

(170)

(123)

(406)

(256)

(452)

(54)

(2075)

96
d

$51-100

Over
$500

$1-25

$101-250 $251-500

Totalo

a The actual amount of bail is ten times the indicated cash deposit amount.
b The length of predisposition custody measures the number of days elapsed between
arrest and release. A person arrested at 10 p.m. and released at 2 a.m. is, therefore, credited
with one day of custody.
a Includes 120 cases where bond amount information was unavailable.
d Less than
of 1%.

Even when a defendant had sufficient cash in his possession at the
time of arrest to post bail he was denied the opportunity to post it at
l1th and State, where most bond hearings were held.137 Instead, he
remained in custody until he was transported to the County Jail,
where, often many hours later, he was allowed to post bail.138 According to judicial personnel, this policy was followed, despite statutory
authorization for the clerk of the bond court to receive cash bail, for
security reasons. Authorities were convinced that security protection
would falter if defendants were released near central police headquarters. 39
Bail payment procedures were confused. According to the Austin
Committee, there was "extensive delay (in some cases amounting to a
day or more)"' 40 between the time when relatives or friends appeared
to post bond and the prisoner's release. These delays, it should be
noted, do not show up in our data on predisposition custody, which
measure only the time from arrest to the posting of bail.
The requirement that many defendants, including a significant number of those charged only with minor offenses, post cash bail caused
hardship even for those who did succeed in raising the cash deposit
amount. Incarceration as the result of a riot arrest affected the employment of many riot arrestees, if the few we questioned on the subject
137 Id.; Platt Report 27.
138 Id.

139 Platt Report 27, 28.
140 AUsTIN CommITEr-

REPORT

91.
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are a representative sample. 141 And incarceration during the riot was
a harsh form of punishment, as will be seen later in this section.
B. Data on Initial Bail Determination

Bond amounts for riot arrestees varied with charge, with time of
arrest, and with the magistrate who presided at the bail hearing. Of
these factors, the seriousness 'of the charge is by far the most important.
As Table 13 shows, bond amounts varied widely by charge; those with
more serious charges against them were far less often released on their
own recognizance and far more often required to post substantial cash
bail amounts. Seventy-one per cent of those charged with curfew violation and 20% of those charged with disorderly conduct were released
on their own recognizance, but only 2% of those arrested on property
misdemeanors or felonies and only 4% of those charged with multiple
offenses were so released. Only 4% of those charged with disorderly
conduct had bonds set over $1,000, but 65% of those charged with
property misdemeanors, 68% charged with multiple offenses, and 86%
of those charged with property felonies did.
Of the 504 recognizance bonds, three-fourths were for curfew charges
and another 16% were for disorderly conduct. A majority of the cases
in which bond amounts between $250 and $1,000 were set involved
curfew or disorderly conduct charges. Three-fourths of all bonds of
$1,000 or less were given to curfew and disorderly defendants. On the
other hand, with the exception of property misdemeanors, bonds over
$1,000 were given almost exclusively to those charged with felonies.
As a result, length of detention prior to the disposition of an arrestee's case differed considerably by charge. As Table 14 shows, only
6% of the curfew arrestees spent four or more days in jail before the
disposition of their cases, while 52% of those arrested for property misdemeanor, and 64% of those arrested for property felonies spent at
least four days in jail before disposition of their cases in the Municipal Division.

14 2

Bond amounts were also apparently affected by the extent of riot
activity on the streets. 143 While the patterns are influenced by the
policies of particular magistrates who set bail at different periods during the riot, Table 15 suggests that among curfew arrestees bonds were
more apt to be used after the peak riot period. Ninety-one per cent of
See text at note 450 infra.
The data collected may not indicate the full extent of predisposition custody for
defendants charged with a felony, since it is likely that those defendants spent considerably more time in jail between the disposition of their cases in the Municipal Division
and the final determination of guilt or innocence in the Criminal Division.
141

142

143 AusriN Co mnIrnm

REPoRT 92.
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TABLE 14
LENGTH OF PREDISPOSTION CUSTODY BY CHARGE

Predisposition
Custody
(in days)

Curfew

0-3
4-10
11-30
Over 50

94
1
2
4

76
12
7
4

48
20
12
19

86
17
17
30

89
19
21
21

68
7
10
15

Total

100

100

100

100

100

100

Number of
Cases

(560)

(429)

(130)

(457)

(210)

(136)

Disorderly
Property
Conduct Misdemeanor

Property
Felony

Multiple
Charges

Other

those arrested for curfew violation on the night of April 6, the first

night the emergency curfew went into effect, were required to post
cash bond, despite Chief Judge Boyle's suggestion that curfew defendants be released on their own recognizance. On later nights, the
proportion dropped sharply; by April 9, only 3% of the curfew
arrestees were not released on their own recognizance. While 23% of
those defendants arrested on curfew charges the first evening the curfew was in effect were detained three or more calendar days before
release, the percentage dropped radically on succeeding nights. Variation in bond amounts by time of arrest are less consistent among
defendants charged with other offenses. Disorderly conduct defendants
arrested on Friday night, however, were more apt to be required to
post cash deposits of over $50 than disorderly conduct defendants arrested at other periods. Ninety-five per cent of those disorderly conduct
defendants arrested on or after Sunday evening, by which time the riot
activity had virtually ended, had cash deposit amounts of $50 or less.
Our data indicate no significant association between length of predisposition custody and time of arrest among non-curfew arrests. Persons arrested on property felony charges on or after Monday, for
example, were more often in custody three or more days than those
arrested on Saturday night or Sunday. In large part, such unexpected
results probably reflect the activities of bail relief agencies. On April
9 and 10, in particular, the Community Legal Defense Organization
made available $7,000 in cash for those who remained in detention. 144
144 The Community Legal Defense Organization was established during the weekend
after Dr. King's assassination to raise and distribute bail funds for those arrested. The
organization, administered by a coalition of black and white lawyers, students, and corn-
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TABLE 15
BAIL STATUS AND LENGTH OF PREDISPOSITION CUSTODY OF
CuRFEw ARRESES BY TIME OF ARRES

Percent Released
Without Bail

6 pm Saturday-

Percent Detained
3 days or more

8

23

83

3

6 pm Monday6 am Tuesday

68

4

After 6 pm Tuesday

97

2

6 am Sunday

6 pm Sunday6 am Monday

Although the money was disbursed according to a set of hardship priorities, with preference given to arrestees who were the sole support
of their children, welfare mothers, and the elderly,145 a large number
of those who benefited from the fund were minor offenders and persons who had already spent significant lengths of time in jail. Given
a limited amount of money and the desire to obtain the release of as
many persons as possible, there was a natural tendency to post bail first
for those with smaller bond amounts.
Several defendants, and the Warden of Cook County Jail, have complained that those arrested late in the riot were "forgotten men."' 46 Indeed, 51 of the 59 property felony arrestees arrested after 6 p.m. on
Sunday who served more than three days of predisposition custody
were in jail for over 10 days, and 32 had not made bond by the middle
of June, 10 weeks after the riot.
There is little evidence to suggest that the bail policies implemented
by the bond hearing magistrates were the direct result of orders from
superior judicial officers. 147 To the contrary, bail policies were, for the
most part, the result of recommendations of the State's Attorney and
the determinations of individual magistrates. 148 Partly because of the
ineffectiveness of defense counsel (which is the subject of Section VII,
infra), the State's Attorney's recommendations were often adopted by
the bond courts. And even in instances in which the State's Attorney
made no bond recommendation, the uniformity of bond amounts for
particular charges was established early.
An analysis of a sample of bond hearing transcripts reveals the sigmunity leaders, acted as a dearing house for bail information and as a headquarters for
bail money contributions. Platt Report 25.
145
148
147

Platt Report 25.
Moore Testmony 207.
Austin Committee ifies.

148 AusrN Co?,-mrrraE REFPOT 92.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

nificant role of the State's Attorney in bond determination. As Table
16 shows, the State's Attorney alone recommended a bond amount in
54% of the cases. In over three-fifths of these cases, his recommendation was accepted by the presiding magistrate. And in most of the
other cases, the magistrate set bond only one category below the State's
Attorney's recommendation. 149 The Public Defender, on the other
hand, recommended bond in only 16% of the cases. This recommendation was accepted in only one-third of these cases; in one-sixth, the
amount set was a compromise between his recommendation and the
State's Attorney's.
TABLE 16
BAIL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation Made by
Bail Set at Amount
Recommended by
State's Attorney
Public Defender
Neither
Total

State's
Attorney
Alone

State's Attorney
and
Public Defender

70
38

15
11
5

108
(54%)

31
(16%)

Neither
-

60
60
(30%)

Total
85
11
103
199
(100%)

That the recommendations of counsel-and particularly of the
State's Attorney-were adopted in 96 of the 199 cases should not obscure the importance of the individual magistrate's discretion in setting
bail. In more than half the cases the magistrates set bail at amounts
which had not been recommended by either the State's Attorney or
the Public Defender. Table 17 presents data on the amount of bail set
by each magistrate for charge categories. The data show wide variations in bond setting practices among the magistrates. Several factors
contribute to the variations including the time when a magistrate presided over bail hearings. As indicated earlier, bonds for misdemeanors
tended to be set higher early in the riot, as magistrates applied a
temporary detention policy. But this factor does not account for all
the disparities among magistrates. Even among those sitting at the
same time, there were different bond policies. The bond amounts set
by some magistrates tend to be clustered around a single category,
while those established by other magistrates are distributed over a
149 Thus, in two cases, the State's Attorney recommended $10,000 but the magistrate
set bond at $5,000; in 17 cases, he recommended $5,000, but bond was set at $2,500; in
3 cases, bond was set at $500, despite his recommendation of $1,000; and in 4 cases, $500
recommendations resulted in $250 bonds.
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broader range. Analysis of our sample of 202 bond hearing transcripts
suggests that the range of a magistrate's bond determinations reflects
the role of the Public Defender in his courtroom. Magistrates like
Higgins and Lee, whose bond determinations are clustered for each
charge, played a prominent role in examining the defendants in the
bond hearings they conducted. (Our sample of bond transcripts included 23 bond cases heard by Higgins and 7 heard by Lee.) On the
other hand, the Public Defender did most of the questioning in the
hearings conducted by Jankowski and Janega, whose bond determinations tended to range over a number of categories. In hearings conducted by Gorenstein, La Verde, Bailey, and Gill-whose bond determinations for each charge were neither as uniform as Higgins' and
Lee's nor ranged as widely as Jankowski's and Janega's-sometimes the
Public Defender and sometimes the magistrate did most of the questioning.
The importance of the charge on which the defendant was arrested
also varied. Magistrates Lee, Gill, and Gorenstein, for example, set
relatively high bonds for defendants in each of the five charge categories. Magistrates Kogut and Janega, on the other hand, were more
likely to admit misdemeanor arrestees to relatively low bonds and
those charged with felonies and multiple offenses to relatively high
bonds. All five of these magistrates sat primarily during the early riot
period.
The data examined thus far suggest that individual circumstances
were seldom taken into account in setting bond. Active participation
of defense counsel in the bond hearing, including the recommendation of an appropriate bond amount, may have had some effect in
lowering bond determinations. But defense counsel rarely participated
effectively in bond court proceedings. The ineffectiveness of defense
counsel, the pressure toward using bail for preventive detention, the
failure to utilize preset bail schedules or to operate a sufficient number of bond courts to prevent long delays and crowded dockets, the
lack of relevant information about defendants in many cases, and, in
general, the demand for judicial economy all contributed to the court's
tendency to make non-individualized bail determinations in the vast
majority of cases. 150
150 One major source of delay in bail processing which may have resulted in non-individualized bail hearings was police fingerprinting, photographing, and processing procedures. After April the State's Attorney's office discussed with police department personnel
the possibility of avoiding fingerprinting and photographing of minor offenders. Interview
with William J. Martin, April 26, 1969. In July 1968 Mr. Martin tested a procedure of
processing arrestees at the Criminal Court building rather than at district and central
police headquarters. But processing time still resulted in long delays. Chicago American,
July 24, 1968, at 3; interview with William J. Martin, April 26, 1969.
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TABLE 17

AMOUNT OF BAIL INITIALLY SET* BY MAGISRATE FOR VARious CHARGES

Curfew
Released
Without
Bail

Magistrate

Kargman
La Plante
Edelstein
Casey
Mooney
Jankowski
Janega
Others

77
99
99
60

$1-25

$26-50

1

1

-

-

-

38

-

-

-

-

-

77
58
34

13
21
15

2

21
20

23
-

Over $100

-

-

-

1

-

-

100

$51-100

7

182
84
67
45

26
3

29

Number
of Cases
(= 100%)

s0
19
59

2

Disorderly Conduct
Released
Without
Magistrate
Bail

Gill
Lee
Janega
La Plante
Jankowski
Kogut
Shamberg
Gorenstein
Others

5
10
12
81
4
9
5
21

$1-25

$26-50

5

14

2

-

15
15
21
36
14
19
26

3
-

17
27
24
5
19

$51-100

76
82
21
4
54
27
62
71
25

Number
of Cases
S101-250 $251-500 Over $500 (= 100%)

-

5
3
-

4
-

-

-

-

6

9

-

-

-

-

-

-

5

-

-

3

2

42
39
33
26
24
22
21
21
129

Property Misdemeanor
Released
Without
Magistrate
Bail

Palmer
Jankowski
Gill

Gorenstein
Shamberg
Janega
La Verde
Others

$1-25

$26-50

4

13

8
19
85
-

.

-

-

-

13

50
33
30

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

--

-

4

$51-100

-

2

Number
of Cases
$101-250 $251-500 Over $500 (= 100%)

28
81

56
-

-

-

15
25
57
17
17

-

63
29
50
50
28

4

-

14
6

25
16
13
8
7
6
6
47
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TABLE 17 (Continued)
Property Felonies

Released
Without
Magistrate
Bail

$1-25

$26-50

% %
Janega
Gill
Gorenstein
Higgins
Kogut
Jankowski
Bailey
Palmer
Garrity
Duggan
Others

1
3
2
-

3
-

%

%

%

3

3
21
7
5
18

6
11
14
18
50

-

2

$51-100

-

2

2

-

8

-

3
-

4

Number
of Cases
$101-250 $251-500 Over $500 (
100%)

3

-

40

-

34
7

-

-

-

5
2

-

7

19
29
8
64
26

%
81
63
72
77
21
97
41
61
69

32
58

6
2

80
62
58

-

39

3
23
2

82

38
33
28
26
22
122

Multiple Charges
Released
Without
Magistrate
Bail
$1-25

Garrity
Janega
Gorenstein
La Plante
Kogut
Higgins
Jankowski
Limperis
Others

5
18
-

$51-100

9
5

-

-

-

16

$26-50

-

12
7
-

-

3

8

23
5
28
12
6
21
8
27
19

Number
of Cases
$101-250 $251-500 Over $500 (
100%)

41
25
11
35

38
43
42
18
18

23
40
50
24
56
29
42
36
29

-

25
11
8
18
18

22
20
18
17
16
14
12
11
90

* See Table 12, note a.

Illinois statutes do not prescribe specific inquiries which must be
made of the defendant in determining bail. Section 110-2, authorizing
recognizance bonds, refers to an inquiry into "all the circumstances"; 5 1
section 110-5 provides that the amount of cash bail shall be "not oppressive," and "considerate of the financial ability" and "the past
criminal acts and conduct of the defendant."' 152 Despite these provisions, the bond hearings seldom included inquiry into the defendant's
personal circumstances to determine the likelihood of his subsequent
appearance in court. Although magistrates and judicial officers have
asserted that relevant information was generally solicited, an analysis
151 ILL. R v. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1967).
152 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1967).
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of 202 adult bond hearing transcripts does not support their claim. In
only 52% of those cases were questions put to the defendant to elicit
information regarding his employment status. In only 26% were inquiries made regarding the length of defendant's residence in Chicago.
Fifty-three per cent of the defendants were asked questions regarding their marital or family status, but only, 26% were asked concerning their financial ability. And in only 32% of the cases was inquiry
made of the defendant concerning his prior criminal record.
Virtually none of this information was available to the magistrate
from other sources, including police records. Prior criminal history
sheets, normally referred to for purposes of bond setting, were unavailable. 15 3 Public Defenders, especially early in the riot, were not
permitted to interview defendants in the bullpen prior to the hearing
in order to obtain information. 54 Volunteer lawyers were rarely successful in obtaining relevant information concerning the defendants
which could be introduced at the hearing, 55 and no standardized
means of verifying privately obtained information was instituted.5 0
In addition, overcrowded temporary detention facilities annexed to
the bond courts resulted in many defendants being processed through
57
bond hearings in groups of up to four arrestees.
The summary character of most bond hearings is best reflected in
the transcripts. The following excerpts are representative:
The Defendant:

The Court:

I'd like to have a break because I got
burned out Saturday because I have no
clothes and nothing but what I gots on and
my kids the same thing and nowhere to
stay. All I got is one lousy five dollars.
Well, look, these are difficult times for a
lot of people, and a lot of people are getting
themselves into trouble. All I know is the
charge that has been filed against you and

153 Aus'rw ComMITmE REPoRT 90. One magistrate said that it would have meant "too
much delay" to consider any prior criminal history sheets in the bailsetting process, and
that consequently he released no defendants on their own recognizance. Austin Committee

files.
154 Platt Report 7-8.
155 One magistrate noted that he did not allow lawyers to talk to clients until their
cases were called, because it would have been "too slow" to permit such consultation.
Austin Committee files.
156 Austin Committee files.
1S AusrIN COMMITME REPORT 89. One magistrate noted that the large volume of cases
in the bond courts made it "almost impossible" to hold complete bond hearings, and
that the idea was to process cases "as fast as possible," so people who had money could
get out of jail quickly. Austin Committee files.
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based on the charge I can't make that less
than $5,000. I wish I could
The Clerk:
The State's Attorney:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:

[Announcing the case]
State curfew, your honor.
What were you doing on the corner?
Going home.
From where?
From a friend's house.
Thousand dollar bond, April 18th.

The Clerk:
The Court:
Defendant:

[Announcing the case]
What were you doing on 63rd and Ellis?
I was there with a friend of mine at the
Company.
These are riotous conditions going on, get
off the street. 11:00 o'clock at night.
It wasn't 11:00 o'clock.
Bond, thousand dollars, branch 47, April
18th.

The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:

The Clerk:
The State's Attorney:

The Court:

[Calling the defendant]
[He] is charged with resisting arrest and obstructing a police officer, who was attempting to effect an arrest. We suggest the 16th
of April and a $1,000 bond.
So ordered, 4/16/68, $1,000 bond, Branch
47

The State's Attorney:

Private Attorney:

The State's Attorney:

....

In the matter of the bond, since the defendant is not pleading guilty, the State recommends a bond of $5,000. Court date of
April 18th.
I would like to ask the Court to reconsider
his bond on three grounds. [Presenting employment, residence, and family information].
. . . The State remains steadfast that the

bond be retained at $5,000 until the time
of trial.
The Court:

-

.

. The charge [burglary] is an extremely

serious charge. In the absence of unimpeach-
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Private Attorney:

The Court:

The Clerk:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
The State's Attorney:
The Court:
The State's Attorney:
The Court:
The State's Attorney:
The Court:
The State's Attorney:
The Court:

Private Attorney:

The Court:

Public Defender:
The Court:
The Clerk:
The Court:

[Vol. 36:455

able evidence of the facts stated the Court
is not inclined to lower the bond.
Your Honor, may I point out that the purpose of bond is to insure presence. They
have families and are employed in the City
and are residents in the community. That
should be an important factor in consideration of setting bond.
The Court denies the request of counsel
for the defendants.
[Calling defendant]
[Reading the charge] How do you plead?
Not guilty.
State's Attorney.
Is it a theft charge, your Honor?
Theft charge.
The Court is asking the State for a bond?
The Court is asking the State for a recommendation.
We recommend a bond of $1,000, on a
charge of theft.
This is burglary.
$5,000, your Honor.
The Court accepts the State's recommendation and sets bond at $5,000. Plea of not
guilty. Order of Court.
Your Honor, the defendant states he has no
record. He has been working for
Wash for the past eight months.
You say the defendant has no record. Where
do you get your information, just from his
statement?
Yes, sir, that is all.
The bond will remain at $5,000.
[Calling defendant]
[Y]ou have been charged by
that
on or about the 6th of April, 1968, at 2310
West Roosevelt, you committed the offense
of disorderly conduct in violation of Chap-
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ter 28, Section 26-1(a)(1). Let the record
show that a plea of not guilty has been
entered in arraignment. Bond will be set at
$1,000.

It is important to emphasize that relevant individual inquiry for the
purposes of setting bond was made in many cases. But even in these
cases there is no indication that the information was taken into account.
The magistrate often set bonds at the amount recommended by the
State's Attorney in these cases, as excerpts from bond hearing transcripts show:
The Court:
The State's Attorney:

The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:

[Calling defendant]
I recommend $5,000 bond on the charges of
burglary and disorderly, your Honor.
I request a lower bond. This man does
work, and I don't know what his record is.
How long have you lived in Chicago?
I have been here about, I'd say nine years
or more.
Married?
Yes.
Do you have any kids?
About five.
The kids and wife live with you?
Yes.
Does your wife work?
She don't work.
Have you been employed?
Employed?
Are you working?
Oh yes. I am working.
Where are you working?
Work for
-Auto Wash, where they
wash cars.
How long have you worked there?
Four or five years or more.
Five thousand dollar bond.

The Clerk:
The Court:
Defendant:

[Calling defendant]
How long have you lived in Chicago?
Eleven years.

Public Defender:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
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The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
The State's Attorney:

The Court:
The Clerk:
The State's Attorney:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:

Public Defender:
The Clerk:
The State's Attorney:

Defendant:
Public Defender:

[Vol. 36:455

Are you married?
Yes.
Any children?
Four.
What time of the day was this?
I guess it was about two in the morning.
Do you work for yourself?
Yes-not exactly, but I am with another guy.
We do decorating.
What is the recommendation.
My information indicates a 3:30 a.m. time,
and the charge is burglary. Recommend
$5,000 bond.
Five thousand dollar bond.
[Calling defendant]
is also charged
Your Honor, Mr.
with burglary ...
Tell the Judge. You have a job?
Yes.
How long have you been working?
Two years.
Are you married?
Yes, I am.
Do you have any children?
Yes, one. Your Honor, as far as I am concerned, I got a good job. I just got my job. I
am making good money. My wife, she is
sick. She got cramps from taking these birthcontrol pills, and she can't work. I don't
want to be put in jail because I haven't got
any money-I don't want to lose my home
and job or nothing.
We request $1,000 bond.
What time was the arrest?
Twenty-five after twelve this morning, inside
the premises, where obviously he did not
belong.
No, I wasn't. Sir, I wantIs he going to show up for trial? Let's show
the fact that he is trying to keep the job.
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Defendant:

The Court:

I don't want to lose my job and my home. I
will lose everything if I don't go to work.
Is your wife working?
No, she can't work. She is under the doctor.
I suggest if he is so concerned about his
wife and home, he would have been there.
Five thousand dollars bond.

The Clerk:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:

[Calling defendant, arrested for burglary]
The defendant states he is working.
I was just getting off from work.
How long have you been working there?
For the last three years, sir....
Do you have a family?
Sure, a wife and three kids. I have two jobs.

The Court:
Defendant:
The State's Attorney:

What were you doing in this building?
I was not in the building, Judge . . .
The State recommends bond for $5,000,
court date of April 18th.
Bond, $5,000.

The Court:
Defendant:
The State's Attorney:

The Court:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
The State's Attorney:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:

How old are you, Donald?
Eighteen.
Where do you live?
[Answering]
Who do you live with?
My mother and father.
How long have you lived at that address?
Eight years.
Do you work or do you go to school?
I go to school.
What school?
High School.
What year are you in?
I am a senior.
We recommend a $1,500 bond, Judge.
How much money can you raise for bond?
I don't know, $75 or $100.
Your Honor, we would ask the bond be set
at $500.
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The Court:

The bond will be set at $1,500 for appearance in Branch 47 on April 18th, $150 cash
we will release you....

The Clerk:

[Calling defendant, arrested for violation of
curfew]
Are you married or single?
I am married.
And how many children do you have?
I have three children.
Where do you work?
I work for the Post Office and also a barber
part-time....

Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
Public Defender:
Defendant:
The Court:
Public Defender:

The Court:

And where do you live?
[Answering]
How long have you lived at that address?
I lived there about ten years.
And how long have you worked for the
Post Office?
Five years.
Your bond will be $500 for an appearance.
Your Honor, could you make that an individual bond? This is simply another curfew
situation. No other aggravation.
He lives at
. He was arrested
at
, where we had an awful lot of
trouble. That's all....

The State's Attorney:

[Recommends $5,000 bond on a burglary
defendant]

The Court:
Public Defender:

What is the story here?
Judge, he's been employed at the
-Company for a year and a half, he has
been a resident of Chicago for ten years.

Defendant:

I have to go to work tomorrow, I have kids
to support.
How many children do you have to support,
Dave?
Two.

Public Defender:
Defendant:
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The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:
Defendant:
The State's Attorney:
The Court:
Defendant:
The Court:

Twenty-five hundred dollar bond....
Your Honor, can you drop the bond, I
can't raise that much today.
What bond could you make?
I can raise a hundred dollars.
I resist that.
I dropped it to twenty-five hundred dollars.
I can't raise that.
I can't help you, sir, if you can't raise it. I
set the bond, I didn't get you in trouble, you
understand that. That will be the order.

The sample of bond hearing transcripts, taken as a whole, shows
no significant relationship between bond amount and information on
marital and employment status, number of children, length of residence
in Chicago, and number of prior arrests, where this information was
elicited. 158 Data from the entire sample of 2,189 riot cases generally
support this conclusion. Controlling for charge we compared bond
amounts among those with and without prior arrest or conviction
records, and among the employed, unemployed, and students-factors
presumably relevant to bail determinations. As Tables 18 and 19
indicate, there is no substantial variation in the distribution of bond
amounts by these variables.
C. Detention Facilities
We have already noted that preset bail schedules, which would have
enabled many defendants to post cash bail without appearing in court,
were not used during the riot. 159 During the first days of the riot, no
procedure was instituted to enable defendants to post bail immediately
after their bail hearings. 60 Even curfew defendants released on their
own recognizance were detained overnight at the City House of Correction, the County Jail, or temporary detention facilities. 6 ' Almost
all defendants spent some time in jail; those unable to make bail were
often detained for long periods.
Although the State's Attorney's Riot Control Unit had considered
the use of other detention facilities in mass arrest situations-including
the State Penitentiary at Joliet-only the City House of Correction
158 These data confirm the Austin Committee's finding: "There is no question that
there was little individual variation in the setting of the bonds." AusTIN ColsMrrrx
RExorT 92.
159 See text at notes 96-104 supra.
160 Platt Report 27.
161 AusTN COMMITTEE REPORT 87.
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and the County Jail were used during the April riot.1 62 At the height
of the riot, a number of convicted misdemeanants who had served over
half their sentences were pardoned to make room for riot arrestees in
the House of Correction. 163 Conditions at the House of Correction
were somewhat better during the riot than at the County Jail, but were
164
not beyond criticism.
The County Jail, a maximum security institution for detention of
both convicted prisoners and those awaiting trial, was designed to hold
1,302 males. 16 5 On March 31, its inmate population was 1,881, 44%
above its capacity. 16 6 During the riot, an additional 800 prisoners were
sent to the County Jail, because facilities at the House of Correction
were inadequate. 167 Riot arrestees were segregated from other inmates
at the jail, both to avoid placing them with indicted felons and convicted misdemeanants and because many were not processed prior to
assignment to a cell.168 The jail tiers, which are designed to accommodate 39 men and normally house 70, held as many as 200 prisoners
during the riot. 169
The jail, under an administration which had been in office for only
three weeks, had no emergency plan for the processing of large numbers
of prisoners ' 7 0 Some 400 prisoners arrived during one 18 hour period,
as compared with normal daily admissions of 50 to 60. 1 The normal
jail staff was not augmented during the riot, although some staff members did work overtime to process riot arrestees 7 2 The result was
162

Id.

Interview of Superintendent C. William Ruddell, House of Correction, with Isaac
Balbus, January 10, 1969: "One further step that I took with the cooperation of the circuit court and the Corporation Counsel . . . we made the decision at my request to
discharge all prisoners from here who had no more than 10 days left on their sentence,
and who had served at least half their sentence. Approximately 270 were discharged."
The release occurred on Monday, April 8. According to Mr. Balbus, there were two
main factors involved in the decision. First, the curfew was still in effect, and therefore
more arrests were expected. Second, some officials apparently feared renewed disorders on
the South and West Sides on Tuesday, the day of Dr. King's funeral.
163

164 AuSTIN CozmrMr-rE

REPORT 108.

165 H. Mattick, The Cook County Jail: Report of Cook County's Correctional Plant and
Program 9 (1957) (prepared while the author was Assistant Superintendent, Cook County

Jail).
166 Sheriff's Report of Prisoners in the Cook County Jail (Report of All Prisoners in
the Custody of the Sheriff of Cook County Jail, March 31, 1968, pursuant to ILL. REv.

STAT.

ch. 75, § 8).

167 Moore Testimony 212.
168
169
170

Id. at 204-5.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 203.

171 AUSTIN COMMMrrEE REPORT 108.
172

Platt Report, app. F; Austin Committee files.
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chaotic; records, and even prisoners, were lost.18 Some arrestees were
under 17 years of age and, once admitted, were unable to secure release without court order.174 According to the testimony of the Warden, "lots of them [prisoners] were lost"; "everything broke down."' 78
As prisoners entered the jail, there were insufficient temporary
detention facilities. The jail bullpen, which normally accommodates
50 men awaiting medical processing, often held over 200.178 Only two
doctors were available to conduct medical examinations. 7 7 Many prisoners were not permitted to shower before final processing. 7 8 Cells
which normally house two prisoners held as many as five prisoners. 179
According to the chief guard, there were shortages of mattresses, bedding and blankets.8 0 Many prisoners slept on bare floors in the dayrooms of the tiers.' 81 Toilet facilities were inadequate. 18 2 The daily
diet of many prisoners consisted of two bologna sandwiches. 18 3 And,
because the County Jail and the House of Correction could not accommodate the large number of arrestees, many prisoners were held in
the Criminal Court lockup "for a long time under extremely crowded
84
conditions with no food."'
Many prisoners were admitted to the jail with improper or incomplete mittimus papers and this impeded processing and identification. 185 Upon admission, prisoners were given identification cards and
photographs were taken. 86 However, by the time photographs were
developed, a number of prisoners had apparently traded their identification cards for cigarettes. 87 A limited use of aliases further complicated identification. 88 The problem was aggravated by what several
173 Moore Testimony 202, 212.
174 Id. at 211-2.
175 Id. at 205, 215.
176 AUSTIN COMMITrEE REPORT 106.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.

at 107.
180 Austin Committee files.
181 AUSTIN Cosnirrm REPORT 108.
182 Moore Testimony 207.
183 Austin Committee files; see also AUSTIN COMMITTEE REPORT 107; Platt Report 28.
184 Bsmu app. D, p. 4 (May 1968).
185 Moore Testimony 215.
186 AUSTIN CornirEE REPORT 107.
187 Austin Committee fies.
188 AUSTIN CosAnrrrF REPORT 107.

Warden Moore has estimated that "maybe about
five per cent, maybe more" of arrestees sent to the Cook County Jail used aliases. Moore
Testimony 212. Data taken from police arrest sheets of 2,047 arrestees show that the
police recorded existence, rather than the use, of an alias in less than 2% of the cases.
Another report noted "[w]e have no way of knowing how many people did give false
names but there were many specific instances when a correct name was found three days
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observers referred to as lackadaisical attitude on the part of jail em89
ployees.
Under Illinois law, an arrestee has the right to communicate with
an attorney or a member of his family "by making a reasonable number
of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner."' 190 If he is
transferred to a new place of custody, his right to communicate is
renewed. 191 The County Jail, however, is not equipped with telephones
for the use of prisoners. 192 Defendants who were unable to make telephone calls prior to incarceration had to rely on the services of volunteers or helpful jail personnel. 193 And often prisoners were not assigned
to a detention facility until their arrival, which prevented them from
notifying an attorney or their families of their location. 19 4 Recordkeeping breakdowns made it impossible for relatives to locate prisoners
for hours and even days. 95 Despite long lines of inquiring friends and
relatives, the records window at the County Jail was closed at night
without explanation. 196 There was no coordination between the records
department and the bond clerks or between the jail and House of
Correction lists.

97

Volunteers, including lawyers, were able to track down some prisoners and relay information to friends and relatives.' 8 They also acted
as court clerks, expanding incomplete records to obtain information
needed to post bond for a prisoner.'9 9 Persons who arrived to post bond
sometimes waited as long as two days after payment of bail before
20 0
prisoners were released.
The Kerner Commission's recommendation that "[d]uring any detention period, defense counsel must be able to interview prisoners
individually at the detention centers" went unheeded 20 1 during the
week after Dr. King's assassination. Public Defenders and volunteer
20 2
lawyers were often turned away from the jail.

or a week after the relative had been told that the prisoner 'must have given a false
name'." Platt Report 27.
189 Platt Report 27.
190 ILL. RFv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-3(a) (1967).
191 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-b(a) (1967).
192 Moore Testimony 214.
193 Platt Report 16; AUSTIN COMmiTTEE REPoRT 108.
194 Moore Testimony 215.
195 Platt Report app. F, at 2; AUSTIN COMMITTEE REPORT 86.

196 Platt Report 26.
197 Id. at 29.
198 AUSTIN CoMMHrsm REPORT 86.

199 Id. at 90.
200 Id. at 91.
201 KERNER COasMISION REPORT 192.
202 AUSTIN CommrrrEE REPORT 86.
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The impact of bail policies on riot arrestees, their relatives, and
their friends cannot be fully appreciated without recognition of the
hardship of detention under these conditions. Defendants whom we
interviewed described their detention in vivid and bitter terms:
We were in the cell, no mattresses, no bed, no anything, five
in a cell, no nothing. You know we get to know each other
so good that we took turns sleeping... You would have to,
you know, take turns sleeping or else you just didn't sleep.
We got one sandwich a day, and if we got smart we didn't
get that .... The guards would come in there, and if you so
much as asked a little question, they'd just spray mace on you.
That stuff you just can't breathe....
After I got in jail I didn't trust anyone even if they came
and said they were a lawyer and wanted to help. We just
couldn't trust them.
Like living in a slum building. Every where it was dirty,
nasty, smelled like piss and looked like piss. It's enough to
make you sick.
They should have at least put me in a clean cell or something. I mean I don't think that you should have put all of
us in one room like a bunch of animals with everyone laying
on top of one another and everyone needin' a bath and
stinkin' in there. And see how they was sweatin'. And ya have
to get in the bathroom and go to the window before you
could get any air, and at least about twelve guys in the little
ole bathroom trying to get to the window.... That's the way
they treated us, I mean, just like a bunch of animals.
Well, to me they were like a cowpen where you put cows
in, where you put this cow and this cow in this pen, and this
cow and this cow in this pen. Only in this case there were a
whole lot of cows in this pen, and a whole lot of cows in this
pen. It was like on a farm, and the way you would treat animals,... I mean, you treat dogs better.
Like a chain gang. It was overcrowded, you didn't have
a place to sleep, you had to sleep in shifts, you had to wash
up in shifts, you cleaned yourself in the best way you could.
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D. Bond Reduction Hearings

The non-individualized bond amounts set at initial bond hearings
and the continued detention of a large proportion of riot arrestees in
overcrowded and unsanitary facilities, generated public pressure to
institute bond reduction procedures.
On Monday, April 8, about 40 lawyers met under the auspices of
the Chicago Bar Association (CBA) and decided that the president of
the Association should attempt to get more courts opened to hold
bond hearings. 203 Later the same day, the president and vice president of
the CBA met with Judge Boyle, without informing or inviting any representatives of the volunteer or legal aid organizations. 2°4 After the
meeting they informed other lawyers that bond reduction hearings
would begin on Wednesday, April 10.205 Chief Judge Boyle argued
that no bond reduction hearings should take place on Tuesday because
Dr. King's funeral could cause new tension in the black community,
which might be exploited by those making bail as a result of bond
reduction.

206

No bond reduction hearings were held on Wednesday, contrary to
what the CBA and several volunteer lawyers had been led to believe.20 7
On Wednesday evening, the Cook County Bar Association (CCBA),
whose membership consists of black lawyers from the Chicago area,
met to discuss the role of black lawyers in defending riot arrestees. 20

The Association sent a telegram to Chief Judge Boyle informing him
that representatives of the Cook County Bar would be at his office the
next day.20 9 Over 50 members appeared for the meeting, along with
reporters.2 10 After initially refusing to meet with all of the Cook County
Bar members present, Judge Boyle met briefly with the group.211
Mayor Daley had declared the emergency to be over on Wednesday,
and lifted the curfew. 212 Chief Judge Boyle, who opposed any bond
reduction hearings until such a determination had been made by the
executive, 21 3 apparently gave his assistants permission to hold bond
203 Platt Report 10. Another estimate said there were only 20 lawyers present. See
Open Meeting Before the Illinois State Advisory Committee to the United States Commission on Civil Rights 50, June 12, 1968 (Testimony of Lawrence X. Puseteri) [hereinafter cited as Puseteri Testimony].
204 Platt Report 10.
205 Id.
206 Id.

207 Id.
208 Id. at 11.
209 AUSTIN ComIITrIE REPORT 93; Platt Report 11.
210 AUSTIN CohaIrrE REPORT 93.

211 Id.; Platt Report 12.
212 AUSTIN ComraITrEE REPORT 93.

213 Id. at 95.
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reduction hearings on Thursday. 2 14 At about the same time the Cook
County Bar group was attempting to meet with Chief Judge Boyle,
the vice president of the CBA and a representative of the ACLU were
told that bond reduction hearings would begin later in the day.215 Only
one magistrate was sitting, however, and the flow of cases was irregular2 16 because the court was requiring a written petition for each individual requesting a reduction hearing 217 and the State's Attorney had
announced that one day's notice was necessary to allow the State's
Attorney's office time to locate the prisoner and his prior arrest
record.2 18 Both these requirements were intended to assure the court
and the State that each arrestee's file would be available, so that his
arrest record could be taken into 'iccount. According to Anthony
Platt, "It was extremely difficult for the attorneys to comply with this
standard procedure under emergency conditions because the Jail and
the House were unable to handle the expanded population and could
not or would not supply the lawyers with the names of the prisoners." 219
The Austin Committee asserts that the State's Attorney cooperated
with volunteer attorneys in the location of prisoners:
The assistant state's attorneys, upon receiving a call from a
volunteer lawyer that he intended to obtain a bond reduction
hearing for a particular defendant, would call the jail and
have the prisoner brought over to the court. The assistant
state's attorneys would then search through the unorganized
pile of arrest history sheets.., in order to locate that particular man's history and report. 220
It appears that about a maximum of 100 persons-most likely those
represented by private attorneys-obtained bond reduction hearings
by the l1th.221 But at least 600 arrestees still remained in jail.22 2 Few
reduction hearings were conducted on the 12th and 13th,223 primarily
214 Id. at 87, 94.
215 Platt Report 10.

216 Puseteri Testimony 51-52.
217 AusrxN COMMITrEE REPORT 87; Puseteri Testimony 59.

218 Interview with William J. Martin, April 26, 1969; ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-6(b)
(1967) requires that "reasonable notice" of an application for a bond reduction be given
to the State. In the Criminal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, notice of
motion to reduce bail must be served on the State's Attorney, and filed with the Clerk
of the Criminal Court before 2 p.m. of the day preceding the hearing of the motion.
Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division, Rule 5, §§ 2, 4(a).
219 Platt Report 11.
220 AusrIN CoMMrrrrE REPORT 98.
221 Id. at 94.
222 Austin Committee files; accord, Address by Judge Boyle to members of the Cook

County Bar Association, April 11, 1968.
223 AUSTIN Comm-irTr
RiE ORT 94.
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because few defense counsel had requested bond reduction hearings
in specific cases. 224 The ex-Chairman of the CBA's Committee on
Civil Disorders testified that on the 13th the State's Attorney told him
he would insist on written notice of proposed bond reduction hearings. 22 5 Members of the CBA photostated arrest records and presented
'226
them to the State's Attorney: "[W]e made that our written notice.
In addition, a mandamus action was filed on the 12th by four volunteer attorneys to compel the Chief Judge to provide the necessary
2 27
facilities for special bond reduction courts over Easter weekend.
Further conferences involving private attorneys and members of the
228
CBA and CCBA were held on the 13th.

On Easter Sunday, the 14th, nine special bond courts were opened
in the Criminal Court Building and House of Correction at 26th and
California.2 29 About 275 defendants, represented by the Public Defender or volunteer attorneys, had bond reduction hearings on that
day.230 At least 90 more bond reduction hearings were held on the 15th
and 16th. In all, over 500 bond reduction hearings were conducted for
riot defendants.
According to the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Judge, plans
to open bond reduction courts as soon as the riot had subsided were
initiated by the Court and were not stimulated by pressure from the
CCBA or other private attorneys.23 1 There is substantial evidence that
those still in custody when the riot ended would have been afforded an
opportunity to have their bonds reduced. It is unlikely, however, that
nine courtrooms would have been opened to facilitate bond reduction
hearings without the demands by both black and white attorneys, as
well as the State's Attorney.232
224 After April 1968 the Circuit Court established procedures for review of bonds "[a]s
soon as practicable" after the mass arrest incident on the motion of the court. General
Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 18 (1968).
225 Puseteri Testimony 59.
226 Id. There is some evidence however that the State's Attorney waived requirement
of written notice, although exactly when is unclear. See AUSiN CoMMI=rra REPoRT 94.
Under normal circumstances written notice is usually waived. Boyle, Bail Under the Judicial Article, 17 DE PAUL L. REv. 267, 274 (1968).
227 AusTiN Comnmrr
REPORT 94; Memorandum from Phillip H. Ginsberg, Mandel
Legal Aid Clinic, to National Legal Aid and Defender Association, at 7, May 9, 1968
[hereinafter cited as Ginsberg Memorandum].
228 Ginsberg Memorandum 8.
229 Puseteri Testimony 60; Platt Report 14.
230 The Chicago Sun-Times, in an article entitled Riot Suspects Win Freedom For
Easter, reported that there were 283 bond reduction hearings held on Easter Sunday.
Chicago Sun-Times, April 15, 1968, at 5.
231 Austin Committee files.
232 The State's Attorney hoped to alleviate overcrowded detention facility conditions
and avoid the necessity of conducting bond reduction hearings during the following week
when riot cases were scheduled for trial. Interview with William J. Martin, April 26, 1969.
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Over 70% of the bond reduction hearings were conducted on or
after Easter Sunday, a week after the rioting had subsided. Many of
those arrested early in the riot who had been unable to make bail had
been in detention for a week before their bond was reviewed. The
delay in bail review was contrary to the normal practice, as described
by the Chief Judge in early 1968:
As soon as it is determined by court records that the defendant
is being held pending trial for failure to post bond, an assistant Public Defender interviews him to determine his suitability for a release upon individual recognizance. 233
We obtained data on 496 arrestees who had bond reduction hearings.
Persons who had bond reduction hearings were more likely to have
prior arrest and conviction records than arrestees who did not have
bond reduction hearings. That fact probably reflects the greater incidence of prior criminal records among persons charged with serious
offenses. As we have previously noted above, defendants charged
with relatively serious offenses had higher bail amounts, resulting in
greater likelihood of a bond reduction hearing, than arrestees charged
with minor offenses. (See Table 18.) Nearly half of the persons
who had bond reduction hearings were arrested on felony charges, as
compared with approximately one-fifth of those who did not have
reduction hearings. Only one-fourth of the former group were charged
with curfew violation or disorderly conduct as compared with over
half of other arrestees.
Of those defendants who had bond reduction hearings 85% had
their bond reduced. Over one-quarter were released on their own
recognizance and another three-eighths had their bond reduced to an
amount which required a cash deposit of $100 or less to obtain release.
The results of bond reduction hearings are tabulated in Table 20.
Two patterns emerge-release of those with initial money bonds requiring a cash deposit of $100 or less on their own recognizance and
reduction of bonds requiring a deposit of more that $100. Eighty per
cent of those whose initial bonds were $1,000 or less were given ROR's;
they accounted for 86% of the defendants released on their own recognizance after bond reduction hearings. Nearly two-fifths of the
defendants with initial bonds higher than $1,000 had them reduced to
that amount; only 15% had them reduced to a lower amount. The
presence of those reduction patterns suggest that magistrates at bond
reduction hearings were in many cases using original bail amounts as
233 Bo)lc, supra note 226, at 271.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

guidelines to determine the limits of bond reduction. In some cases,
the same magistrate presided over the reduction hearing as had set the
initial bail; 234 several have admitted that they were reluctant to lower
230
bonds they had personally set.
TABLE 20
AAouNT OF ]FINAL BAIL BY AMOUNT OF INITIAL BAIL FOR
RIOT ARRFmEES HAVING BOND REDUCrION HEARINGS
Initial Bail Amount (in $)

Final Bail
Amount

Num-

(in S)a

ber

%

(12)

86

Released
Without Bail

1-25
26-50

Num-

(2)b 14

Num-

Num-

Num-

ber

%

ber

%

her

%

ber

(7)

64

(88)

81

(4)

7

(12)

(1) 9
(3)" 27

51-100
101-250

(7)
(6)

6 (1) 2
6 (12) 20

(7)b

6

(25)
(19)b

Over 500

251-500

101-250

50-100

26-50

1-25

41
31

251-500

Num-

%
5

-

-

(22)

9

(108)
(72)

43
28
15

(39)b

100

(11)

100

(108)

100

(61)

100

(253)

100

%

(1)

-

Over 500
(14)

ber

3

-

(1)
(5)
(7)
(8)
(12)
(34)

3
15
21
24
35
100

a See Table 12, note a.
b Bonds in these categories may have been reduced within the category.

The results of* bond reduction hearings differed considerably by
charge. The Austin Committee found that magistrates considered
whether a "serious hard core" case was involved in making reduction
determinations.236 Defendants who did not fall within this group, the
Committee suggests, were released on their own recognizance or had
237
bond redetermined at an amount "within their resources."
Our data suggest that only if "serious, hard core" is taken to mean
all riot arrestees except those charged with curfew violation and disorderly conduct is the Austin Committee's finding accurate. Ninetenths of those charged with curfew who had reduction hearings
obtained release on their own recognizance as did two-thirds of those
charged with disorderly conduct. In all, nearly seven-eighths of those
charged with either of these two offenses obtained ROR's or could
achieve release by posting $25. But well over half of those charged
with other offenses, misdemeanor or felony, had bonds reset at $1,000
or more. (See Table 21.)
234
235
236
237

AuSTIN C084MrTrrEE REPORT 95.

Austin Committee files.
AusTIN COMMITTEE REPORT 96.

Id.
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TABLE 21
BOND REDUCTION HEARING RESULTS FOR VARioUs CHARGES
Final Bail
Amount
(in $)*

Initial Bail
Amount
(in $)

Release
Without Bail
1-25
26-50
51-100
101-250
251-500
Over 500
1-25

Curfew

Disorderly
Conduct

88

67

10
6
72
-

2
2
55
4
2
2

-

-

16

1-25
26-50
51-100
101-250
25 1-5 0 0
OverS50

-

4
2
10

26-50
51-100
101-250
251-500
Over 500

-

26-50

51-100

1

51-100
101-250
250-500
Over 500

101-250

-

251-500
251-500
Over 500
Over 500
Over 500
Increase
Number of
Cases
* See Table 12, note a.

11
-

-

2

2
5

3

-

-

-

2

-

2

-

-

-

-

2

-

2

-

-

-

-

-

32

6

7
2
20
2

9

9

3
5

-

-

-

5
2

6

32

45

25

4

5
5
20
2

-

-

8
36
1

5
17

2

27

27

23

2

2
-

101-250
251-500
Over 500

-5

-

6
-

4

-

-

-

1

-

2

-

- ....
-

Property Property Multiple
Misd.
Felony
Charges

3

-

15
12

3

5

-

24

11

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

13

17

-

-

-

12
1

9
8

-

-

5

1

8

-

-

5

1

8

8

9

2

1

1

6

100

100

100

100

100

(78)

(49)

(41)

(244)

(65)
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The Austin Committee also suggested that "[w]here the charge was
not serious and the arrestee had no serious criminal record," judges
at reduction hearings "were inclined to release the arrestee on his own
recognizance or to set the bond at whatever amount the arrestee could
make. ' 238 For curfew and disorderly conduct cases, the fact that the
charge was minor seemed to be sufficient to achieve this result; the
presence of an arrest or conviction record made little difference. The
availability of prior criminal records at bond reduction hearings does
seem to have had an impact on magistrates' determinations for defendants charged with other offenses. Those with a prior record were less
likely to have bond reduced to ROR, and, except for property misdemeanants, defendants were less likely to have bonds reduced to amounts
requiring a cash deposit of $100 or less.239
The Austin Committee's indication that one relevant criterion for
resetting bail was the defendant's ability to pay does not seem to be
borne out by the data. Even comparatively small cash deposit requirements sometimes prevented a defendant from obtaining release prior
to

trial. 2

40

Thirty per cent of those who had bond reduction hearings

did not make bail, and 13% of those whose final cash deposit amount
after bond reduction hearing was $100 or less did not make bail. Less
than 6% of those charged with curfew or disorderly conduct were not
released after their bond reduction hearings, but 39% of those charged
with all other offenses did not make bond. Of those who had a money
bond set after reduction hearings, two-fifths failed to make bond;
96% of those defendants were charged with offenses other than curfew and disorderly. These data also seem to cast doubt on the Cook
238 Id. at 94.
239 We also tabulated the results of reduction hearings by employment status; no clear
pattern emerges. The employed obtained proportionately more ROR's among defendants
charged with disorderly conduct, but the unemployed obtained proportionately more
ROR's among property misdemeanor arrestees. On the other hand, unemployed property
misdemeanor defendants more often ended up with bonds over $1,000. The reduction
hearings led to similar results for employed and unemployed property felony defendants,
but students fared better than either of these groups, more often achieving bond reduction to $1,000 or less.
240 The Austin Committee noted that even $100 cash is "a high amount for those who
are poverty stricken." AusrIN CoMmrrrEE REPORT 91. It is noteworthy that, of the defendants for whom we have information concerning bond reduction hearings, 33% had cash
bonds of $100 or more after those hearings. It is difficult to reconcile this fact with the
Austin Committee's apparent approval of the bond reduction hearings in which "$5,000
bonds were reduced to $I,000 or S1,500." Id. at 94. Presumably, the Committee felt that
$100 cash was an appropriate bond for people who had been in detention for a week on
more serious charges, but was not acceptable for defendants arrested for disorderly conduct at the early part of the disorder.

1969]

Criminal Justice in Extremis

County State's Attorney's assertion that reduction in bond was usually
"to the limit that the defendant could make." 241
There may have been several reasons for a defendant's inability to
make bond after a reduction hearing. As we suggested earlier in this
section, some magistrates at bond reduction hearings may have shown
inadequate awareness of the financial plight of many of the defendants
before them. 242 Some were reluctant to reduce bonds they had set.
Conversely, some defendants may have overestimated the resources
available to get them out of jail.243 There are conflicting evaluations
of the quality of bond reduction hearings, 244 but it is clear that more
than one-quarter of those defendants who came before the magistrates
to have bond reduced did not get out of jail before the disposition of
their cases in the Municipal Court system.
Twenty-four per cent of the total number of riot arrestees who
were not released on their own recognizance-and 17% of those whose
cases were not disposed of at their bail hearing-were not able to
obtain their release on bond prior to the final disposition of their
cases. Over half of these defendants were charged with property felonies, and nearly one-fifth with more than one offense. But only 9%
of the curfew arrestees and 11% of the disorderly conduct arrestees
who had money bond set were unable to obtain their release before
trial. Thirty-three per cent of the property felony defendants, 31% of
those charged with multiple offenses, and 22% of the property misdemeanor defendants could not raise enough cash to meet their deposit
requirement.
More important, over half those not making a final cash bond
never had a bond reduction hearing.2 45 And among those who did
241 In fact, one observer has suggested that magistrates were reducing bond "to an
amount that was just over that which the defendant stated he could make." Platt Report
31.
242 See text at note 122 supra.
243 In a telephone conversation on April 1, 1969, Melvin Goldberg, an attorney present
at some of the bond reduction hearings, noted that in some instances magistrates set bond
at amounts that defendants agreed they could raise. Some of these defendants subsequently
failed to obtain pretrial release because friends or relatives could not, or did not, raise
the necessary amount of money.
244 Platt Report 31; AUSTIN COMriTrEE REPORT 94-95.
245 Data on the characteristics of those not making bond show that, both for those who
had bond reduction hearings and those who did not, those with a previous criminal
record and the unemployed were generally less likely to make bond. This probably reflects the fact that those with prior criminal records were more often arrested on serious
charges, for which higher bonds were set, and that the unemployed had less resources
available for bond.
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make bail a surprisingly small percentage forfeited bail by not appear246
ing at a subsequent court appearance.
E. Conclusion

In this section, we have analyzed bail determinations during the
April disorder. We found that the bail policy used did not include
the setting of unusually high money bonds. In fact, felony bonds for
riot arrestees were set near normal levels. Misdemeanor bonds were
set above normal amounts, but not as high as those used in earlier
civil disorders in other cities, or in previous mass arrest situations in
Chicago. The result of the bail determinations, however, was the detention of many arrestees for extended periods of time. A significant
number had difficulty raising even relatively moderate cash bail; those
able to make bail were denied early release because of chaotic bail
posting procedures.
It is important to recognize that detention overnight, for a day, or
for two days was the almost inevitable result of a massive influx of
arrestees into unprepared jail facilities. Detention was prolonged by
inefficient clerical processing in the courts, jails, and police stations.
But there is also evidence that some magistrates were setting cash bail
for the express purpose of detaining riot arrestees, particularly during
the first days of the disorder. Unusually high bond amounts were not
needed to effectuate preventive detention. A large proportion of normal arrestees are unable to make bail; in the chaotic conditions of a
riot, it could be predicted that an even larger proportion would not
make cash bail, at whatever level it was set, especially when they were
unable to communicate with their families, friends, or attorneys. The
use of near normal bail amounts may have reflected an understanding
by the State's Attorney and the Circuit Court that the detention of riot
arrestees could be effectively achieved without utilizing obviously excessive bail determinations, such as those which had been criticized in
Detroit and elsewhere.
Initial bail determinations were non-individualized in most cases,
based only on the charge against the arrestee. Uniformity in bailsetting

is not restricted to times of civil disorder. As early as 1927, one study
of bail in Chicago found:
246 Our data show that 6% of a sample of 1,191 adult arrestees forfeited money bonds
before disposition of their cases in the municipal court system. In many cases, this forfeiture judgment was vacated in accordance with Illinois law. ILL. R V.STAT. ch. 38, § 1107 (1967). Interestingly, 6% of a sample of 599 defendants who were given recognizance
bonds also forfeited bond.
These figures compare favorably with normal forfeiture rates. Chief Judge Boyle has
written that the forfeiture rate for "ten per cent" bonds in Municipal Division One was
10% in 1965, and 11% in 1966. Boyle, supra note 226, at 275.
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[T]here are certain standard amounts of bail for specific offenses. For instance, in the Municipal Court the rule and
practice is that for a single violation of any section of the city
code, the bail is fixed at $400. In the case of "disorderly conduct," for instance, the standard amount is set down by the
clerk, more or less automatically, and irrespective of the facts
in the case, the character and reputation of the accused, etc.
In the Criminal Court, exactly the same policy obtains. For
each charge or indictment for burglary, bail is fixed at $5,000.
In the case of robbery, bail is $10,000 for each indictment,
7
24
and so on.

The Cook County court system has been reorganized since 1927;
bond amounts have changed; the 10%0 cash deposit provision has superseded the bondsman. But the substitution of fixed bail amounts for
individualized determinations, which the early study criticized, is still
apparent. As the transcripts of bond hearings suggest, it was accentuated during the riot.
The uniformity of initial bail determinations during the riot, and
the resulting detention of many arrestees in deplorable conditions,
produced demands from the bar for bond reduction hearings. But these
hearings were not held in substantial numbers until the 14th, four
days after the emergency was officially declared over, a result, in part
at least, of the failure of defense attorneys to request specific bond
reduction hearings earlier and the reluctance of the court to institute
such proceedings on its own motion.
The result of bond reduction hearings, as our data show, was the
release of some defendants on their own recognizance and bond
amount reduction, but not necessarily release, for most of the rest.
After the riot had ended, the courts no longer seemed interested in
continued detention of those arrested during the riot for misdemeanors, especially, curfew violation and disorderly conduct. Those
detained for more serious offenses, however, were often unable to
make their new bonds. In particular, the court seemed reluctant to
set bonds at levels which those with prior criminal records could
meet.
No strictly comparable data on normal arrestees are available. What
data we have suggest that a roughly equal proportion of riot felony
arrestees and normal felony defendants did not make bail. But riot
arrestees were younger and it may be assumed, poorer than those
normally arrested. Accordingly, we may speculate that the prominence
of riot cases resulted, to some degree, in special treatment of them, at
247 A. BEELEY, TnE BAIL SYsTn

IN CHICAGO 31 (1927).
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least after the riot was over. The court achieved its initial goal of
detaining riot arrestees during the disorder. Once the riot had ended,
it appears to have returned to its normal bail practices in both felony
and misdemeanor cases.

V.

THE DISPOSITION OF RIOT CASES

Some 54% of the riot arrestees charged with a misdemeanor were
ultimately convicted in the Municipal Department. Nearly 70% of the
riot felons whose cases were disposed of in the Criminal Division by
February 28, 1969, were also convicted. And one-third of those charged
with multiple offenses during the riot were convicted of at least one
2 48
misdemeanor in the Municipal Department.
The ultimate judicial determination of guilt in these cases, however,
resulted in less severe sanctions than those normally imposed by the
criminal courts. Seventy per cent of the riot felons convicted by early
1969 were sentenced only to probation. Over 90% of the convicted
misdemeanants were fined, and over half of these were fined less than
$15. A majority of those fined never had to pay the amount stipulated; they were credited instead with having worked off their fines
on the basis of the time they had spent in custody prior to trial. For
those defendants-primarily those charged with minor misdemeanors
-- conviction and sentencing were almost a mere formality. Our data
show, for example, that nearly all the convicted disorderly conduct defendants were sentenced to a fine of $50 or less and that for a majority
pretrial detention time equalled or exceeded the fine amount (computed
at the rate of $5 per day). Many of these defendants, who were allowed
to credit their detention time to their fine, fared no worse than
defendants who were not convicted. About half of the curfew and disorderly conduct defendants and over three-fifths of the property misdemeanor defendants who spent three or more days in pretrial detention were ultimately discharged or dismissed. Thus, the punishment
imposed by the criminal justice system was borne by many defendants
before, not after, trial, and it was borne without regard to whether
there was final judgment of guilt.
The courts did ultimately make judgments concerning guilt and
sentencing, and their impact cannot be disregarded. In this section we
consider those factors which are related to the ultimate disposition of
riot cases. Two types of factors may be identified, although they are
not mutually exclusive. The first includes the individual characteristics
248 This figure is somewhat misleading since some defendants were charged with multiple felonies, or a combination of felonies and misdemeanors. The Municipal Department, as was indicated in Section I, has no jurisdiction to hear felony cases, and the final
judgment of that department for such cases is normally "nolle prosequi" or "held to the
grand jury." Of those charged with two misdemeanors, 47%, were convicted of at least

one.
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of defendants-age, prior criminal record, and employment status.
The second includes systemic factors, relating to the operation of the
criminal justice system-the charge filed against, a defendant, when he
was arrested, his ability to obtain release on bond, the length of his
predisposition custody, the date on which his case was disposed of by
the court, and the magistrate presiding over the disposition of his
case. 249 We shall examine these factors as they influenced the defendant's plea, the final judgment entered in his case, and his sentence
if he was convicted. Our data relate primarily to the disposition of
cases in the Municipal Department. At the time we obtained records
on individual cases, few of the riot felony cases had been disposed of
by the Criminal Division. Although we have limited aggregate data
on those which were completed prior to February 28, 1969, we have
no detailed data for individual defendants beyond the Municipal Department. The data on the preliminary disposition of these cases in
the Municipal Department and available data on disposition in the
Criminal Division are presented later in this section. First, however,
we consider the disposition of misdemeanor cases, for which our
statistical information is more exhaustive.
A. Misdemeanor Cases
1. Disposition: The Nature of the Charge. For defendants charged
with single misdemeanors, the seriousness of the offense significantly
influenced the ultimate disposition of the case. (See Table 22.) Threefifths of those charged with curfew violation, and half of those charged
with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest were found guilty. By
contrast, two-fifths of those few defendants charged with misdemeanors
against the person and less than one-third of those charged with
property misdemeanors were convicted. Just as those charged with
more serious offenses were less apt to be convicted, they were more
likely to be dismissed before trial. Three-fifths of the cases against
those charged with personal and property misdemeanors were dismissed, but only one-quarter of the curfew, resisting arrest, and disorderly conduct cases were dismissed. Discharges upon a finding of not
guilty do not follow such a simple pattern; they were relatively rare
for personal and property misdemeanor cases, but not so infrequent for
the other offenses.
There are several possible explanations for these figures. A prima
facie case is relatively easily established by the prosecution for the
less serious offenses; it generally requires only the testimony of the
arresting officer, unlike personal and property misdemeanors. In addi249 Another systemic factor-the Tole of defense counsel-is the subject of Section VII.
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TABLE 22
DIsPosrrION OF CASES

I)isposition
Dismissed
Discharged
Convicted
No. of cases

Disorderly
Conduct

Resisting
Arrest

17
23
61

36
12
51

31
19
50

100
(575)

100
(445)

100
(32)

Curfew
%

Misdemeanor
Against
Property
Person Misdemeanor
60

Total

40

30

30
17
53

100
(10)

100
(135)

100
(1197)

-

62

8

tion, since in Illinois a state case can be dismissed prior to trial in any
of four ways, 250 data on dismissal as a single category tend to obscure
the subtle differences in the disposition of the cases within the three
largest misdemeanor charge categories.
In the discussion below we will consider, for the most part, only
three misdemeanor charge categories-curfew, disorderly conduct, and
property misdemeanor. These three charge groups encompass the entire
TABLE 23
TYPE OF DISMISSAL
Type of
Dismissal*

Curfew
%

Disorderly
Conduct
%

Property
Misdemeanor
%

DWP
SOL
Nolle prosequi
LFD

4
47
20
29

30
30
28
13

19
50
31

100
(162)

100
(84)

Number of cases

100
(96)

0 See note 250, supra.

spectrum of misdemeanor charges in terms of seriousness; they also

constitute 96% of the single-charge misdemeanor cases in our sample.
And because, as we have seen, the charge is the key variable in dis250 There are four forms of dismissal in Cook County. L.F.D. or "leave to file denied"
indicates that a magistrate, normally at a bail or preliminary hearing, has decided that
the charges against the defendant should not be entertained in the courts. S.O.L. or
"stricken off with leave to reinstate" represents the prosecution's agreement to drop
charges with the right to reinstate such charges within four months. In ordinary practice,
an S.O.L. is usually tantamount to a final dismissal. D.W.P. or "dismissed for want of
prosecution" usually indicates the absence of an identifiable complainant or arresting
officer. Nolle prosequi serves as a general category of dismissal used when no other notation is appropriate. Nolle prosequi of a felony charge in the Criminal Division usually
indicates that the charge has been dropped in favor of a guilty plea to a reduced charge.
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position (as it is in sentencing), we will consider the data for each
charge category independently.
With the exception of LFD, it is difficult to determine whether
the court or the State's Attorney initiated a dismissal. LFD represents
a magisterial decision to dismiss the complaint at the initial court
appearance. At times it is used in cases where a night in jail is considered sufficient to achieve the purpose of the charge. It is probably
accurate to say that other forms of dismissal are in the overwhelming
majority of cases initiated by the prosecution. As Table 23 shows,
three-tenths of the curfew dismissals and one-eighth of the disorderly
conduct dismissals were LFD's. By contrast, none of the property
misdemeanor cases was dismissed by use of an LFD order. It is clear
that magistrates were screening curfew violators and disorderly conduct defendants out of the criminal justice system at bail hearings, but
not property misdemeanor arrestees. Furthermore, it is possible to
speculate, on the basis of the data for other dismissal types, that more
dismissals of property misdemeanor cases than of the other two charges
were initiated by the prosecution. This probably reflects the greater
difficulty the State's Attorney had in assembling evidence for a prima
facie case where a property misdemeanor charge was involved.
The data on discharges and convictions for these charges also mask
important differences among them. Twenty-sLx per cent of the curfew
defendants pleaded guilty compared to 16% of those charged with
disorderly conduct and of those charged with property misdemeanors, suggesting that relatively lenient sentences imposed in curfew
cases, as well as the ease of proving a curfew violation, induced many
defendants to plead guilty. But Table 24 shows, somewhat surprisingly,
that only three-fifths of those actually tried for curfew violations were
convicted. The explanation for this is probably the policy of some
magistrates to acquit curfew defendants who had been detained during
the riot, rather than convict and sentence them to time already
2 51

served..

Riot curfew and disorderly conduct charges are offenses for which
there are no counterparts during normal times. The ordinary disorderly conduct case usually involves drunkenness, vagrancy, or a domestic dispute. It would, therefore, be misleading to compare the disposition of all riot misdemeanors with the disposition of an ordinary
sample of misdemeanors. But the other riot misdemeanors-misdemeanors against the person and against property, resisting arrest, and
the handful of miscellaneous charges-may usefully be compared
251 Data presented later in this chapter on disposition by magistrate serve to illustrate
this point. See Table 42 infra.
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TABLE 24
DISPOSITION OF CAsiEs GOING TO TRIAL

Disposition
Convicted
Acquitted
Number of cases

Curfew
%

Disorderly
Conduct
%

60
40

74
26

62
38

100
(327)

100
(213)

100
(29)

Property
Misdemeanor
%

with a normal sample. If we exclude curfew and disorderly conduct
cases from the riot misdemeanors, we find that 34% of the misdemeanor defendants were convicted. This is very similar to the conviction rate for all misdemeanor cases decided in Chicago in 1963, the
last year for which comparable data are available. 252 In that year,
37% of the misdemeanor defendants were convicted. 253 As we shall
later see, the type of sentence imposed in these two groups of cases
was also similar. This suggests that, with the exception of curfew and
disorderly conduct cases, riot charges were not disposed of significantly differently from normal misdemeanors; the differences occurred prior to final disposition and involved bond (and consequent
detention for many) rather than the ultimate decisions in the case.
The conviction rate for the April riot cases differed substantially
from that for defendants arrested during the minor mass disturbances
in 1967. Seventy per cent of those arrested in the 1967 incidents were
ultimately convicted of at least one offense, 254 17% more than the
percentage of single-charge misdemeanants convicted after the 1968
riot. The 1967 defendants were booked on multiple charges; bail, as
noted earlier, 255 was set unusually high; and the majority of the
arrestees spent long periods in custody before trial. As a result, over
three-fifths of these defendants pleaded guilty to at least one charge.
2. Disposition: Personal Factors. We turn now to considerations
of those personal factors which may have had an impact on the likelihood of conviction. We have not attempted to make a particularly
sophisticated analysis of those factors which might have influenced
disposition. Our data limit us to consideration of only a few-prior
criminal record, age, and employment status. We find that, for all
252 In 1954, after the reorganization of the Cook County Circuit Court, official statistics
in misdemeanor and quasi-crime (municipal ordinance) dispositions were combined so
that it is no longer possible to get independent data on misdemeanors.
'13 OArs & LEH MAN 39, Table 7.
254 See note 68 supra.
255 See text at note 115 supra.
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charge categories except curfew, those with prior arrest records were
much more apt to be convicted than those who had not been previously arrested. (See Table 25.)
TABLE 25
CONVICION RATES BY PRioR ARREST RECORD

Curfew

Disorderly Conduct

Convicted

Number
of Cases

Convicted

61%
57%

(493)
(82)

46%
63%

No prior arrest record
Prior arrests

Convicted

Number
of Cases

Convicted

38%
73%

(21)
(11)

33%
100%

No prior arrest record
Prior arrests

Number
of Cases

23%
41%

(86)
(49)

Number
of Cases
(9)
(1)

Total
Single-Charge
Misdemeanors

Property Misdemeanor
Convicted

(303)
(142)

Misdemeanors
Against Person

Resisting Arrest

No prior arrest record
Prior arrests

Number
of Cases

Convicted
52%
58%

Number
of Cases
(912)
(285)

Figures on the disposition of property misdemeanors and disorderly
conduct cases by the age of the defendant are somewhat surprising.
They show that conviction rates were lower for older defendants for
each of these charges, while dismissal rates were higher. (See Table
26.)
TABLE 26
DISPOSMON BY AGE OF DEFENDANT

Age

Number
of cases
( 100%)

Convicted
%

Discharged
%

Dismissed
%

68
58
44
32
53

14
11
14
10
13

18
31
42
58
35

(120)
(116)
(117)
(69)
(422)

34
31
32
17
31

11
8
10
9

55
61
58
83
60

(47)
(36)
(31)
(12)
(126)

Disorderly Conduct:
17-20
21-25
26-35
Over 35
All age groups
Property Misdemeanors:
17-20
21-25
26-35
Over 35
All age groups
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Most of the dismissals were apparently on the prosecutor's motion.
It appears that the State's Attorney's office was screening on the basis
of arrest record in the older age groups. As Table 27 indicates, dismissal rates for those without prior arrest records increase with age
for both charge groups and particularly for disorderly conduct.
TABLE 27
DIsPosrrIoN BY AGE AND PRioR AEREST RECoRD

Per Cent Dismissed

Per Cent Convicted
Age

No Prior

Prior

No Prior

Prior

Arrest

Arrests

Arrest

ArrestsS

67
55
39
19

71
65
52
71

18
33
51
75

17
26
28
6

24
38
21
-

27
25
71
25

61
50
71
100

43
70
14
75

Disorderly Conduct:
17-20
21-25
26-35
Over 35
Property Misdemeanors:
17-20
21-25
26-35
Over 35

There may have been an element of retribution involved in the
State's Attorney's decision to push for conviction of young defendants
because of the prominent role of youth in the early riot period. But
according to Assistant State's Attorney William J. Martin these figures probably reflect a subconscious feeling among prosecutors that
an older black defendant without a prior criminal record arrested
25
during a riot is an inappropriate case for full prosecution.
256 Interview with William J. Martin, April 26, 1969. We also cross-tabulated disposition at trial for those defendants whose cases were not dismissed by age. Conviction rates
at trial were as follows:

Disorderly Conduct
Age in
Years

Number
of Cases

17-20
21-25
26-35
Over 35
Total

73
60
55
21
209

Per Cent
Convicted
77
78
71
67
75

Property Misdemeanors
Number
of Cases

12
10
6
1
29

Per Cent
Convicted

58
70
50
100
62

These data suggest that trial disposition was not influenced by age to the same extent as
dismissals.
The age pattern for dismissals holds for defendants arrested at each stage of the riot,
although it is least significant for those arrested during the peak of riot. Data on disorderly conduct dismissals, by age and time of arrest, reveal that younger defendints were

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

Table 28 shows conviction rates for curfew, disorderly conduct, and
property misdemeanor cases by employment status. No such clear
pattern emerges as for prior record or age.
TABLE 28
CONVIGTON RATE BY EmPLOYMENT STATUS

Curfew

Disorderly Conduct

Property Misdemeanors

Employment
Status

Per Cent
Convicted

Number
of
Cases

Per Cent
Convicted

Number
of
Cases

Per Cent
Convicted

Employed
Unemployed
Student
Other

63
63
55
67

(267)
(169)
(99)
(3)

56
46
56
40

(245)
(114)
(32)
(10)

35
32
14

Number
of
Cases
(83)
(25)
(7)
(7)

g. Disposition: Systemic Factors. Systemic factors influence disposition in different ways, and no single factor can be expected to
correlate consistently with disposition. The factors which we have
analyzed statistically are those which we initially hypothesized would
indicate differential disposition rates-either because they entered
directly into judicial decision-making or because they are related to
factors which were influential. We found that there are variations in
conviction rates for each of the three charge categories dependent
upon date and time of arrest, date of dispositive court appearance,
less likely to have their cases dismissed than older arrestees at whatever riot period they
were arrested:
Age (in years)
17-20
Time of
Arrest
6 pm Thursday-6 pm Friday
6 pm Fri.-Midnight Sat.
Sunday
After Sunday

Number
of Cases
13
65
14
30

21-25
Per Cent
Dismissed
23
17
14
17

Number
of Cases

Per Cent
Dismissed

9
56
23
25

44
21
34
40

Age (in years)
26-35
Time of
Arrest

Number
of Cases

6 pm Thursday-6 pm Friday
6 pm Fri.-Midnight Sat.
Sunday
After Sunday

8
66
21
18

Over 35
Per Cent
Dismissed
62
30
38
72

Number
of Cases
11
26
11
18

Per Cent
Dismissed
91
30
72
72

The small number of property misdemeanor cases does not allow us to examine dismissal
patterns by age and time of arrest for defendants arrested on charges in that category.
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length of pretrial custody, and bond history. But these factors did
not all influence disposition in the same manner.
Table 29 shows conviction and dismissal rates by time of arrest
for curfew, disorderly conduct, and property misdemeanor defendants. The relationship between time of arrest and disposition is different in each charge category. Curfew defendants arrested late in the
riot (Sunday or later) were more likely to be convicted than those
arrested earlier; disorderly conduct defendants arrested during peak
riot hours (6 p.m. Friday-Midnight Saturday) were most likely to be
convicted; and property misdemeanor defendants arrested during the
early riot period (6 p.m. Thursday-6 p.m. Friday) were more likely to
be convicted.
TABLE 29
DIsPosmION By Tihm

Time of Arrest

Per Cent
Convicted

OF

ARasr

Per Cent
Discharged

Per Cent
Dismissed

Number
of Cases
(= 100%)

Curfew:
6 pm Thursday-6 pm Friday

-

-

-

6 pm Friday-Midnight Sat.
Sunday
After Sunday

48
68
61

36
24
20

76
8
19

(69)
(148)
(329)

89
61
55
43

7
15
7
11

54
24
38
46

(41)
(209)
(69)
(90)

50
29
29
14

4
11
14
-

46
59
57
86

(24)
(76)
(7)
(14)

(0)

Disorderly Conduct:
6 pm Thursday-6 pm Friday
6 pm Friday-Midnight Sat.
Sunday
After Sunday
Property Misdemeanors:
6 pm Thursday-6 pm Friday
6 pm Friday-Midnight Sat.
Sunday
After Sunday

There is then no over-all consistent relationship between time of
arrest and disposition as we noted earlier existed between bond
amount and time of arrest. It seems probable that the courts responded
less to the pattern of events in the streets when they eventually disposed of riot cases than they had during the riot and its immediate
aftermath when they set bond.
One possible test of the relationship between changing judicial
attitudes toward riot arrestees over time and the disposition of riot
cases is conviction rates by date of disposition. Table 30 shows, how-
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ever, that conviction rates for curfew and disorderly conduct defendants increased sharply for cases disposed of after April 28-more than
two weeks after the end of the riot. For property misdemeanors,
on the other hand, the pattern is reversed. The later the disposition
of a property charge, the more likely was a dismissal or acquittal on
the merits.
TABLE 30
CONVICtION

RATES By DATE OF CouRT DISPOSmON

Number

Per Cent Convicted
Date

Total

Guilty Plea

Trial

of Cases

26
64
76

10
32
25

17
32
51

(92)
(346)
(135)

40
59
69

17
7
22

23
51
47

(235)
(107)
(102)

83
28

50
19

33
9

(18)
(73)

Curfew:
April 5-27
April 28-June 1
After June 1
Disorderly Conduct:
April 5-27
April 28-June 1
After June 1
Property Misdemeanors:
April 5-27
April 28-June 1

In part, these patterns reflect different dismissal patterns for the
different charge categories. As noted earlier, some magistrates dismissed curfew charges at bond hearings. This probably accounts for
a significant proportion of the dismissals before April 28. Forty-nine
per cent of the curfew defendants whose cases were heard before
April 27 were dismissed, but only about 10% of those whose cases
were heard after that date were dismissed. Magistrates apparently
also dismissed disorderly conduct cases at early stages. Forty-four per
cent of disorderly conduct cases disposed of before April 27 were dismissed, while only 28% of disorderly conduct cases heard after that
date were dismissed. Dismissals of property misdemeanor cases, on
the other hand, as we have seen, were predominantly on the motion
of the prosecutor, which may explain why they were granted later.
Seventeen per cent of the property misdemeanor cases disposed of
before April 27 were dismissed, while 70% of those disposed of
later were dismissed.
But dismissal rates do not totally explain the disposition data.
Table 31 demonstrates that the conviction rate among cases disposed
of at trial increased for curfew and disorderly conduct defendants
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and decreased for property misdemeanor defendants the later the
case was heard. And the evidence of guilty pleas also fails to explain
the relationship between date of dispositive court appearance and
conviction rates. (See Table 30.)
While guilty pleas represent a greater proportion of curfew defendants disposed of the longer after the riot the disposition occurred,
the data indicate that the conviction rate at trial was also higher for
those cases disposed of later. The proportion of guilty pleas for disorderly conduct actually dropped for cases heard in May, but nevertheless the conviction rate increased, as more than four-fifths of those
whose cases were tried were convicted. Property misdemeanor guilty
pleas declined after April, as did the conviction rate at trial.
TABLE 31
CONVICrION RATE AT TRuL BY DATE OF COURT DIsPOSITON

Curfew

Date
April 5-27
April 28-June 1
After June 1

Disorderly Conduct

Property Misdemeanors

Per Cent
Convicted

Number
of Cases
Tried

Per Cent
Convicted

Number
of Cases
Tried

Per Cent
Convicted

Number
of Cases
Tried

51
71
87

(47)
(31)
(118)

73
83
92

(131)
(76)
(76)

100
80
60

(15)
(15)
(20)

The most likely explanation for the relationship between date of
dispositive court appearance and conviction is that different magistrates sat at different times. As we shall see, 257 each magistrate had
a distinctive method of disposing of riot cases. But one of the important factors determining the date of a defendant's court appearance is whether or not he secured release on bail or recognizance.
Generally in Cook County the cases of criminal defendants not out
on bail are advanced on the docket. During the riot, the presiding
judge of the Municipal Division announced that this practice would
be carried out for riot arrestees. 25 1 Our data indicate that earlier hearings were generally held for misdemeanants who did not make bail.
(See Table 32.)
Disposition by bond history is shown in Table 33, For curfew and
disorderly conduct it shows a higher conviction rate for those making
cash bond than for those not making bond and a still higher conviction rate for those released on their own recognizance. For property
misdemeanor cases, on the other hand, conviction rates were lower
257 See Table 42 infra.
258 Chicago Tribune, April 11, 1968, § I, at 8.
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TABLE 32
DATE OF COURT DisPosITION BY BOND HISTORY

Date

Bond Not Made
%

Cash Bond Made
%

R 0 R
%

50
38
13

49
24
28

3
72
24

100
(8)

100
(76)

100
(442)

74
10
16

56
25
19

18
35
47

100
(31)

100
(252)

100
(102)

41
37
22

5
27
68

50
50

100
(27)

100
(93)

100
(2)

Curfew:
April 5-27
April 28-June 1
After June 1
Number of cases
Disorderly Conduct:
April 5-27
April 28-June 1
After June 1
Number of cases
Property Misdemeanors:
April 5-27
April 28-June 1
After June 1
Number of cases

for those released on bond. 259 Moreover, as Table 33 indicates, the
changes in conviction rate over time are primarily the result of
charging dismissal, not discharge, rates. Curfew and disorderly conduct defendants released on bail or ROR were more likely than those
not released to be tried later and convicted, while property misdemeanor defendants released on bail or ROR were more likely to have
their cases dismissed or discharged at a later court appearance than
those who were not released. Bond history, then, appears to have indirectly affected conviction rates by influencing the date on which
a case was disposed of. But it is also important to consider the direct
impact of bond history on the likelihood of conviction. 20 It would
259 It should be pointed out, however, that less than 2% of the curfew violators and
7% of the disorderly conduct arrestees, but 22% of the property misdemeanants, were
unable to make bond. In addition, bond forfeitures may have had some effect on the
higher conviction rates for the curfew and disorderly conduct defendants released on
bond. In Illinois forfeiture of bond is a felony, but the usual procedure is to vacate the
forfeiture and quash the warrant for arrest if a defendant appears in court within 30
days. This practice was followed for most riot misdemeanor cases. Eighty-one per cent
and 88%, respectively, of the curfew and disorderly conduct defendants who missed court
appearances were convicted. In comparison, only one of the four property misdemeanor
defendants who forfeited bond was convicted.
260 See Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 641 (1964).
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seem logical that those unable to make bond-and, therefore, detained
until the disposition of their cases-would be more likely to plead
guilty in exchange for sentence or fine credit for time already
61
served.
TABLE 33
DISPOSITION BY BOND HISTORY

Bond History

Convicted
%

Discharged
%

Dismissed
%

Number
of Cases
(= 100%)

50
55
67

12
32
23

38
13
10

(8)
(77)
(443)

45
57
62

10
17
10

45
26
28

(31)
(252)
(102)

62
22
-

5
11
-

33
67
100

(27)
(94)
(2)

Curfew:
Bond not made
Cash bond made
ROR
Disorderly Conduct:
Bond not made
Cash bond made
ROR
Property Misdemeanors:
Bond not made
Cash bond made
ROR

But Table 34 shows that there is no consistent relationship between
bond history and conviction rates for those charged with curfew
violations or disorderly conduct when we control for date of disposition. Among property misdemeanor defendants, on the other hand,
TABLE 34
CONVICTION RATES BY BOND HISTORY AND DATE OF CouRT DISPOSITION

Per Cent Convicted
Curfew

Disorderly Conduct

Property Misdemeanors

Bond April5- April 28- After April5- April 28- After April5- April 28- After
History April 27 June 1 June 1 April 27 June I June 1 April 27 June 1 June 1
Bond not
made

50

67

46

54

Cash bond
made

39

73

63

ROR

46

63

81

-

40

91

60

54

68

59

60

24

17

22

55

81

-

-

-

-

there is a consistent relationship. Those defendants who did not make
bond were far more likely to be convicted than those who made
bond whether their cases were heard before or after April 27.
261 See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 38 (1964).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:455

No significantly greater proportion of curfew and disorderly conduct defendants who were not released on bond pleaded guilty than
of those who were released. Indeed, a smaller percentage of the few
curfew defendants not released on bond pleaded guilty than of those
who were released. The opposite was true with respect to property
misdemeanor defendants: a far greater proportion of those who did
not make bond pleaded guilty than of those who were released before trial. (See Table 35.)
TABLE 35
GUILTY PLEA AND TRIAL CONVICEION RATE

Per___________________________Number
Cent Convicted
Bond History

Total

Guilty Plea

At Trial

of Cases

Curfew:
Bond not made
Cash bond made
ROR

50
55
67

13
18
34

38
36
33

(8)
(77)
(443)

45
58
62

26
17
21

19
41
41

(31)
(252)
(102)

59
22
-

44
12
-

15
11
-

(27)
(94)
(2)

Disorderly Conduct:
Bond not made
Cash bond made
ROR
Property Misdemeanors:
Bond not made
Cash bond made

ROR

The time which a defendant spent in jail prior to the disposition
of his case might be expected to influence conviction rates more directly than bond history. Predisposition custody time could have
either of two opposite effects on disposition. On the one hand, longer
predisposition custody time would be expected to induce more guilty
pleas for minor misdemeanors, in exchange for crediting the detention time against fines or sentences. On the other hand, longer pretrial detention might lead to increased dismissal and discharge rates
because magistrates regard the pretrial custody as punishment enough
for minor charges.
Among curfew defendants, the latter tendency appears to have
predominated: those detained three days or longer less often pleaded
guilty, but were more often convicted at trial. Among those charged
with disorderly conduct, both effects seems to have operated: those
detained three days or longer more often pleaded guilty but, if they
did not, were less likely to be convicted the longer they had been
detained. Guilty plea rates increased sharply among property mis-
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demeanor defendants detained three days or longer; conviction rates
at trial, on the other hand, showed an ambiguous pattern with increasing pretrial detention time. (See Table 86.)
Our data suggest that pretrial detention was often considered
sufficient punishment for those charged with curfew violations and
disorderly conduct. In part, this may reflect the large number of
young persons and ghetto residents without prior criminal records
arrested on these charges. Those defendants who had secured release
on ROR or bail, however, were more often convicted than those
who did not, suggesting a judicial reluctance to allow minor riot
offenders off without some from of punishment.
For many property misdemeanor defendants, on the other hand,
even lengthy pretrial detention was not considered sufficient punishment. Those detained longer were more likely to be convicted, whether
because they were induced to plead guilty or (except for those detained over 30 days) because a magistrate was less willing to consider
time served sufficient punishment without a formal finding of guilt.
The very low conviction rate at trial for those detained over 80
days suggests that magistrates were considering pretrial custody of
this length as sufficient punishment without a conviction.
TABLE 36
GUILTY

PLEA AND TRIAL CONvIcTION RATE BY LENGTH OF PREDISPOSrriON CUSTODY

Per Cent Convicted

Number of
Cases

Total

Guilty Plea

Trial

62

28

34

50
56
52

10
11
9

40
44
43

51

13

38

(312)

55
52
41

23
23
24

32
29
18

(74)
(31)
(17)

19
32
56
31

6
20
25
23

13
12
31
8

(48)
(41)
(16)
(26)

Curfew:

0-2
3-10
11-30
Over 30

(569)
(10)
(9)
(23)

Disorderly Conduct:

0-2
3-10
11-30
Over 30
Property Misdemeanors:
0-2
3-10
11-30
Over 30

4. Sentencing. Sentences for convicted riot misdemeanants were
predominantly fines of relatively small amounts. Tables 37 and 88 give
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a breakdown of sentence type and fine amounts for those convicted
of misdemeanors. 262 Sentence type, if curfew and disorderly conduct
cases are excluded, is very similar to that for normal misdemeanors.
In 1963, the last year for which comparable data are available, 24%
of the convicted misdemeanants were fined, 21% were placed on
probation, and 55% were imprisoned. 26 3 The comparable distribution for the serious riot misdemeanors is 26%, 15%, and 59%. No data

are available to compare severity of sentences.
Three-fourths of the multiply-charged misdemeanants and 57%

of the singly-charged misdemeanants who were fined were credited with
TABLE 37
SENTENCES BY CHARGE

Curfew
Fine
Probation

97
-

Disorderly
Conduct

Resisting
Arrest

97

59

1

-

Fine and
probation
Prison and
probation
Prison
Number
of Cases

Misdemeanors
against
Persons

Property
Misdemeanors

Total

25
50

5

91

10

a

-

20

2

a

18

25

43

3

a

2

23

-

23

4

100

100

100

100

100

100

(353)

(229)

(17)

(4)

(40)

(646)b

-

a Less than
of 1 per cent.
b Includes three fines imposed in other misdemeanor cases.

having worked off their fines on the basis of the time they had spent
in custody prior to trial. 264 Of those sentenced to jail, 54% of the multiply-charged and 74% of the singly-charged were credited with the
265
time they had spent prior to trial.

262 Of the 43 misdemeanants sentenced to time in jail, 35% were sentenced to 10 days
or less and 47% to 11-30 days.
263 OArs & LEHMAN 39, Table 7.
264 Illinois law requires that detention time prior to sentencing for those defendants
not making bail for a bailable offense be credited toward the fine imposed at the rate of
$5 per day. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-14 (1967).
265 Sixty-four per cent of the misdemeanants sentenced to jail, or jail and probation,
had been convicted of property misdemeanors and 26% had been convicted for resisting
arrest. Seventy per cent of the property misdemeanants were given sentence credit, but
only 30% of those convicted of resisting arrest.
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TABLE 38
AMouNTs or FINE

Fine

Amount

Curfew
%

Disorderly
Conduct
%

Resisting
Arrest
%

Misdemeanors
against
Persons
%

52
47

61
31

45
36

100
-

40
-

55
40

1
*

5
3

18
-

-

60
-

4
I

100

100

100

100

100

100

(845)

(221)

(1)

(5)

(583)

$5-$15
$16-$50
$51-$150
Over $150
Number of
Cases

(11)

Property
Misdemeanors
%

Total
%

Less than V of 1 per cent.

These figures suggest that for many misdemeanants post-trial sentencing was largely a formality. In Table 39 we compare fine amounts
for those convicted of curfew and disorderly conduct and sentence
lengths for those convicted of property misdemeanors with length of
pretrial detention. The fine amounts for half those fined for curfew
violations and three-fifths of those fined for disorderly conduct were
the equivalent of detention for a period shorter than or equal to their
pretrial detention. The length of prison sentences imposed on threefifths of the property misdemeanants sentenced to prison or prison
and probation was shorter than or equal to their pretrial detention.
TABLE 39
COPARISON OF LENGTH OF PRETRuL DETENTION AND SENTENCE*

Curfew

Disorderly
Conduct
%

Property
Misdemeanors

Less than or equal
to pretrial detention

49

61

59

Greater than
pretrial detention

52

38

41

Sentence

Number of cases

100

100

100

(845)

(220)

(27)

* Fines are translated into days at the Illinois rate of $5 = I day.

Data on the severity of sentences by plea show that those pleading
guilty to curfew violations and disorderly conduct were more likely
to be fined greater amounts; there is no comparable relationship
between the length of sentence imposed on those few persons con-
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victed oi property misdemeanors and plea, but the number of cases
is small. (See Table 40.)
AmOUNTS OF

TABLE 40
FIN, By TYPE OF

PLEA

Curfew

Fine Amount
(in $)
0-5
6-10

Guilty
Plea
%

Convicted After
Not Guilty
Plea
%

1
19

3
70

11-15

-

16-50
51-150
Over 150

79
1
1

Number
of Cases

Disorderly Conduct
Guilty
Plea
%

1
24
1
-

Convicted After
Not Guilty
Plea
%

38
3
56
3
-

22
6
4

64

1

100

100

100

100

(150)

(175)

(64)

(148)

These figures do not necessarily show that those pleading guilty were
not in fact treated as leniently as those convicted after a not-guilty
plea. As we have seen, sentence severity often reflected pretrial detention time. For example, 35% of those who pleaded guilty to disorderly conduct spent four or more days in custody before trial while
only 20% of those convicted at trial were detained that long.
Sentencing is within the discretion of the individual magistrate.
We would expect that the behavior patterns of the magistrates, more
than any other factor, will explain sentence data. We turn to an analysis of disposition and sentencing patterns for different magistrates.
5. Magistrates: Disposition and Sentencing Practices. Four magistrates disposed of more than f6ur-fifths of the curfew violations, disorderly conduct, and property misdemeanor cases stemming from the
riot. Table 41 indicates that Judge Wendt heard at least one-quarter
of the cases in each of these categories, and Magistrate Lee heard
266
more than one-eighth of each category.
266 We checked the incidence of prior arrest records among the defendants heard by
each magistrate, to see whether there were personal factors which accounted for the different disposition patterns of each magistrate. The results by charge are as follows:

Per Cent With No Prior Record
Magistrate

Curfew

Disorderly
Conduct

Property
Misdemeanors

Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

86
88
84
85

62
60
60
60

48
69
68
67

There is remarkable similarity among the cases which came before the four magistrates.
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Judge Wendt normally serves on the Narcotics Court, where he is
known for his ability to dispose of a large daily caseload efficiently
and fairly. He supervised the setting of the docket and the assignment of magistrates to handle riot cases, as well as hearing a large
number himself. As a judge, Wendt is in a more secure position than
267
magistrates, whose terms expire each year.
TABLE 41
DISTRMUTION oF CASES AMONG MAGISTRATES

Curfew

Disorderly
Conduct

Property
Misdemeanor

Magistrate

%

%

%

Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill
All Others

25
24
20
13
18

35
15
12
10
28

37
27
23
5
15

100

100

100

(558)

(447)

(138)

Number of Cases

Tables 42 and 43 show that Judge Wendt handled each category
of riot cases in a different manner than the three magistrates. He
acquitted only 1% of disorderly conduct defendants, and none of
those charged with curfew or a property misdemeanor. Ninety-three
per cent of the property misdemeanor cases which came before him
were dismissed, a far higher percentage than for Magistrates Lee,
Limperis or Gill.
Wendt's sentences, however, were much more lenient than those
of the magistrates. Table 44 shows that he fined 96% of those he
convicted of curfew violations, and 92% of those he convicted of disorderly conduct, $10 or less. And, as Table 45 shows, 98% of those
he fined were given credit for time served equivalent to the amount
of the fine.
Wendt apparently considered curfew and disorderly conduct
charges as similar enough to be treated in the same way. His disposition of these cases--conviction and a fine, with time considered
served-suggests that he was legitimating the arrests made during
the riot, but saw no need to impose further punishment. If that is an
accurate statement of his attitude, it was perceived by many of the
arrestees we interviewed, who recognized their initial arrest and predisposition detention as their primary punishment.
Data on the age of defendants whose cases were disposed of by each magistrate show
greater discrepancies. Limperis heard a somewhat greater proportion of those over 25
than the other magistrates,
267 See Section I supra.
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TABLE 42
DIspoSrION BY MAGISTRATE
Convicted
Guilty
Plea
%

Trial
%

Discharged
%

Dismissed
%

Number
(= 100%)

Curfew:
Vendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

9
22
37
44

81
7
33
19

64
4
31

10
7
26
6

(140)
(137)
(111)
(73)

Disorderly Conduct:
Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

12
21
25
5

75
20
12
47

7
35
12
19

12
24
52
30

(140)
(67)
(53)
(55)

Property Misdemeanors:
Wendt
Lee
31
Limperis
13
Gill
67

7
8
20

-

93
44
64
33

(41)
(86)
(31)
(6)

Magistrate

17
8

TABLE 43
CONVICTION RATES AT TRIAL BY MAGISTRATES

Magistrate
Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

Curfew
%

Disorderly
Conduct
%

100
10
93
89

99
36
50
71

Property
Misdemeanors
%
100
3
86

TABLE 44
AMOUNT OF FINE BY MAGISTRATE

Per Cente
Magistrate

Number
Fined
(
100%)

$5-$10

$15-$25

Curfew:
Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

96
7
50
2

4
59
41
93

34
8
4

(125)
(41)
(78)
(46)

Disorderly Conduct:
Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

92
4
22
19

2
29
23
71

6
67
54
10

(120)
(24)
(18)
(21)

Over $25
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TABLE 45
FINE CREDIT FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION TiNiE BY MAGISTRATE

Percentage of Those Fined Given Credit
for Pretrial Detention

Magistrate

Total

Full Amount
of Fine
Credited

Less Than
Full Amount
Credited

Number
Fined

98
34
74
24

96
12
41
7

2
22
33
17

(125)
(41)
(78)
(46)

99
58
61
81

97
29
39
52

2
29
22
29

(120)
(24)
(18)
(21)

Curfew:
Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill
Disorderly Conduct:
Wendt
Lee
Limperis
Gill

Magistrate Lee, in contrast with Judge Wendt, found relatively
few defendants guilty at trial. But 96% of the disorderly conduct
defendants he convicted he fined $15 or more. Only 34% of the curfew sentences included credit for time served, and for only 12%
this credit was equal to the full amount of the fine.
Magistrate Lee normally sits in Branch 36, where most misdemeanor cases are eventually tried, and has presided at the disposition
of many past mass arrest cases in Chicago. He has been criticized by
the Negro bar for the handling of these cases. In dealing with riot
misdemeanor cases, he seems to have decided each case on an individual basis, unlike Judge Wendt. In an interview, he indicated that
he repeatedly refused to cooperate with the State's Attorney in promising defendants who pleaded guilty that they would be sentenced only
to time already considered served. 2 8 The relatively harsh fines Magistrate Lee levied in some cases required several indigent defendants
to spend additional time in jail to work off their fines.
Magistrate Limperis served in the Corporation Counsel's office and
as a private attorney before becoming a magistrate. He also has
been active in the Democratic party. Until recently, when he was
transferred to a civil court, Limperis served in Branch 46 and, when
necessary, Branch 47. Like Magistrate Lee, he has been criticized by
black lawyers and civil rights groups for his handling of mass arrest
cases before the riot.
Limperis had a much higher conviction rate than Magistrate Lee
268 Austin Committee files.
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for those curfew, disorderly conduct, and property misdemeanor
cases he heard on the merits, but he also dismissed more cases. The
fines he imposed were generally lower than Lee's, but he did fine half
of the convicted curfew violators $15 or more and over half of the
convicted disorderly conduct defendants over $25. More than twofifths of the curfew fines and nearly two-fifths of the disorderly conduct fines, however, were fully disposed of by crediting predisposition detention. Only one-fourth of the curfew violators and two-fifths
of the disorderly conduct offenders had to pay the full fine amount.
Gill, an ex-State's Attorney, dismissed very few curfew cases. His
conviction rate at trial on the merits was between Lee's and Limperis's. He dismissed a higher percentage of disorderly conduct cases
than Judge Wendt and Magistrate Lee, and convicted a large proportion of those going to trial on the merits. It would appear that,
unlike Judge Wendt, he did not follow a uniform conviction policy.
When he did convict, however, he levied fines of $15-$25 fairly uniformly. He credited time served against the fine for only one-fourth
of the curfew defendants he convicted. He handled disorderly offenders somewhat differently, crediting four-fifths with time served.
Each of the four men seems, then, to have had a distinctive method
of handling riot misdemeanor cases. We hypothesized earlier that
differences in conviction percentage rates by date of dispositive court
appearance might be the result of the policies of different magistrates
who sat at different periods. In Table 46, we indicate the distribution
of cases by date for the four magistrates whose performance we have
analyzed. The figures appear to support our hypothesis: Wendt,
whose conviction rate was very high for curfew and disorderly conduct, heard a greater proportion of the later cases, which undoubtedly
accounts in part for the high conviction rate among curfew and disorderly conduct defendants tried during later periods. It is also
likely that the effect of a defendant's ability to make bond, or length
of predisposition custody, on his likelihood of conviction depended
upon the particular magistrate before whom his case was heard. The
policies of each magistrate or judge account for much of the variation in the disposition of the riot misdemeanor cases.
Our analysis of misdemeanor cases has demonstrated that age and
prior arrest record, taken in conjunction, were influential factors in
the disposition of riot cases. Cases against disorderly conduct and
property misdemeanor defendants were more likely to be dismissed
the older a defendant was-provided that he had no prior arrest record. In not pressing for conviction in these cases, the State's Attor-
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TABLE 46
DIsTRIBuTlON OF CASES AMONG MAGISTRATES By DATE OF COURT DsPosrrlON

Curfew

Magistrate
Wendt
Lee
Gill
Limperis
Others
Number
of Cases

April 5-27
%

April 28June 1
7

14
20
5
5
55

20
32
20
16
12

100
(92)

Disorderly Conduct
After
June 1
7

April 5-27
0

April 28June 1
0

After
June 1
%

41
6
28
9
16

10
18
17
10
45

49
18
5
16
12

67
7
13
13

100

100

100

100

100

(346)

(135)

(237)

(101)

(98)

Property Misdemeanors

Magistrate
Wendt
Lee
Gill
Limperis
Others

Number of Cases

April 5-27
%

April 28-June 1
Y

After June 1
7

6
17
39
11
28

12
47
23
9
9

16
48
19
16

100

100

100

(18)

(43)

(73)

ney was in effect screening out many of those arrests which may have
been attributable, in part, to the confusion of the riot, rather than
to serious criminal conduct on the part of the defendant. The

young, however, were apparently not afforded the same treatment.
The apparent exercise of prosecutorial discretion in moving for dismissals was matched by magisterial discretion in deciding whether

to convict and how to sentence. The data, even on the four magistrates
we studied, show wide variations in judicial practices regarding riot
misdemeanor defendants. Other magistrates exhibited still different
patterns of disposition and sentencing of riot misdemeanor defendants. And, while none of the magistrates imposed sentences which
were particularly severe, it should be noted that court records indicate that 21 convicted riot misdemeanants were forced to spend
time in jail to work off fines. For some indigent defendants, even
modest fines resulted in post-conviction incarceration.
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B. Disposition: Felony Cases

The preliminary hearing is unusually important in felony prosecutions in Illinois, because it marks the first stage at which the police
decision to arrest is critically reviewed. In contrast with most other
jurisdictions, the prosecutor in Illinois normally has little discretion
in charging. Even during the riot, when the State's Attorney's office
did establish the charging policy, it had little control over what
arrests were made and which arrestees were formally charged. The
pretrial screening function performed by the prosecutor in other
jurisdictions is largely left in Illinois to the preliminary hearing.
Only in that proceeding, after the charge has been determined, are
spurious or doubtful felony cases dismissed.
Formally, a magistrate must find "probable cause" to believe that
the defendant committed the offense with which he is charged to
order that he be held over to the grand jury. The magistrate's decision,
however, may rest on different considerations. According to Donald
McIntyre, as a general rule magistrates apply a standard of "adequacy
of evidence to support a conviction," and this standard may vary
from charge to charge. 269 When this evidentiary threshold is not

met, McIntyre found that the magistrate either dismisses the charge
or encourages reduction to a misdemeanor. Magistrates are inclined
to dispose of felony cases at preliminary hearings, McIntyre asserts,
because they know that "the single grand jury in Cook County, the
ten judges who preside over felony trials, the limited personnel in
the State's Attorney's office, and the heavily taxed jails and probation
facilities can only handle about 20% of the cases." 270 The magistrate's
primary concern is to avoid the time, delay, and difficulty involved
in full trials of felony cases. There is a systemic interest in disposing
of felony cases at the earliest possible stage of prosecution.
Four-fifths of the felony cases in the sample McIntyre studied were
disposed of at preliminary hearings.2 71 These cases either were dismissed on the basis of the preliminary findings, were reduced to
misdemeanors and later heard on the merits in the Municipal Department, or were heard on the merits immediately, as the defendant
waived his right to indictment and proceeded to trial before a judge
of the Municipal Department. 272 Most of these last two groups of
269 McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. CRAT.
L.C. & P.S. 463, 475 (1968).
270 Id. at 464-5.
271 Id. at 464.
272 In Illinois all felony prosecutions must be by indictment unless waived understandingly by the accused in open court. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-2(a) (1967). When the
defendant waives his right to indictment, the method of prosecution is usually referred
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cases involved a plea bargain between the prosecution and the defense.

The magistrate, because of the importance of his preliminary hearing determination, is able to review the appropriateness of a charge
reduction involved in plea bargaining.
The riot arrestees charged with felonies were processed differently
from normal felony defendants in the Municipal Department. The
statistics show that their cases were much more likely to go to the
grand jury for indictment than McIntyre's sample of normal cases.
Seventy-two per cent of the riot felony cases but only one-fifth of
those in McIntyre's sample were presented to the grand jury for indictment. Only 21% of the riot felony cases were dismissed at preliminary hearing, either on the motion of the State's Attorney or because the magistrate found no probable cause. (See Table 47.)
TABLE 47
DISPOSITON OF FELONY CASES IN MUNICIPAL DEPARYTAENTa

Disposition

Property
Felony
%

Robbery
%

Felony
Against
Person
%

Arson
%

Weaponsb
%

Viceb
%

Total
%

Discharged

3

-

-

14

27

15

5

Dismissed

17

27

26

-

32

Convicted

2

-

-

-

20

67
3

21
5

79

73

44

86

22

15

72

100

100

100

100

100

100

(553)

(15)

(9)

(7)

(41)

(33)

Held for
prosecutione

Number =

100
(658)

a This table includes only those defendants charged with one felony. Due to difficulties
in obtaining felony disposition data from court records, not all riot felony defendants are
included.
b An undetermined number of persons charged with these offenses were prosecuted as
misdemeanor defendants, rather than as felony defendants. That fact is reflected in the
relatively high proportion of such cases disposed of at trial in the Municipal Department.
c The figures in this category may overstate slightly the percentage of felony cases held
for prosecution in the Criminal Division. The formal disposition in the Municipal Department of riot cases held for further prosecution in the Criminal Division was usually
nolle prosequi. Normally that disposition is used to indicate the reduction of a felony
charge to a misdemeanor, or an outright dismissal, and a few of the riot cases which
we have included in "held for prosecution" may in fact have been reduced or dismissed.
See note 250 supra.

The vast majority of riot felony cases-84%0-involved property
offenses. Ninety-four per cent of the property felony defendants were
arrested for burglary. A comparison of our data on these property feloto as proceeding by information. Proceeding by information is most frequently used in
narcotics offenses.
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ny defendants with a sample of normal burglary cases collected by McIntyre shows that the riot cases were much less likely to be disposed of
at preliminary hearing than were normal burglaries. Only one-fifth
of the riot property felony cases were discharged, dismissed, or reduced to a misdemeanor at preliminary hearings compared with
two-thirds of McIntyre's sample. (See Table 48.)
TABLE 48
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY FELONIES

Disposition
Dismissal or discharge
Reduction to misdemeanor
Held for further prosecutione

Riot
Property
Felonya
%

Normal
Burglaryb
%

19
2
79

44
22
33

100

100

a See note a, Table 47 supra.
b Source: Sample of cases disposed of from January to May 1966, derived from McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of the Charging Process, 59 J. Cnmt. L.C. & P.S.
463 (1968).
e See note c, Table 47 supra.

The reason for this disparity is clear. In the preponderance of
riot felony cases, a preliminary hearing was never held. In most
cases, the State's Attorney decided to avoid the preliminary hearing
and rely on the grand jury formally to determine probable cause in
the first instance. 273 Only 13% of the property felonies went before
the grand jury at the order of a magistrate after a preliminary hearing.
The preliminary hearing is generally held in the same proceeding
in which the defendant is advised of the charge against him and his
right to counsel and admitted to bail. In some cases, where the State
or the defense need additional time to obtain evidence or subpoena
witnesses, continuances may be granted for two to three weeks. If
the preliminary hearing is continued on the motion of the prosecution and the defendant has not made bond, a writ of habeas corpus
will lie to obtain his release or compel an earlier preliminary hear273 McIntyre estimates that there are normally only 400 cases each year for which pre-

liminary hearings are not conducted. These are primarily cases involving crime syndicate
operators, indicted defendants on bond who commit another crime, situations where new
evidence indicates the more serious nature of the original crime, or cases such as the
fraudulent misuse of funds where it is desirable to avoid complicated multiple evidentiary presentations. Although the State's Attorney has no formal authority to proceed
directly to an indictment after arrest, this procedure is regarded as part of his discretionary power. McIntyre, supra note 269, at 483.
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ing.274 Despite the statutory requirement that a preliminary hearing be
held, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that denial of a preliminary hearing is reversible error only if it actually prejudices the trial
27 5
of the defendant.
The sample of bond hearing transcripts we studied indicates that
even when preliminary hearings were held they did not take place
when riot felony defendants first appeared in court but were continued until a later date. The Administrative Assistant to Chief Judge
Boyle has said that preliminary hearings could not be held during
the riot because the arresting officers were not available to testify.278
But preliminary hearings were not simply postponed until the
officer could appear; in most cases, they were avoided entirely. The
State's Attorney decided to present the riot cases directly to the
grand jury without the benefit of prior magisterial review. The grand
jury heard most of the cases in May; as a result, no probable cause
determination was made for many defendants until more than a
month after their arrests. Preliminary hearings were frequently continued again until the grand jury had returned an indictment and
the case was docketed in the Criminal Court Division. At that time,
the case was dropped in the Municipal Department.
Unlike the preliminary hearing, however, the grand jury proceeding
is not an effective screening device. As Oaks and Lehman have shown,
few cases are presented to the grand jury in Cook County which do
not result in indictment. 277 This was also true of the riot felony
defendants. There were 751 cases 278 referred to the grand jury; it returned true bills in all but 13 cases.
274 Since the granting of the writ by a judge is discretionary, and since the judge has
a reasonable time to decide the matter, the value of the writ in compelling a timely preliminary hearing is questionable. Practically, a motion for bond reduction hearing is a
more effective device in getting a defendant released from custody.
275 People v. Petruso, 35 IIl. 2d 578, 221 N.E.2d 276 (1966). See also, People v. Bonner,
37 IMI.2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967).
276 Austin Committee files. Despite this straightforward statement with which our
findings concur, one magistrate in an interview claimed preliminary hearings were conducted at bail hearings in all cases. Another magistrate maintained that an Assistant
State's Attorney told him that the cases involved were on information and therefore preliminary hearings were not required. The term "information" is used not only to indicate that an indictment has been waived but also to indicate a form of prosecution initiated by the prosecutor's office. This latter method of prosecution is rarely used in Cook
County since it is more cumbersome than the "complaint" procedure initiated by a private complainant or arresting officer. Almost all the riot cases were initiated by on-view
arrest complaints signed by police officers.
277 OAKS & LEHzMAN 65. In only 1% of the cases referred to the grand jury are nobills returned that result in the complete dismissal of all charges against the defendant.
278 These included 662 individual burglary charges, 6 arson, 16 grand theft, 4 attempted
murder, 10 robbery, 9 weapons, and 4 aggravated battery.
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But riot cases were not unscreened by the State's Attorney before
presentation to the grand jury. 27 9 The State's Attorney established

a grand jury preparations room in which several assistant state's attorneys reviewed each felony case before submitting it to the grand
jury. Over 200 felony cases were dismissed or reduced to misdemeanor charges through this informal screening process. Only cases
in which the State's Attorney was assured that the complainant was
willing to testify and the arresting officer was able to identify the defendant were prosecuted in the Criminal Division. Only defendants who
had been arrested inside the burglarized premises or within a short
distance of the premises with goods clearly identifiable as having been
stolen from particular premises were prosecuted on felony charges.
Despite avoidance of preliminary hearings and the ineffective
screening role of the grand jury, therefore, riot felony cases were better screened and stronger evidentially than ordinary felony cases. Several factors appear to have persuaded the State's Attorney to adopt
special screening procedures during the riot. First, it seemed to be the
most efficient method. The Illinois four-term rule requires that defendants in custody be brought to trial within 120 days. 2 0 Any delay in
early screening procedures jeopardized subsequent prosecution. Secondly, it was believed that the informal screening procedure worked
no greater hardship on defendants than preliminary hearings, most
of which were being continued until long after the date of arrest anyway, presumably because arresting officers were needed on the streets
and were unavailable to testify. Thirdly, the ordinary plea bargaining
advantages of the preliminary hearing forum were largely absent under
riot conditions. Many cases involved multiple defendants which, from
the prosecutor's point of view, made plea bargaining with an individual defendant difficult. And with the advice of defense counsel,
defendants were unwilling to plead guilty to a reduced charge in
April or May when the proximity of the riot might result in harsh
sentences. In fact, only about 2% of the property felony cases were
reduced to misdemeanors before presentation before the grand jury.
Under ordinary circumstances, 22% of burglary defendants are convicted on reduced charges. (See Table 48.)
Most important, however, was the feeling that magistrates acting
under the political pressures and popular hysteria of the moment
would lower probable cause standards to detain almost all of the
arrestees. The State's Attorney's office would still be faced, therefore,
with the task of dismissing or reducing evidentially weak cases.
279 The following discussion is based, in large part, on an interview with William J.
Martin, April 26, 1969.
280 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5 (1967).
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Although the State's Attorney's office decided soon after the riot
to avoid preliminary hearings, several assistant state's attorneys, uninformed of the decision, presented cases for preliminary hearing. Most
of these cases were held for further prosecution.
Final data on the disposition of riot felony cases in the Criminal
Division are not available; 11 months after the riot, 19% of those
indicted had not yet been tried. Of the 599 riot felony cases concluded by February 28, 1969, 70% resulted in convictions. (See Table
49.) This compares with a 1967 conviction rate for all felonies of
61%. It also compares extremely favorably with riot felony conviction
rates in other cities. For example, in Los Angeles 79% of the felony
arrestees from the Watts riot were convicted, but the majority of these
convictions were on reduced charges; 28' in Detroit, only two persons
out of a sample of 1,630 were convicted of the felony with which
28 2
they were originally charged.
TABLE 49
DIsPosMoN OF RIoT AND NORMAL FELONY CASES AFE
Disposition
Discharge or dismissal
Found not guilty
Nolle Prosequi
SOL, SOL warrant, misc.
Convicted
Probation
Probation and jail
House of Corrections
Cook County Jail, Vandalia
Illinois State Penitentiary
Fine
Miscellaneous
Number =

Normal Casesa

INDicTME
Riot Casesb
30%

39%
10%
2
19

7%
7
25

70%

61%
19
12
-26
2
2

49e
11
2d
6
1
100%
(4,486)

100%
(599)

a Source: Circuit Court of Cook County, Criminal Division, 1967 Annual Report.
b Source: Compiled by the Cook County State's Attorney's office. Includes cases concluded by February 28, 1969.
c Includes three cases for which restitution as well as probation was prescribed.
d Includes two cases in which fine was imposed in addition to time in the Cook County
Jail.

The figures in Table 49 are somewhat misleading, however, since
more than four-fifths of the riot felony cases which were dismissed
were cases in which an SOL disposition was entered and a warrant
281 Klein, Ogren & Thomas, Watts 1965: Arrests and Trials: Analysis and Statistics,
3 L. IN TRANs. Q. 177 (1966).
282 Crockett, Recorder's Court and the 1967 Civil Disturbance, 45 J. URBAN LAw 841,
847 (1968).
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for arrest entered as a result of a defendant's failure to appear at
trial.ga3 If the SOL warrant cases are excluded from the sample, 85%
2 4
of the riot felony defendants were convicted on the felony charged.
Despite the higher conviction rate among riot felony defendants
than among normal post-indictment felony defendants, a slightly
greater precentage of the riot cases resulted in discharge at trial than
is normal-10% of the riot defendants compared with 7% of the
1967 felony defendants. The higher conviction rate among riot defendants reflects, therefore, a higher guilty plea rate. Although the normal
guilty plea rate among post-indictment cases is high-in 1967 nearly
84% of those convicted pleaded guilty to the charge for which they
were indicted 2 80-the State's Attorney's office indicated that an even
higher proportion of the riot felony defendants pleaded guilty to the
offense charged. But, as Table 49 suggests, riot felons may have been
sentenced more leniently than normal felons. Seventy per cent of
the convicted riot felons were sentenced only to probation, usually for
two, three, or five years. 288
The Kerner Commission was sharply critical of the prosecution
of riot arrestees in Detroit and other cities. 28 7 By adopting more careful charging and screening policies, and, perhaps relatively lenient
sentence policies, the Cook County State's Attorney avoided the low
conviction rate and much of the administrative breakdown which
characterized the prosecution of riot defendants in other cities. But it
is important to note that most felony defendants received no formal
probable cause hearings. For a variety of reasons, neither preliminary
hearings nor grand jury proceedings could be relied upon as effective
screening procedures.
Most felony defendants were not even informally screened by the
State's Attorney's office until a month or so after their arrest.28 8
283 "SOL warrant" indicates that a warrant for the defendant's arrest has been issued,
but normally no concerted effort to take the defendant into custody is made. Until he

is rearrested his case is "SOL'd" in the Criminal Division.
284 If the SOL warrant cases are excluded from the 1967 data, the overall conviction
rate would undoubtedly also rise. But we have no information on the number of SOL
warrants included in the 1967 data,
285 ADMmisTRATE OFF CE oF THE ILLINoIs COURTS, 1967 ANNUAL REPoRT 55 (1968).
286 In large part, however, the apparent leniency may be explained by the difference
in the charges on which convictions were obtained. Ninety-four per cent of the riot indictments were for burglary or unarmed theft, compared with only one-fourth of those
convicted of felonies in 1967. Many of the 1967 felony convictions were for more serious
charges.
287 KERNiER CoMMissIoN REPORT 184.
288 The State's Attorney's office handled the riot cases in a generally professional manner. It is not at all certain that similar policies will prevail in the future, State's Attorney
John Stamos, who was in office during the April 1968 riot, was not slated by the Cook
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And judicial review of most misdemeanor arrests was automatically
continued until weeks after the riot. In the meantime, for many
defendants, the significant sanctions of the criminal system had already been imposed. Many had been required to make numerous
court appearances in the Municipal Department. And many had already served considerable lengths of time in jail. In the next section
we shall explore more fully the rationale of pretrial detention.
County Democratic Party for reelection. He is presently serving on the Circuit Court of
Cook County. William J. Martin, Assistant State's Attorney in charge of the prosecution
of the April 1968 riot cases, is now Assistant Professor of Law at Northwestern University.

VI.

PREVENTIVE DETENTION

In a previous section we saw how bail, though set at approximately
normal levels in felony cases, resulted in the detention of many defendants until the rioting subsided. In this section we examine the
problem of temporary detention during civil disorders. We begin with
the fact that ordinary bail practices may be, and are in fact, used to
achieve temporary detention both under normal circumstances and
during civil disorders. We consider the costs of detaining arrestees
through high bond amounts, and the special circumstances which
may justify preventive detention during civil disorders. We then
turn to an analysis of three approaches to the establishment of an
express authorization of preventive detention during civil disorders.
Finally, we briefly explore the problem of detention in light of the
present overall operation of the criminal system.
A. Bail Practice and PretrialDetention
1. Generally. Whether or not there is a constitutional right to bail
is unresolved. While most commentators interpret the eighth amendment bail clause as implying a right to bail, 28 9 it would appear by

virtue of federal and state statutory authorizations of denial of bail in
capital offenses, 290 that the right to bail is subject to some restriction.
289 "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsr. amend. VIII.
The most comprehensive argument that the bail clause confers a right to bail can be
found in Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. Rav. 959,
969-71 (1965). Logically, a right to bail can be found in the fact that
It would be anomalous to assume that the eighth amendment, while prohibiting
the de facto denial of release through the imposition of excessive bail, leaves the
way open for legislative elimination of the right to bail. Thus, in order to give
effect to what must have been the framers' intention, it should be concluded that
the excessive bail prohibition guarantees by implication some right to bail.
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HARV. L. Rxv. 1489, 1499 (1966). See also
United States v. Motlow, 10 F.2d 657, 659 (Butler, Circuit Justice, 1926) (dictum); Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 485, 484-5 (D.D.C. 1960); Punishment Before Trial, 48 J. Am.
JuD. Soc'Y 6, 7 (1964) (quoting address by Chief Justice Warren to 1964 National Conference on Bail and Criminal Justice).
It is now generally assumed that the bail clause is applicable to the states. See In re
Shuttlesworth, 369 U.S. 35 (1962); Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964).
290 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148 (Supp. II, 1967). For the proposition that the eighth
amendment does not guarantee a right to bail, see Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 710
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964): "Traditionally and acceptedly, there are offenses of a nature as to which a state properly may refuse to make provision for a right
to bail." The leading Supreme Court case on bail discusses it in the context of a statutory
rather than a constitutional right. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
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Like other Bill of Rights guarantees, the right to bail is probably
subject to reasonable legislative restrictions, but such restrictions, in
the case of a criminal defendant pending trial, have not been extended
beyond protecting the public interest in an orderly judicial pro29 1
cess-usually to assure appearance in court.

Regardiess of the constitutional status of restrictions on the right
to bail, the Federal Bail Reform Act and most state statutes provide
that bail shall be set in order to assure the defendant's appearance
in court. Setting high bail for the purpose of detaining an accused
292
is clearly unauthorized under most statutes.
Nonetheless, the lower courts often resort to bail to effect pretrial
291 The risk of flight would appear greatest in the case of a capital offense. See Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 712 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 965 (1964); State v.
Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 373, 164 A.2d 740, 743 (1960); People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell,
296 N.Y. 109, 71 N.E2d 423 (1947). The notion that risk of flight is part of a larger
public interest in the orderly functioning of the judicial process would reconcile the few
opinions which have upheld denial of bail because of the danger that the defendant
would intimidate witnesses. Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 289, at
1502-3.
On the other hand, future dangerousness as a reason for denying bail has been upheld
pending appeal of a criminal conviction (Leigh v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 994, 996 (Warren, Circuit Justice, 1962); Carbo v. United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 669 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1962); United States v. Martone, 283 F. Supp. 77, 81 (D. Puerto Rico 1968); 18
U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. II, 1967)) (allowing denial of bail pending appeal if the defendant
poses "a danger to any other person or to the community'), as well as under certain
civil detention statutes. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 542 (1952) (aliens pending
deportation hearings); Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309
U.S. 270 (1940) (sexual psychopaths); Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.),
aff'd, 350 U.S. 366 (1955) (mentally incompetent persons); In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App.
2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952) (juveniles); State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 232
S.W.2d 897 (1950) (sexual psychopaths). It has been argued, however, that these instances
are based on a rationale fundamentally inapplicable to preventive detention of normal
criminal defendants prior to conviction:
ahe theory [behind the detention] is that, because of some mental or emotional
abnormality, these people are not responsive to the deterrence provided by the
threat of criminal sanctions and cannot be dealt with through the usual process
of the criminal law.
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 289 at 1504.
292 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (Supp. II, 1967). A right to bail similar to the federal
statute exists in all but seven states. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. II, § 7; ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, §§ 110-1 to -15 (1967). Bail in an amount necessary to assure appearance at trial as
the standard for reasonable bail has been upheld in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951).
See also Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1960); United
States v. Foster, 278 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1960); Heikdinen v. United States, 208 F.2d 738
(7th Cir. 1953). Similar limitations have been imposed on state courts. Gusic v. Boies, 72
Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446 (1951); In re Newbern, 55 Cal. 2d 500, 360 P.2d 43, 11 Cal. Rptr.
547 (1961); People ex rel. Sammons v. Snow, 340 I1. 464, 173 N.E. 8 (1930); State v. Clark,
234 Ia. 338, 341, 11 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1943), cert. denied, 823 U.S. 739 (1944); State v.
Bentley, 46 N.J. Super. 194, 134 A.2d 445 (1957); People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 296
N.Y. 109, 71 N.E.2d 423 (1947); In re Cremati, 99 Ohio App. 402, 117 N.E.2d 440 (1954).
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detention.29 3 The most common explanation for this practice is the
need to protect society by detaining arrestees thought to pose a threat
to public safety. Such threats include tampering with evidence or
threatening witnesses, 294 habitual or compulsive criminal behavior,295
and the danger that a defendant is likely to cause injury to someone
29 6
or threaten the physical safety of the public.

A second, though less frequently articulated, explanation rests on
the inability of the lower criminal courts to handle large numbers of
criminal cases efficiently. In order to avoid trial litigation, which
would overburden the system, courts rely on pretrial detention to
induce guilty pleas. 297 In order to avoid the administrative imprac-

ticality of time-consuming individualized bail hearings, magistrates
make mechanical determinations and set uniform bond amounts which
are often prohibitively high, to avoid risking release of large numbers of arrestees.

29

A third explanation, also seldom articulated, is based on punitive
and deterrent motives reflected in the practice of giving minor offenders "a taste of jail," 299 particularly where courts' leniency with first
offenders, and other factors, result in suspended sentences, pretrial
dismissals, or probation.30 0
It is important to recognize that the latter two explanations are
not, like the first, related to preventive purposes, but refer respectively
to administrative needs and to punitive and general deterrent pur293 The sub rosa practice of detention through setting high bail is discussed in
D. FREED & P. WALU, BAIL IN THm UNITED STATES: 1964, at 49-55 (1964); NATIONAL CoNFEIRENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS AND INTERIM REPORT 201-3, 212-3

(1965) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL]; Note, Compelling Appearance
in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1031, 1038-40 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as PhiladelphiaBail Study].
294 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL 152-4; Comment, Preventive Detention, 36 GEo.
WAsr. L. REv. 178, 179-80 n.13 (1967).
295 NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL 152-4; Comment, Preventive Detention, supra note
294, at 179.
296 1 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRIME IN THE DIsTRIcr OF COLUMBIA

527 (1966) [hereinafter cited as D.C. CRIME COMMISSION REPORT]. See also ALI CODE CRmT.
PROCEDURE § 70 (1931); ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 83 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ABA PREmmAL REiEASE STANDARDs]; Foote, Twelve Judicial Views on Bail, in Hearings on S. 1357, S. 616,
S. 647, and S. 648 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and the Subcomm. on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. 298 (1965).
297 See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. Rv. 1, 38 (1964).
298 See PhiladelphiaBail Study 1036-43; Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail
in New York City, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 707, 712-5 (1958) [hereinafter cited as New
York Bail Study].
299 See, e.g., New York Bail Study 705.
300 See Packer, supra note 297, at 39.
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poses. But the problem has, to date, been discussed as if it were
solely one of preventive detention. We will return to this problem
at the end of this section.
A variety of reasons suggest that today's sub rosa use of bail as a
tool for effectuating unauthorized policies of pretrial detention is
unfortunate. The use of bail for purposes of pretrial detention foredoses any opportunity to check magisterial abuse. In the absence of
statutory criteria for establishing future dangerousness, bail determinations intended to implement preventive detention can only
be measured against statutory standards designed to assure appearance
in court. 01 Unarticulated findings of dangerousness cannot be rebutted.30 2 Moreover, bail determinations are not subject to effective review. They are not accompanied by written opinions, and the wide
discretion given the bailsetting judge precludes reversal of a bail
determination unless it is "beyond the range within which judgments
could rationally differ in relation to the apparent elements of the
situation."30 3 In reality, the principal limitation on bailsetting is a
magistrate's sense of self-restraint. 30 4
There are also practical difficulties in obtaining review of bail. A
defendant may be brought to trial before his appeal from the bail
determination is heard, thereby mooting his claim. 805 In Illinois the
Public Defender does not customarily appeal bail determinations
of indigent defendants. 30 6 Federal habeas corpus relief is unlikely,
because "the question in the federal court will rarely be a substantial one unless the discretionary judgment has not been exercised in
the state courts." 307 Consequently, state habeas corpus relief may
be the only feasible means of review, and that form of relief may
also be too slow to protect defendants' interests. 306
A defendant's remedy for pretrial detention is said to be a motion
for expedited trial, 309 which puts a burden on a defendant's right
301 For the statutory standards, see, e.g., FED. R. Cane. P. 46(c) (superceded by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3146, 3148 (Supp. 11, 1967)), upheld in Stack v. Boyle, 42 U.S. 1, 5 (1951); Yocca v.
Ogilvie (Ill. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 1964) (unreported) in
302 Comment, Preventive Detention, supra note
303 Mastrian v. Hedman, 326 F.2d 708, 711 (8th
See also Gusick v. Boies, 72 Ariz. 233, 233 P.2d 446
2d 346, 287 P.2d 885 (1951).
304 See New York Bail Study 705.
305 See, e.g., M. PATNER,

APPOINm.

Kamin, supra note 105, at 683-4.
294, at 179.
Cir.), cert. denied, 876 U.S. 965 (1964).
(1951); In re Morehead, 107 Cal. App.

COUNSr 'S GUIDE FOR ILLINOIS CRmINAL APPEALS

23 (1968).
306 Cawley Testimony 231.
307 Brown v. Fogel, 387 F.2d 692, 694 n.1 (4th Cir. 1967).

308 See Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1125,
1176-7 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote I1].
309 See United States v. Rumrich, 180 F.2d 575 (2d Cir. 1950).
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to trial by jury.310 Moreover, a detained defendant's preparation for
expedited trial is likely to be impaired by his inability to locate witnesses and other factors. 311
Finally, money bail amounts are an irrational means of detaining
presumably dangerous persons. 312 Since ability to make bail bears no
necessary relation to a defendant's potential dangerousness, both dangerous and non-dangerous poor defendants who cannot make bail are
3 13
detained, while the rich and possibly dangerous defendant goes free.
But, as one commentator has noted:
If the present system of requiring bail for some reason or other
stopped producing a high rate of pretrial confinement, it would
have to be replaced by one that did.314
In light of that fact and the shortcomings in the use of bail for
preventive detention purposes, commentators have examined the possibilities of an overt preventive detention scheme.3 15 An express preventive detention scheme may have the additional virtue, by removing
the necessity for relying on monetary bail to achieve detention, of
paving the way for much needed bail reform measures. 316
Comment, Preventive Detention, supra note 294, at 185-6.
311 See generally Wald, Foreward to Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631, 633 (1964); Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention,
39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964). See also Axes, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project:
An Interim Report on the Use of Pre-TrialParole, 38 N.Y.U.L. REv. 67, 90 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Manhattan Bail Project]; ATroRNEY GENERAL'S COMMrrrEn ON POvERTY
AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 70-71 (1963) [hereinafter
cited as ATrORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITrEE]; Foote II, at 1140-8.
312 The same criticism has been made of the bail system generally, suggesting that risk
of financial loss is neither necessary nor sufficient to assure appearance in court. See
FREED & WALD, supra note 293, at 9-21.
313 Comment, Preventive Detention, supra note 294, at 179.
314 Packer, supra note 297, at 41.
315 See, e.g., Foote II, at 1125; Comment, Preventive Detention, supra note 294, at 178;
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 289, at 1489; D.C. CRIME COMMISSION
REPORT 513-29; ABA PRETRIAL RELEAsE STANDARDS 83 ff. Current interest in a preventive
detention statute is reflected in the debate surrounding President Nixon's 12-point
program to combat crime in the District of Columbia, including a recommendation that
"dangerous" criminals be held without bail while awaiting trial. 27 CONG. Q. 214
(Weekly Report) (1969).
For a comparison with the overt practices in other countries, see Bratholm, Arrest and
Detention in Norway, 108 U. PA. L. Rav. 336 (1960); Keane, Preventive Justice, 2 ImsH
Jur.
233 (1967); Mostyn, Bail and the Presumption of Innocence; England and America:
A Comparison, 61 L. Soc. GAz. 799 (1964); Smith, Bail Before Trial: Reflections of a
Scottish Lawyer, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 305 (1960).
316 For a discussion of the bail system in general, see FREED & WALD, supra note 293;
Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70 YALE L.J. 944 (1961). See also A. BERLEY,
THE BAIL SYsTm IN CHICAGO (1927), a pioneer study, many of whose findings are valid
today.
Criticisms of bail practices as well as proposals for reform and alternatives to the pres310
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Those who have considered the overall merits of an express preventive detention system have been reluctant, however, to recommend
its application in ordinary circumstances. Some studies indicate that
the risk a defendant released on bail will commit subsequent crimes
is much lower than many judges have assumed. 317 But because accurate
means of predicting future dangerousness have not been developed,
many fear that legislation authorizing preventive detention in normal
times could not be written carefully enough to insure accurate and
narrow application. 318 Too many people would be detained, and some
dangerous defendants might not be held at all. 319 Moreover, application of accurate measures and strict guidelines, even if they could be
provided, would be self-defeating, since it would result in prolonging
both initial bail determinations and review. 320 In fact, to the extent
that both non-individualized hearings and delay reflect structural deficiencies in the lower criminal courts, a preventive detention scheme
would suffer many of the same defects of current bail practice.
Still others consider that untested alternatives less drastic than
pretrial detention may adequately protect society from the dangers of
release, 321 particularly when weighed against the hardships which deent system are examined in Foote II, at 1125; New York Bail Study 693; Philadelphia
Bail Study 1031; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMrrEE 58-124; ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARms 31-55. The use of bail as a means of harassing civil rights workers is discussed in
Wizner, Bail and Civil Rights, 2 L. IN TRANS. Q. 111 (1965).
For a discussion of bail reform projects, see Manhattan Bail Project 67; Kamin, supra
note 105. The success of ROR projects and an examination of the desirability of using
ROR are reported in NATIONAL CONFEMNCE ON BAIL 33-148.
The Federal Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (Supp. II, 1967), is evaluated in
D.C. CMIE CoMI~ssION 504-29. See also IL.. RFv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 110-1 to -15 (1967);
Bowman, The Illinois Ten Per Cent Bail Deposit Provision, 1965 U. ILL. L.F. 35 (1965).
The reluctance of courts to utilize bail reform measures is discussed in ABA PRETRIAL
RELEASE STANDARDS

55-7.

317 See Foote II, at 1169-72; Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 289,
at 1496-7.
318 See Foote II, at 1172-4; Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 289,
at 1506-7; New York Bail Study 706; ABA PRETRAIL RELEASE STANDAits 6-7, 68-70; PREsIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, Tim CHALLENGE
OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIrY 131 (1967) [hereinafter cited as PRESMENT'S CRIME COMMISSION
REPORT].
319 See Mostyn, supra note 315, at 799-800; Paulsen, Pre-trial Release in the United
States, 66 COLUM. L. RiEv. 109, 125 (1966); Colista 9- Domonkos, Bail and Civil Disorder,
45 J. URBAN L. 815, 822 (1968).
320 "The more precise the standards for preventive detention are made, the more will
be required of the prosecution to establish a case for detention, with corresponding increase in the complexity of the fact finding process." Foote II, at 1175. See id. at 1176-80.
321 Such alternatives include conditional release restricting travel, associations, or
activities, release to the custody of a parole officer or other third party, rearrest and
detention on violation of conditions, and daytime release. See generally Bail Reform
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tention imposes on "legally innocent" defendants. 32 2 The propriety
of preventive detention obviously involves a balancing of the risks to
society and the rights of arrestees. Most examinations have concluded
that under ordinary conditions the "calculated risk" to society posed
by releasing arrestees is only a small part of the total "price of our
3 23
system of justice."
2. During Civil Disorders. One may accept the conclusion that
preventive detention is undesirable under ordinary circumstances and
nevertheless believe that extraordinary conditions during periods of
civil disorder require a recalculation of the risk to society of releasing
arrestees. 324 During both the Detroit and Chicago riots, bail magistrates
and others apparently felt that increased social risks required pretrial
detention. The initial response of many Detroit and Chicago judges
to riot conditions was to set high bail "so as to frustrate release." 32
Mass arrests and temporary detention were justified as necessary to
clear the streets, 326 "break the back of the rioting," 327 "provide a threat
to potential riot participants and hence a deterrent to continued rioting," 328 prevent arrestees from "returning to the scene," 329 and avoid
the "danger of contempt replacing respect . . . [which would lead to]
new acts of lawlessness." 330 Again, as with the use of temporary detention under normal conditions, it is evident that reasons based on
prevention of unlawful conduct must be distinguished from those
grounded in punishment and general deterrence.
It is exceedingly difficult to determine whether the threat posed by
riot conditions justifies the use of preventive detention, because it is
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (Supp. II, 1967); PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMMISSION REPORT 131-2;

ABA PRETRIAL RELEASE STANDARDS 70-74.
322 For a general discussion of the hardships imposed on the defendant by detention,
see THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 38 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT:
THE COURTS]; ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COm, rrE 70-77; FREED & WALD, supra note 293, at
39-48.
323 Stack v. Boyle, 842 U.S. 1, 8 (1951). See Foote 11, at 1170-1.
324 Such a reevaluation in the context of riots has been suggested in a study of the
1967 Detroit disorders. The study noted that the Kerner Commission's rejection of preventive detention was based on the recommendations of the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice which evaluated the scheme in the
context of ordinary conditions. Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 821-3. See
KERNER COIMISSION REPORT 186, 192 n.24; PRESmENT'S CRIME COm' IssioN REPORT 131-2.
325 KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 185. In some instances, the practice was not even sub
rosa but involved an out-and-out refusal to accept bonds. Id. at 185 n.7.
326 See 1 BNA CiUm. L. RPTR. 2286 (Aug. 16, 1967); KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 184.
327 Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 819.
828 Id. at 819, citing a pronouncement by a Detroit judge.
329 Rueger, Riot Panel, 3 TrlE PROSECUTOR 282, 287 (1967).
330 Cahalan, The Detroit Riot, 3 THE PROSECUTOR 430, 432 (1967).
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almost impossible to calculate the risk to the public of releasing defendants during civil disorders. Partly because judges have practiced
sub rosa preventive detention through setting high bail and have not
experimented with releasing arrestees thought likely to commit dangerous acts, we lack knowledge of the effectiveness of standards for detention even under normal conditions.331 Almost nothing is known about
criminal repeaters during civil disorders, 3 2 and rearrest would seem to
be an unreliable measure of recidivism during riots. 3 3 The inability to
predict accurately the consequences of releasing arrestees in riot situations only adds to the reluctance of magistrates to release rioters on
low bail.
This reluctance may be encouraged by certain factors peculiar to
riots. Even if the percentage of arrestees likely to engage in lawless
activity on release is no greater than under normal conditions, 334 the
sheer number of people arrested might make that percentage significant.3

35

And given the nature of crowd behavior, the interactive effect

of releasing even a small number of people in a densely populated
area 336 distinguishes the risk from that occasioned by release in normal
times.
Second, since many participants in past riots have been ordinarily
law-abiding citizens, 337 it may seem that the risk of reentry into the riot
338
is substantially greater than that of ordinary criminal conduct.
331 See authorities cited supra note 318.
332 Participation in riot activity by many young citizens without prior criminal records (see note 337 infra) indicates that standards of prediction based on past behavior
may be irrelevant to the detention decision. Moreover, the relatively large numbers of
ghetto residents who lack financial resources, lack roots in the community, and have
prior arrest records because of conditions of discrimination and poverty raise questions
about the fairness of ordinary standards of prediction.
333 See Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 823-4.
334 For an analysis of the risk of release under normal conditions, see Foote 11, at

1170-1.
335

Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 823-4.

336 Id.
337 The non-criminal character of many riot participants is indicated by various
studies of the riots. The Kerner Commission found that much looted merchandise was
returned after the Detroit riot. KERNFR COMMSSION REPORT 190. Of 3,927 people arrested in the Watts riot, over half had no record of prior convictions. PRESMENT'S
COMMISION ON LAW ENFORCEMIENT AND

ADmINISTRATION

OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE:

CRIME

AND ITS IMPACT-AN AssEssMENT 120 (1967 [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT:
AssESsmENT]. A survey of Newark riot arrestees revealed that less than 45%o had police
records. KERNER CoMMIssION REPORT 190 n.17. These figures are particularly significant

in light of the estimate that a Negro male who grows up in the slums has a 75% chance
of being arrested in his lifetime. TASK FORCE REPORT: ASSESSMENT 120, citing M, E.
VOLFGANG, CR.IE AND RACE-CONCEPTIONS AND MIS-CONEPTIONS 31 (1964).
338 On the other hand, the low incidence of riot arrestees with prior criminal records
may indicate that preventive detention is unnecessary. For many such arrestees the mere
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Furthermore, feasible alternatives available to meet the ordinary
risk of criminal conduct 339 appear to be impracticable during a riot.340
Release on specified conditions or to the custody of a third partyalternatives which require court supervision-would seem impractical
in light of the confusion and manpower shortages characteristic of
judicial administration during civil disorders. Providing penalties for
violating conditions of release or for rearrest on criminal charges would
probably be ineffective, because the absence of adequate law enforcement in riot areas would make rearrest unlikely.341 All of these factors
may seem to justify the use of preventive detention as a tactic of riot
control.
But it is also important to recalculate the costs of preventive detention under riot conditions. The difficulties of providing adequate
safeguards during ordinary conditions 42 to ensure both a narrow and
accurate application of detention standards are magnified during
periods of civil turmoil. The difficulty of accurately predicting the
likelihood of subsequent riot-related conduct, together with the apparent disposition of judicial authorities to detain large numbers of
people for deterrent and punitive reasons, reduces the possibility of
significantly limiting judicial discretion and over-detention.
The abuses and hardships which result from temporary detention are
radically magnified during civil disorders. Detention conditions are
particularly dehumanizing during riots. In Detroit, some arrestees were
held in underground garages or in buses without adequate food, water,
and sanitation facilities; 43 the inadequacy of detention facilities in
Chicago was described in Section IV above. Loss of earnings and
employment resulting from only a few days' detention has a particularly
crippling effect on economic and family relationships within an already
3 44
economically depressed community.
In addition, it is important to remember that many riot arrestees
are young persons and minor offenders without prior criminal records.
And the imposition of preventive detention on riot arrestees may only
serve to aggravate existing resentment and hostility toward the criminal
system.3 45 Hostility and cynicism toward the larger society "is reinfact of arrest and initial court processing may constitute sufficient deterrence to reentry.
See Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 824 n.58.
339 See note 321 supra.
340 For a discussion of alternatives in the context of civil disorder, see KERNR CoasMISSION REPORT 192.

341 See Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 823.
342 See notes 318-20 supra and accompanying text.
343 See KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 184.

344 See id. at 71 ff., 73 ff.; Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 818.
345 A composite picture of the "typical" rioter drawn by the Kerner Commission
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forced by a widespread perception... of the existence ... of a 'double
standard' of justice and protection-one for Negroes and one for
whites." 346 Complaints that the courts dispense "assembly-line justice"
denying equal treatment to the poor and the affluent, and that bail
procedures only further class inequities3 47 reveal deeply antagonistic
feelings toward the criminal process.
The sub rosa use of bail for detention purposes undoubtedly appears
to many ghetto residents to be a particularly obvious instance of unequal justice. 34 But the switch to an overt preventive detention system
would hardly reduce feelings of distrust toward the system. In fact, the
authorization of preventive detention may only aggravate existing resentments.
But whether or not the disadvantages of an overt preventive detention scheme outweigh its desirability in times of civil disorder, it is
apparent that magistrates and judges expressly approve of and practice
preventive detention during civil disorders and will in all likelihood
continue to disregard constitutional and statutory prohibitions against
its use. A frank recognition of this insistence on using detention as a
riot control tactic has led some commentators to examine the possibility that an overt scheme with reasonable guidelines might result in
fewer detentions during riots than have resulted from the sub rosa
use of bail to effect detention. They see statutory authorization for
the use of preventive detention during riots as a means of assuring
both incarceration of truly dangerous defendants and the rapid release
of about 80%o of those arrested 49 through use of bail reform alternatives. We shall turn now to consideration of three different approaches
to the problem of preventive detention during civil disorders.
B. Legal Approaches to Preventive Detention Under Riot Conditions
1. The Flexible GuaranteesRationale. One approach to the problem of preventive detention, outlined recently in the Columbia Law
Review, builds on the premise that "[m]any constitutional rights are
flexible enough to permit unusual procedures in time of riots." 350
reveals a strong distrust of the political system and intense perceptions of victimization
resulting from racial discrimination. KERE COM.MsSIoN REPORT 73-74.
346 Id. at 93.
347 Id. at 183. Three-quarters of the cities surveyed by the Kerner Commission revealed significant grievances involving the administration of justice. Id. at 82.
348 "A defendant's attitudes are crystallized in prison, where the most obvious lesson

of the pretrial period is that if you have money you go out, i.e., that justice is for
sale. Those familiar with detention prisons are aware that this cynical attitude dominates the value culture of the jail." Foote II, at 1148.
349 See Colista &fDomonkos, supra note 319, at 826.
350 Note, Riot Control: the Constitutional Limits of Search, Arrest and Fair Trial
Procedure, 68 COLUm. L. REv. 85, 115 (1968).
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Preventive detention may be based, under this view, on present statutory exceptions to the right to bail3 51 which state legislatures might ex352
tend to deny bail to riot arrestees if compelled by public necessity.
Safeguards would be provided by requiring the prosecution to establish
at the preliminary hearing both the probability of guilt and the
necessity for detention. A detention order would expire after two days,
requiring the state to meet its burden again in order to justify an ex53
tension of the order.
This approach attempts to steer a middle course between two unpalatable alternatives. On one hand, it is feared that "[i]f the courts do
decide that necessary measures are barred by the Constitution, the
case for using martial law to avoid the Constitution's effect will become much stronger."3 54 On the other hand, it is thought that the
present bail system is too inflexible to accomplish temporary detention with minimal abuse.
The major weakness of the proposal is the long-term effect it may
have on our system of constitutional guarantees. Creating flexibility in
constitutional standards raises the danger of ultimate encroachment
upon long-established guarantees which, though subject to abuse in
practice, have the virtue of remaining benchmarks against which current practice must ultimately be evaluated. It may be argued that
"Americans have long trusted their judges to distinguish necessary
from unnecessary encroachments on liberty," and that "the principle
that what is permissible during a riot may be impermissible at other
times is one that courts can apply."35 5 But some "other times" too may
present unique dangers. While a riot may be the most familiar type
of crisis presently threatening civil peace, other less volatile but still
dangerous circumstances can easily be envisaged which might provide
similar justification for further extending "exceptional" limitations on
pretrial release, once those limits are extended for riots.
Furthermore, this "exception" is not, as the author of the note seems
to suggest, merely another in the tradition of existing exceptions to
bail, as where the risk of flight is great,356 or pending appeal, 35 7 or to
351 E.g., in the case of previously convicted felons, N.Y. CoDE CRiM. PROC. § 552(3).
352 Note, Riot Control, supra note 350, at 104.
353

Id.

354 Id. at 110.
355 Id. at 111.
356 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1951); Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial,
supra note 289, at 1492.
357 See Rehman v. California, 85 S. Ct. 8 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1964); Carbo v.
United States, 82 S. Ct. 662, 668 (Douglas, Circuit Justice, 1962); Ward v. United States,
76 S. Ct. 1063 (Frankfurter, Circuit Justice, 1956); 18 U.S.C. § 3148 (Supp. HI, 1968).
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effect civil detention. 358 Denial of bail to a riot arrestee would be the
first exception based on the risk of future dangerous conduct of a
competent adult criminal defendant prior to an adjudication of guilt.3 59
This new "extension" involves a difference in kind whose rationale
is in tension with the foundations of our criminal system-the presumption of innocence, and the notion that detention prior to adjudication of guilt except for those incapable of responding to the
threat of ordinary sanctions is justifiable only where it serves to
protect rather than displace the trial process.
In attempting to strengthen its constitutional justification, the proponents of the "flexible guarantees" approach may ultimately weaken
the foundations of those guarantees. The present bail system, while
subject to abuse during normal conditions and to breakdown during
riots, has the advantage of maintaining constitutional safeguards, at
least in theory.
2. The Martial Law Rationale. Perhaps the clearest rationale for
preventive detention is found in cases approving executive actions
pursuant to express or implied declarations of emergency. 360 Whereas
the flexible guarantees concept attempts to accommodate expansions
of the police power and the Bill of Rights, martial law contemplates an
express or de facto executive declaration of emergency rather than a
judicial finding of "special circumstances" as the basis for limiting Bill
of Rights guarantees. 361 While both approaches assume the existence
of extraordinary public danger, the initial limitations are imposed
by the courts in the first model and by an executive officer in the second.
The martial law approach has been recently advocated by Lawrence

Hyde, Dean of the National College of State Trial Judges. Recognizing
358 See Greenwood v. United States, 219 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1955), aff'd., 350 U.S. 366
(1956); Craig v. Steele, 123 F. Supp. 153, 154-5 (W.D. Mo. 1954); In re Magnuson, 110
Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952); A.N.E. v. State, 156 So. 2d 525, 527-8 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1963); 18 U.S.C. §§ 4244-8 (1964). See generally Note, Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288 (1966); Comment, The
Validity of the Segregation of the Sexual Psychopath Under the Law, 26 OHIo ST. L.J.

640, 646 (1965).
359 See Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, supra note 289, at 1504.
360 See Wiener, Helping to Cool the Long Hot Summers, 53 A.B.AJ. 713 (1967);
Project, The Long, Hot Summer: A Legal View, 43 NoraE DA.m LAw. 918, 975-9 (1968).
361 The use of military detention and avoidance of the civil courts is advocated in a
recent memorandum opinion by the Indiana Attorney General: "[Djetention of rioters
in jail until the riot is suppressed is often considered more desirable than actual arrest
which necessitates a turning over to civil authorities and setting of bond. The latter
method would frustrate the attempt of the military to suppress since the person would
rejoin the rioters upon being released on bail." 2 BNA CRIlM. L. Rr'ra. 2376 (Feb. 14,

1968).
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that the most urgent task of the executive branch during civil disorder
is to quell rioting, he. nevertheless noted that
[T]he courts must protect the Constitutional right of the accused
to reasonable bail. If both cannot be done, then the courts muft
not be forced to subvert due process by delaying or denying release on reasonable 2 bail. Rather, the executive branch should
3
declare martial law.
It may be fruitful at the outset to review briefly the emergency
363
powers granted to the governor and municipal officers of Illinois.
The governor is authorized, as commander-in-chief, to mobilize the
state's military forces to suppress violence. Whenever there is a riot
or threat thereof,
it shall be deemed that a time of public disorder and danger then
exists, and it shall be the duty of the Governor thereupon to order
such military ...

force as he may deem necessary to aid the civil

authorities in suppressing such violence and executing the law.364
The commanding officer of the state military forces is then authorized
to
arrest any person or persons in view without process and hold
them in custody until, by order of the Commander-in-Chief, such
person or persons are discharged from custody or delivered over
to. the civil authorities. 365
Under similarly broad constitutional and statutory authorization,
state executive officers have invoked martial law on numerous occasions. Indeed, the best precedents for the use of preventive detention
during conditions of civil disorder may be judicial decisions reviewing
similar measures under situations of martial rule.366 Judicial review of
362

52 J. A i. JuD. Soc'Y 210-11 (1968).

363 ILL. CoNsr. art. 5, § 14; I . REv. STAT. ch. 129,
364 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.83 (1967).
365 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 129, § 220.84 (1967).

§§ 220.83-.90 (1967).

Subject to the authority of the governor, a mayor "may call out the militia to aid in
suppressing riots and other disorderly conduct .... " ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 24, § 8-11-4 (1967).
And the discretion of the military commander is broad: "Orders from civil officers to
any military . . . commander shall specify only the work to be done or result to be
attained and shall not include the method to be employed as to which the military...
officer shall exercise his discretion and be the sole judge as to what means are necessary."
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 129, § 220.85 (1967).
366 The decisions on martial law recognize the severity of the impact of military interference on basic constitutional guarantees. Ex parte MUlligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wan.) 1, 123
(1866); Moyer v. Peabody, 148 F. 870, 876 (C.C. Colo. 1906). Since the impact is similar
whether the military or police interfere, it would seem that the judicially evolved standards regulating military interference should also apply to police interference.
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executive and military measures taken pursuant to express or de facto
declarations of martial rule has focused on two questions: (1) the conclusiveness of executive declarations of emergency; and (2) the measures which may be constitutionally taken to restore order. A review
of instances of martial rule reveals that where a state of actual violence
exists or is "immediate and impending" the courts have generally
upheld the use of martial law. 3 7 But where no state of violence is

threatened, 36 or where martial rule has been used for various political
or economic reasons369-what one authority has called "bogus" martial
0
rule3 7O-the
courts have generally disallowed the governor's actions.
In considering the measures which may be constitutionally taken to
restore order, it is useful to distinguish between situations in which
military tribunals have been established to try offenders and instances
of "qualified martial law" where the military is called to aid civil
authorities.3 7 ' Although the use of military tribunals has been upheld
in several instances, 372 it has been sharply criticized, and it seems un373
likely that such measures will be used again short of civil war.
Almost all measures taken pursuant to a justified invocation of
"qualified martial law" have been upheld, unless a measure was
"arbitrary or capricious" or "bore no relation to the necessities of the
367 See, e.g., Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. 115
(1851) ("the danger must be immediate and impending'); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp.
355 (S.D. Ind. 1935); In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 P. 706 (1899); State ex rel. Roberts v.
Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933).
368 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Palmer v. Adams, 26 F.2d 141 (D. Colo. 1928); Franks
v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 SAV. 484 (1911); Bishop v. Vandercook, 228 Mich. 299, 200
N.W. 278 (1924).
369 See, e.g., Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932) (regulate oil production);
Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 424-5, 52 P.2d 1054, 1058 (1935) (enforce racial
segregation); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935) (settle a political feud).
370 F. WmINER, A PRACTICAL MANUAL OF MARTIAL LAw 102 (1940).
371 See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Wadsworth v. Shortall, 206 Pa. 165, 170, 55 A.2d 952,
954 (1963). See generally R. RANKIN, WHEN CIVIL LAW FAILS chs. V, VII (1939). Some
commentators have attempted to distinguish between "qualified martial law" and "military assistance." See, e.g., C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RuLE 30 (2d ed. 1943);
R. RANKIN, supra at 146. Other Commentators have rejected the distinction as meaningless. See, e.g., WIEN.R, supra note 370, at 8; Ballantine, Military Dictatorship in California and West Virginia, 1 CALIF. L. Rav. 413, 419 (1913).
372 United States ex tel. Seymour v. Fisscher, 280 F. 208 (D. Neb. 1922) (denying
habeas corpus to petitioners convicted by military court for violating military regulation); United States ex rel. McMaster v. Wolters, 268 F. 69 (S.D. Texas 1920) (rejecting
habeas corpus petition of defendant incarcerated pursuant to default of payment of fine
levied on conviction for traffic violation in military court); Hatfield v. Graham, 73 W. Va.
739, 81 S.E. 533 (1914) (arrest on military warrant); State ex rel. Nance v. Brown, 71
V. Va. 519, 77 S.E. 243 (1912); Ex parte Jones, 71 W. Va. 570, 77 S.E. 1029 (1913).
373 See, e.g., In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 476, 143 P. 947, 954 (1914); WIENER, supra
note 370, at 120.
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situation."3 7 4 Detention has often been upheld as a valid incident of
martial rule justifying a denial of the writ of habeas corpus. 375 Hence,
detention under martial law results in suspension by the executive of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus-presumably justified by the
nature of the emergency and subject to judicial review.3 7 6 Even if a
petitioner is successful in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus, however,
377
relief usually comes long after invasion of his rights.

Martial law precedents vividly highlight the fact that the use of
preventive detention is inherently punitive. Many courts have upheld
the use of preventive detention as being a preventive rather than
punitive measure,37 8 but it is difficult to sustain that distinction. The
petitioner in Moyer v. Peabody, for example, was detained without
hearing or adjudication for two and a half months by military au37 9
thorities until the insurrection was over.
In light of the broad discretion enjoyed by the executive and the
military under conditions of martial rule, and the drastic effect of
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, even "qualified

martial law" should be entertained only as a means of absolute last
resort. Nevertheless, martial rule has several advantages over the flexible

guarantees rationale.
The principal advantage of the martial rule approach is that the
374 Powers Mercantile Co. v. Olson, 7 F. Supp. 865, 868 (D. Minn. 1934) (dictum); see
Wilson and Co. v. Freeman, 179 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1959).
375 Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909) (military detention); Cox v. McNutt, 12 F. Supp.
555 (S.D. Ind. 1935); In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 P. 190 (1905) (military detention);
In re Boyle, 6 Idaho 609, 57 P. 706 (1899); In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947
(1914) (military detention); State ex rel. Roberts v. Swope, 38 N.M. 53, 28 P.2d 4 (1933).
But see United States ex rel. Palmer v. Adams, 26 F.2d 141 (D. Colo. 1928) (no violence
alleged); Franks v. Smith, 142 Ky. 232, 134 S.W. 484 (1911) (no evidence of violence).
Contra, Ex parte Moore, 64 N.C. 802 (1870).
376 "mhe privilege or writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 7.
"The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. COsrT. art. 1, § 9,
cl. 2.
377 See, e.g., In re McDonald, 49 Mont. 454, 143 P. 947 (1914) (writ granted almost a
month after petitioner's arrest by military authorities); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78
(1909) (question reached the Supreme Court over four years after petitioner's release);
In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 P. 190 (1905) (question reached the state supreme court
over a year after petitioner's release).
378 "Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution to
prevent the exercise of hostile power." Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909). But
see Herlihy v. Donohue, 52 Mont. 601, 608, 161 P. 164, 166 (1916): "[W]e cannot concede
to the organized militia, or to any department of our government, or to any function
of government, the right to convict and punish without notice, a hearing or an adjudication."
379 In re Moyer, 35 Colo. 154, 85 P. 190 (1905).

1969]

Criminal Justice in Extremis

decisions which invoke restrictions on the rights of citizens are made
by an officer directly responsible to the public. While both models
postulate a determination of public danger as a requisite to abridgement of civil rights, the greater political responsiveness of the executive
argues strongly for entrusting him with such critical decisions. The
responsibility of the executive to an electorate makes it less likely that
martial rule will be invoked in situations that pose only a minor
danger to the populace. Furthermore, the costs of reliance on martial
rule restrict its use: administrative and military costs are great, and
the political costs of admitting that a breakdown of order has occurred
may be substantial. Perhaps as a consequence of these factors resort to
martial law has in recent times been relatively rare.
Another advantage of martial law is that the decision is a highly
visible one; if it is imprudently made, criticism will be immediate. By
contrast, a judicial finding of fact that an exceptional procedure is required by public necessity is easily made and subject to little publicity.
The martial rule rationale, unlike the first approach, forces the community to face squarely the reality of the harsh measures taken. Unlike the first approach, a declaration of martial law publicly recognizes
the suspension of constitutional guarantees, and lasts only as long as
the emergency endures.38 0 The prospect of recurring invocations of
martial law is, therefore, less likely and less objectionable than the
prospect of diluted constitutional guarantees.
On the other hand, martial law has certain shortcomings not inherent
in a flexible guarantees approach. Under martial rule executive authorities must choose between the unacceptable alternatives of inaction
and suspension of the adjudicatory function of the criminal courts and
the writ of habeas corpus. Although civil courts may remain open
under situations of qualified martial rule, the military retains the
capacity effectively to punish persons without an adjudication of
guilt.
Thus neither the flexible guarantees model nor martial law precedents are acceptable rationales for the use of preventive detention
during civil disorders. Assuming a legitimate public need for preventive detention under such circumstances, the criminal courts are
in need of mechanism which avoids the risks of permanently dilut380 A military order, however unconstitutional, is not apt to last longer than the
military emergency... . But once a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order
to show that it conforms to the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for
all time has validated the principle . .. [which] then lies about like a loaded
weapon ready for the hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible
claim of an urgent need.
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 246 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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ing constitutional guarantees, on the one hand, and effectively preempting the judicial function on the other.
3. Limited Emergency Model. In response to the 1967 Detroit
riots, two authors have proposed a limited preventive detention statute
which combines the better features of the other two models.38 ' Like
martial law, the proposed model is called into operation by executive
declaration; this procedure avoids the risk of eroding constitutional
guarantees by numerous exceptions. It outlines a more limited system
of detention than martial law precedents sustain, and supplements
rather than displaces the traditional bail institutions. Detained persons
must be accorded an opportunity for release as soon as (1) the governor
rescinds the declaration, or (2) the committing magistrate declares the
emergency at an end, or (8) a judge declares the arrestees eligible for
38
release on bail.

2

If adhered to by bailsetting officers, the guidelines established under
such a scheme 38

3

might permit the early release of most arrestees, by

avoiding detention of defendants charged with petty crimes or vague
forms of misconduct. Only those whose release would create a substantial risk of reentry into the riot would be held. The authors
estimate that perhaps 80% of riot arrestees could be immediately
admitted to reasonable bail. 3 4
If, as the authors of the Detroit study suggest, the breakdown of the
bail system during riots is due to its failure to provide alternatives
to pretrial release, 38 5 their proposal, by providing such alternatives,
should result in fewer unnecessary detentions.
The limited emergency model also avoids the major disadvantages
of the earlier proposals. It recognizes that preventive detention may
381 Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 824-30.
382 The proposed statute would provide clear guidelines limiting the use of detention
once an emergency has been declared. Provision is made for immediate and reasonable
setting of bail in all cases, and for the suspension of bail only in those cases where
there is "substantial evidence" that an arrestee (1) participated in inciting a riot, or (2)
has a criminal record indicating violent or destructive anti-social behavior, or (3) committed or attempted to commit a serious crime against the physical safety of others, or
arson, or violent destruction of property. Id. at 829.
383 Id. at 828-9.
384 Id. at 826. The failure of the model to provide for counsel or review is presumably
dictated by the need for rapid determinations. The presence of attorneys might prolong
initial hearings so that many who would ultimately be released on bail would be detained through administrative processing. Similarly, review by a higher court would not
only come too late to avoid such harsh consequences as loss of employment, but also, by
requiring detailed written reasons for denying bail, would further prolong the initial
hearing and delay the rapid release of most arrestees. Any safeguards written into preventive detention statutes operating during riots must be operative at the initial hearing
stage rather than as subsequent remedies for judicial abuse of discretion.
385 Colista & Domonkos, supra note 319, at 826-8.
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be justified in some situations, but it does not incorporate these
emergency measures into constitutional doctrine. Furthermore, it employs the resources and experience of the criminal courts rather than
entrust important adjudicative determinations to military officers. By
steering a middle course between the dangers of a Constitution
riddled with exceptions and military control, the limited emergency
model reaches the most acceptable accommodation of individual rights
and protection of the public interest.
C. Conclusion
There is an indication, however, that the pressure toward use of
preventive detention during civil disorders is not, as the proponents
of the limited emergency model assume, due to the failure of the bail
system to provide alternatives to pretrial release. The third model
establishes three criteria of future dangerousness. 380 At least two of
those criteria are also criteria in Illinois for setting bond: criminal
record and the nature of the offense charged. Yet, as we have seen,
many defendants with no prior criminal record and arrested on minor
38 7
If
offenses were temporarily detained during the April 1968 riot.
magistrates were genuinely interested in detaining only those likely to
reenter the riot, there were perhaps rational criteria, institutionalized
into the bail system, with which to achieve that purpose.
The fact that in Chicago the absence of correlation between bond
amounts and prior criminal record may be partly explained by the
frequent unavailability of police prior arrest records illuminates an
even more important reason why even the limited emergency proposal
is likely to be unworkable in practice. One of the main reasons, as we
noted, for the failure to hold individualized bail hearings is the great
388
delay and administrative impracticality which such hearings entail.
Those same factors are bound to thwart any attempt to individualize
determinations of future dangerousness, even if accurate standards of
prediction could be developed. More significant is the fact that magistrates, as we suggested earlier, are not prone to make individualized
bail determinations under normal conditions. 38 9 Nothing but wishful
thinking supports the belief that they will do under conditions of
civil disorder what they fail to do under ordinary circumstances. Indeed, all of the weaknesses of an overt preventive detention scheme
under ordinary circumstances are retained and exaggerated under riot
388
387
388

See note 882 supra.
See Section IV supra.
See text at note 150 supra.

389 See tcxt at notes 292, 293 supra.
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conditions. During those times when the pressure for an overt preventive detention system is greatest, its impracticality is most dramatic.
Of course, if the primary reason why magistrates fail to follow the
requirements of bail statutes under either ordinary or riot conditions
is their insistence on the need to detain arrestees for preventive purposes-that is, to prevent future crime or reentry into the riot-the
impetus behind an express statutory scheme of preventive detention
would be understandable. But, in fact, as we mentioned at the outset,
there are at least two other reasons, in addition to the demand for administrative efficiency, which underlie the use of pretrial detention:
punishment and general deterrence. Indeed, the main deficiency of
proposed preventive detention plans is that they confuse one aspect of
the problem-the most often articulated one-with the general problem. The use of pretrial detention is as much a result of the belief
that it provides an appropriate sanction, especially for minor offenders,
as it is a consequence of fears of risk to society which would result
from the release of individual criminal defendants. In fact the incremental risk of individual defendants reentering a riot is probably
minimal. The fact that the application of this sanction avoids formal
criminal adjudication reflects two increasingly disturbing aspects of the
criminal process, neither of them restricted to civil disorders. The
central fact about any modem urban criminal justice system is the
pressure of criminal caseloads. 390 There is some indication that increasing caseload pressures are resulting in a larger number of pretrial
dispositions. The percentage of felony cases reaching trial in Cook
County, for example, declined from 22% to 17% between 1964 and
1967. 391 Recognition of the contemporary demand for efficiency in judicial administration has induced many writers to view the criminal
system in terms of the competing goals of efficiency and due process. 39 2
390 Between 1964 and 1967 the number of felony cases begun or reinstated in the
Cook County Circuit Court increased 26% (computed from ADsmimTRA=v OFFICE OF
ThE ILLTIois COURTS, 1967 ANNUAL COURT REPORT 60); the number of misdemeanor and
ordinance violation cases terminated in the Municipal Department increased 18% (computed from 1967 ANNUAL COURT REPORT 71 and 1964 ANNUAL COURT REPORT 82). In 1967
each judge and magistrate in the Cook County Circuit Court handles an average of
6,898 cases. 1967 ANNUAL COURT REPORT 56. In

the Cook County Criminal Courts the

pressure for efficient disposition of criminal cases is dubbed the "disposition derby."
With the approval of the chief judge of the Criminal Court, a ranking is posted each
month of the names of the judges and number of dispositions in each courtroom.
Working Paper on Public Defender's Project, A Report to the Center for Studies in
Criminal Justice, University of Chicago Law School 72 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Working Paper].
391 Calculated from data in

1967 ANNUAL

COURT REPORT 55,

1964 ANNUAL COURT

REPORT 62.

392 See, e.g., OAKS & LEHMAN 8 n.15; Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass
Production, in AMERICAN ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW ExPLosioN
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We shall explore the problems raised by these competing goals in the
next section on the effectiveness of defense counsel. For our present
purposes it is important to recognize that the goal of efficiency under
conditions of increased caseload may result not only in a larger number
of pretrial dispositions but also in an increased proportion of pretrial
dismissals as the most efficient way to clear congested dockets.
Indeed, between 1964 and 1967 the guilty plea rate declined 8%
in felony cases in Cook County, and the proportion of cases dismissed
before trial increased from 19% to 32% in felony cases and increased
8% in misdemeanor and ordinance violation cases. 393 Although the
increasing incidence of early dismissals may be due in part to the
greater availability of defense counsel, recent Illinois bail reform, and
other factors, it would seem in large part to reflect pressures toward
economy in the criminal courts.
But there is a second aspect of the modem criminal process equally
as significant as the pressure toward judicial economy-the loss of the
presumption of innocence. "The spirit in 'the building'," one Cook
County Public Defender has written of the Chicago criminal courts
"runs counter to the belief that 'all men are innocent until proven
guilty'."'

4

Many Cook County public defenders estimate that 95%

395
of their clients are guilty.
In light of the presumption of guilt and need for efficiency which
characterize the contemporary criminal process, the immediate goal
of a modem criminal system can be stated as the efficient application
of appropriate sanctions consistent with procedural due process. The
ultimate goal of the criminal process is presumably the general deterrence of criminal behavior.
Given demands for efficient judicial administration and the pre-

(1965); H. SUBIN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT (1966). Sociologists, too,
have recently conceptualized the criminal system as a bureaucratic organization whose
determinations can be viewed in relation to the bureaucratic and organizational pres.
sures which threaten efficient performance. Thus, Jerome Skolnick in reference to the
police, and Abraham Blumberg in reference to the handling of felony cases, have suggested that pressures encouraging efficiency, mass production, and the clearing of police
and court dockets are instrumental in explaining the determinations of officers of the
criminal system. J. SaoLNICK, JusTicE Wrmotrr TaIA (1966); A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL
JusTIcE (1967); see also Sudnow, Normal Crimes: Sociological Features of the Penal Code
in a Public Defender Office, 12 Soc. PROBS. 255 (1965).
393 Computed from 1967 ANNUAL COURT REPORT 55, 71, and 1964 ANNUAL COURT
REPORT 62, 82.
394 Working Paper 72.
"The 'adversary system' and the 'presumption of innocence' are compromised in the
framework of the formal court process itself. They are supplanted by a non-adversary,
accusatory system which actually favors a presumption of guilt." BLUMBERO, supra note
392, at 6.
395 Working Paper 70. The estimate refers to indicted defendants in the Criminal
Division, rather than defendants in the Municipal Department.
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vailirig presumption of guilt, the significance of pretrial detention
under ordinary circumstances becomes clear. Giving presumably guilty
arrestees a "taste of jail" is an effective sanction which avoids the
necessity of formal adjudication.
The use of pretrial detention under conditions of civil disorder is,
to some degree, merely a manifestation of normal pressures on the court
system. The pressure toward judicial economy, for example, is aggravated by large numbers of mass arrests which may ultimately result
in low conviction rates among riot arrestees. 96 The apparent conflict between the presumption of guilt and expected low conviction
rates is reconciled in the use of pretrial detention.
But the use of pretrial detention in mass arrest situations also
burdens inadequate detention facilities and crowded bail court dockets.
To some extent, then, pretrial detention is clearly a calculated inefficiency which courts tolerate because it permits attainment of other
goals. This fact highlights the importance during civil disorders of
pretrial detention as a form of punishment and general deterrence.
Judging by the remarks of court officials themselves, it is apparent that
the use of pretrial detention during riots reflects not so much an intent
to prevent individual arrestees from reentering the riot as a desire
39T
either to punish arrestees or deter potential rioters.
In terms of the traditional goal of general deterrence, riots present
a unique problem to any criminal justice system. The prospect of
formal adjudication and conviction may be thought to be far too remote to provide any immediate deterrent effect. In light of estimates
that the number of actual rioters in recent disorders is five times the
number arrested, 398 the criminal courts may be inclined to opt for
396 KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 184. In Chicago the criminal system avoided low conviction rates by carefully screening arrests, and by careful attention to the nature of
charges levied against riot arrestees.
397 See text at notes 325-30 supra. Those remarks suggest that the courts exercised

broad discretion in detaining large numbers of people, regardless of their guilt or innocence. In justifying this extreme practice, it might be argued that such mass detention
is the only effective means of quelling disorders, not only because it serves as a deterrent
to potential rioters, but also because innocent bystanders might be thought of as providing an indispensable "audience" whose mere presence in the area provides both
encouragement and a protective shield to active rioters. Standards narrowly delineating
only the most dangerous conduct as warranting detention would then be considered
undesirable, because it, is the widespread audience for and participation in property
offenses during riots which the courts hope to deter. The looter and bystander may pose
as great a threat to quelling a riot as the arsonist, even though the "criminality" of his
conduct might not be such as would ordinarily justify the harsh deprivation which
detention involves.
398 Fogelson &: Hill, Who Riots? A Study of Participationin the 1967 Riots, SUPrLMENTAL STUDIES FOR TnE NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMassION ON CIVIL DIsoRDms 230-1 (1968).
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pretrial detention as a telescoped deterrent response, in order to
achieve an immediate impact.
Whether in fact temporary detention is an effective measure of
general deterrence is, of course, open to question.399 It is important to
remember that in Chicago at least the bulk of arrests occurred during
and after peak riot periods. In many instances the real purpose of
so-called preventive detention may be informal retribution-"a slap on
the wrist." In any case, the real issue posed by pretrial detention during
riots is not preventive detention but the informal application of pretrial sanctions.
Within our constitutional framework the application of pretrial
sanctions clearly raises serious objections. Those objections are particularly real during civil disorders, for regardless whether the presumption of guilt is in fact accurate under ordinary circumstances, there is
grave doubt that mass arrest decisions under riot conditions are as
reliable an indication of guilt. Furthermore, as we noted earlier, the
Cook County criminal courts granted automatic continuances in most
misdemeanor cases and avoided probable cause hearing in most felony
cases. In many instances convicted defendants were fined or sentenced
only to the equivalent of time already served in pretrial detention.
The effect of those policies, coupled with use of pretrial detention, is,
as one arrestee put it, that the police "can conduct their court right out
there on the street and define the guilty." Or, as another arrestee remarked, "The police are to bring them in, and the courts are to
lock 'em up."
Of course it may be true, as one commentator has said, that "the
400
observance of suspects' and defendants' rights is not good politics."
There was in Chicago during the April riots much concern that rioters
be punished. 40 1 But the task should properly follow, rather than render
meaningless, an adjudication of guilt.
399 There is some indication that temporary detention did not have a deterrent effect
on the arrestees themselves. The following responses to an interviewer's question whether
the respondent would take part in another riot were typical:
This would make me look back and say I wish that I did something because if
I'm going to go to jail and haven't did anything, I gonna say I wish I had
did something.
V'ell, I probably would take part in the riot because most likely, if all the
blacks get together and know what they are going to do and why they are
doing it,there won't actually be a riot, there would be somewhat of a revolution.
400 Kamisar, Book Review, 78 Hyav. L. REV. 478, 487 (1964); see also R. JACKSoN, THE
SuPREmE COURT 82 (1955).
401 See, e.g., Punishment for the Rioters, Chicago Tribune, April 11, 1968, § 1, at 20.

VII.

THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL

In earlier sections of this study we have referred to the role of defense counsel during the April disorders in Chicago. In this section we
examine the effectiveness of legal representation accorded riot defendants in light of the present posture of the law regarding a criminal
defendant's right to effective representation. In conclusion we offer
some observations on the role of the Public Defender in the criminal
process.
A. The Right to Counsel
Consideration of the right to effective counsel must necessarily begin
with a more basic right-the right to have counsel appointed at all.
In Gideon v. Wainright,40 2 the Supreme Court established an indigent's
right to appointed counsel during the trial in felony cases. 403 The
Court, however, left two questions unresolved: (1) Does the right extend to misdemeanors and, if so, to which cases? 40 4 (2) At what stages
during the criminal process is the right applicable?
Despite continuing uncertainty over the right to appointed counsel
in misdemeanor cases,40 5 it is likely that the Supreme Court will
eventually extend the right of all indigent defendants except those
charged with "petty" offenses, by analogy perhaps to the sixth amendment right to jury trial. In Duncan v. Louisiana,40 6 the Court held
that the sixth amendment right to jury trial "in all criminal prosecu402 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
403 Justice Clark in his concurring opinion stated that the decision erased the meaningless distinction between capital and non-capital offenses, saying that: "The Fourteenth Amendment requires due process of law for the deprival of 'liberty' just as for
the deprival of 'life,' and there cannot constitutionally be a difference in the quality
of the process based merely upon a supposed difference in the sanction involved." 372 U.S.
at 349.
404 Justice Harlan's concurring opinion suggested that the rule might well be restricted to felonies involving a "substantial" prison sentence and cautioned that
"[w]hether the rule should extend to all criminal cases need not now be decided." 372
U.S. at 351.
405 See Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966). The Arkansas Supreme Court had denied habeas corpus to a defendant convicted
of the misdemeanor of "immorality," holding that the rule of Gideon does not apply
in misdemeanor cases. But see McDonald v. Moore, 353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965), and
Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965), each holding that Gideon assures a
right to counsel to an indigent defendant charged with the misdemeanor of "possession
of whiskey."
406 391 U.S. 145 (1968).

592
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tions" extends to all but "petty crimes." 407 It seems reasonable to
assume that the sixth amendment right to assistance of counsel "in
all criminal prosecutions" is coextensive with the jury trial right. In
Cook County the question is apparently resolved by the Illinois Criminal Code which provides that "the Public Defender shall be appointed
as counsel in all misdemeanor cases where the defendant is indigent
and desires counsel .... 408
Recent Supreme Court decisions have considered whether the right
to counsel is applicable in pretrial criminal proceedings. In Hamilton v.
Alabama,40 9 the Court reversed the defendant's conviction because he
had been denied appointment of counsel at his arraignment. The Court
held that the arraignment was a "critical stage" in the criminal prosecution, noting that under Alabama law certain defenses could not be
410
raised at trial if they were not pleaded at the arraignment.
The "critical stage" rationale of Hamilton was apparently followed
in White v. Maryland.411 The Supreme Court found a violation of the
due process clause when White pleaded guilty without the assistance of
counsel at his preliminary hearing. The defendant later changed his
plea to not guilty, but his original guilty plea was introduced in
evidence against him at trial. In Pointer v. Texas, 412 however, the
Court in dictum rejected the petitioners argument that the state had
violated the fourteenth amendment by failing to provide him counsel
at his preliminary hearing, since guilty pleas are not accepted at a
Texas preliminary hearing. At such hearings "the judge decides only
whether the accused should be bound over to the grand jury and if so
413
whether he should be admitted to bail.1
The Illinois Supreme Court, in People v. Morris,414 reached a conclusion similar to the Pointer dictum. 415 The court emphasized that
407 Defendant was convicted of the misdemeanor of "simple battery," punishable by
two years in prison and a $300 fine. His actual sentence was 60 days and $150 fine. See
also Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968).
408 ILL. R y. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(b) (1967). It should be noted, however, that if the
case involves multiple defendants the "court may appoint counsel other than the Public
Defender for the additional defendants." Id.
409 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
410 Among those defenses which would be "irretrievably lost" if not pleaded at the
arraignment were the defense of insanity, pleas in abatement, motions to quash based
on racial exclusion in the grand jury, and motions to quash for improper drawing of
the grand jury. 368 U.S. at 53-54.
411 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
412 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
413

Id. at 402.

Ili. 2d 406, 197 N.E.2d 433 (1964).
415 The Illinois court's discussion of the right to counsel issue was also dictum since
the decision to grant a new trial was based on the failure to allow cross-examination
of the complaining witness as to his sobriety.
414 30
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the absence of counsel at a preliminary hearing in Illinois can in no
way prejudice the defendant's subsequent trial.416
The "critical stage" cases could be read to mean that the sixth
amendment right to counsel matures at a particular point in time prior
to trial, normally at a "stage" in the proceedings at which the defendant
may enter a plea. According to such an analysis, whether a denial of
counsel violates the due process clause would depend on whether the
denial took place during or after the "critical stage." But Miranda v.
Arizonae41 casts doubt upon this approach. In Mirandathe Court held
that all suspects in custody have a right to counsel prior to any police
interrogation. It would appear, then, that station house interrogations
are a "critical stage" in the criminal process, even though they may
precede the preliminary hearing in such states as Illinois or Texas.
Miranda can be squared with the critical stage cases, however, if
"critical stage" is defined as any proceeding which can directly affect,
in some significant manner, the conduct of the defense at trial or the
formal disposition of the case.4 18 Thus it seems that the courts consider
the right to counsel in pretrial stages essential only when a proceeding
bears upon the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence. According to this approach, a bail hearing is not "critical," even if it results
in prolonged confinement in a dirty, overcrowded jail and loss of
employment or wages. In focusing primarily on the rights of the
accused which are related to the formal disposition of his case, this
narrow reading of the "critical stage" approach thus ignores major incidents of impact of the criminal justice system upon the individual,
which may be far more important to him than the determination of
his guilt or innocence.
B. The Right to Effective Counsel
A constitutional or statutory right to appointed counsel is meaningless if it does not imply a right to competent representation. Both
416 The Morris decision predates enactment of § 109-1(b)(2) of the Illinois Code of
Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person arrested without a warrant shall be
taken without unnecessary delay before the nearest and most accessible judge. The judge
shall, inter alia, "advise the defendant of his right to counsel and if indigent shall appoint a public defender or licensed attorney at law of this State to represent him in
accordance with the provisions of Section 113-3 of this Code." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109l(b) (1967). Although this provision might have cast some doubt on the continuing
validity of the Morris holding, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that § 109-1 does
not create a statutory right to counsel at the preliminary hearing. People v. Bonner,
37 IIL. 2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967).
417 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
418 See, e.g., DeToro v. Pepersack, 332 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1964), in which the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals spoke of "prejudice to defendant's ensuing trial." See also
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); People v. Rebenstorf, 37 Ill. 2d 572, 229
N.E2d 483 (1967); People v. Bonner, 37 Ill. 2d 553, 229 N.E.2d 527 (1967).
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federal and Illinois courts appear to recognize a right to effective
representation, based on the sixth amendment right to assistance of
counsel 419 at many stages of the criminal process. 420 But the legal
standards governing the effectiveness of counsel, and remedies available
to the defendant denied effective representation, are presently unclear.
Illinois courts have reversed convictions for lack of effective representation where counsel failed to object to the introduction of selfincriminating evidence,4 21 to move for a mistrial when the jury heard
evidence that the victim was pregnant when killed,422 and to move for
423
dismissal for lack of speedy trial.

The Illinois cases generally indicate that in order to obtain a reversal a defendant must prove (1) actual incompetency and (2) "substantial prejudice resulting therefrom, without which the outcome
would probably have been different."' 4 Appellate courts thus treat
419 In People v. DeSimone, for example, the Illinois Supreme Court ordered a new
trial, stating, "A defendant's right to assistance by counsel is not satisfied by the mere

formality of an appointment of an attorney by the court, but . . . embraces effective
representation throughout all stages of the trial, and where the representation is of
such low caliber as to amount to no representation .. .the guarantees of due process
are violated." 9 Ill.
2d 522, 524, 138 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1956).
420 See, e.g., Entsminger v. Iowa, 386 U.S. 748 (1967) (failure to prosecute appeal);
Anders v. California, 886 U.S. 738 (1967) (failure to prosecute appeal); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1982) (no counsel appointed until morning of trial); United States
ex rel. DeMary v. Pate, 277 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1967) (failure to consult defendant
before and during trial). Illinois cases are cited infra notes 421-4. Even if there be no
constitutional right to appointed counsel at the early stages of the criminal proceedings,
Illinois provides this right by statute-at least at the pleading stage. ILL. Rxv. STAT. ch.
38, § 113-8(a) (1967), and this should be a sufficient basis for the right to effective
counsel.
421 People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.
2d 522, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956); People v. Odom, 71 I1.
App. 2d 480, 218 N.E.2d 116 (5th Dist. 1966).
422 People v. McCoy, 80 Ill. App. 2d 257, 225 N.E.2d 128 (1st Dist. 1967).
423 People v. Morris, 3 Ill.
2d 437, 121 N.E.2d 810 (1954).
424 People v. Morris, 3 Ill. 2d 487, 449, 121 N.E.2d 810, 817 (1954). See also People v.
DeMary, 37 Ill. 2d 864, 227 N.E.2d 361 (1967); People v. Williams, 86 Ill. 2d 194, 222
N.E.2d 821 (1966), cert. denied, 888 U.S. 923 (1967); People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 216
N.E.2d 126 (1966); People v. DeSimone, 9 Ill.
2d 552, 138 N.E.2d 556 (1956).
The Illinois courts have thus declined to follow the approach in Hamilton where the
Court said: "[W]e do not stop to determine whether prejudice resulted [when the defendant pleaded without counsel in a capital felony case] .... [Tjhe degree of prejudice
can never be known." 868 U.S. at 55. This might be termed the "prejudice per se" approach, where the defendant is granted a reversal merely upon showing that his constitutional right was infringed, without a showing of actual prejudice. Putting the burden
of proof on the defendant to show actual prejudice is questionable because (1)actual
prejudice may be absent from the record precisely because counsel was ineffective, (2) as
the Supreme Court has indicated in adopting a prophylactic rule in the context of incustody interrogation, requiring courts to examine the record for actual prejudice burdens judicial administration and inevitably raises difficult and unavoidable factual
assessments, and (3) the burden of proof is and should be on the state in criminal
proceedings. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), where the Court held that
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the due process requirements of the right to counsel and the right to
effective representation similarly; both issues are related only to the
ultimate determination of guilt or innocence in an adversary setting
and not to the prejudicial effect of the criminal process on the defendant's interests in general.
The "substantial prejudice" rule-that incompetency per se will not
require reversal 42 5 -markedly restricts the legal remedies available to a
criminal defendant who is denied effective representation. It is often
difficult to prove the existence of actual prejudice. 426 The inadequacies
of remedies for ineffective counsel are particularly acute with respect
to the bail hearing, as we shall see, where as a result of competing
goals of efficiency and due process the ineffectiveness of counsel is most
significant. If the result of counsel's ineffectiveness is a high bond
determination resulting in prolonged pretrial detention, the defendant
42 7
is virtually without a remedy.
In examining the effectiveness of counsel during the April riots,
we shall consider primarily how ineffective representation influenced
the impact of the criminal process upon the defendant. And since the
focus of the study has been on all, of the sanctions imposed by the
criminal system during each stage of the criminal process rather than
on the ultimate determination of guilt or innocence, our inquiry into
the effectiveness of counsel must be broader than the representation
by counsel at trial.
the state must show that constitutional error (infringement on fifth amendment rights)
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
425 It is also true in Illinois that a showing of actual prejudice is not sufficient for
reversal. See People v. Kuczynski, 33 Il. 2d 412, 211 N.E.2d 687 (1965), where the court
held that despite obvious prejudice, counsel's mistake was one that any competent counsel could have made.
426 In People v. Ashley, 34 Ill. 2d 402, 216 N.E.2d 126 (1966), when appellant failed
to show in what specific ways counsel had been incompetent, the Illinois Supreme Court
suggested that appellant could have tried to prove the existence of evidence not introduced by the Public Defender. See generally note 424 supra.
427 We have already noted in the section on preventive detention that there is little
or no effective relief based on the unreasonableness of bail determinations. See text at
notes 303-10 supra. As we have noted in the present section, the defendant is also unlikely
to succeed in obtaining relief if he bases his claim on denial of right to effective counsel
at the bail hearing because under the traditional "critical stage" approach the severity
of impact on the defendant of high bail is not directly related to an adverse formal
disposition of the case and hence is beyond the pale of judicial protection. And even
if a defendant is successful in urging a court to consider the critical personal impact of
a high bail determination, unless he can also demonstrate actual substantial prejudice to
the formal disposition of his case, he is still without an effective appellate remedy unless
a reviewing court is willing to reverse the conviction solely in order to protect defendants
against adverse impact of denial of effective counsel at pretrial stages.
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C. The Representation of Riot Defendants
Virtually all riot defendants were represented by the Public Defender's office at initial bail hearings. 428 Private counsel, however,
represented many riot defendants during later stages of the criminal
proceedings. 429 The Public Defender did not formally withdraw from
such cases, but "stood aside" to permit private attorneys to assume the
defense. 410 We shall first examine the role of counsel at the bail
hearings; then we shall compare the effectiveness of the Public Defender and private attorneys in relation to the formal disposition of
the riot cases.
1. Bail Hearings. Data compiled from a sample of 202 adult bail
hearings transcripts reveal that counsel was in fact present in all but
7% of the cases. (See Table 50.) Private attorneys represented 4%
TABLE 50
TYPE OF COUNSEL AT BA.

Public Defender Appearance
Public Defender Participating,
but no Appearance
Private Attorney Participating
Public Defender Appearance and
Private Attorney Participating
No Defense Counsel

HEARNG

79
10
3
I
7

Total

100%

Number

202

of the defendants, and the Public Defender represented the remaining
89%.
The small number of private counsel present at bail hearings is
attributable to several factors. Private attorneys were not authorized
to file limited appearances and were reluctant to undertake the
criminial defense in many cases. 431 Moreover, the Public Defender
428 Telephone interview with Thomas Cawley, First Assistant Public Defender, Cook
County, Nov. 28, 1968.
429 See Table 51.
430 Our data indicate that only one written defense motion for leave for the Public
Defender to withdraw was made, and that motion was granted by the court.
431 By April 12, private attorneys, over the objection of the Public Defender, were
allowed to file limited appearances which enabled them to represent defendants at the
bond reduction hearings without undertaking to represent the defendants generally.
AusTIN COMIrrEE REPORT 90; Platt Report 14.
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and State's Attorney repeatedly stated during the early riot period
that the Public Defender would be able to handle all arrestees and
that there was no need for volunteer lawyers.4 32 Many volunteers
433
were not allowed to take cases, according to judicial authorities,
because they were either law students or not admitted to practice in
Illinois. Volunteer attorneys were also turned away for alleged security reasons, because of the fear of sabotage to the central communications network of the police department, a few floors below the courtroom.

43 4

Both the court rule barring lawyers not specifically requested

by criminal defendants435 and a statutory rule precluding the appointment of private counsel in misdemeanor cases in Cook County,436

restricted the number of private attorneys at the bail hearings. During
the early riot period defendants were generally not allowed counsel
of their choice. 437 Although the situation changed somewhat over
the weekend there is evidence that even on Sunday defendants were
not freely allowed to choose private counsel. 438 As one commentator
concluded, "[private] attorneys were clearly not welcome in the pro439
ceedings."
After Sunday, when private volunteers were permitted to assist
432 AusTiN CoMmrrrE REPORT 99; Platt Report 9, 13.
433 AUSTIN CozrmrrTEE REPORT 86.
434 Id. As one Cook County Bar Association lawyer, who was turned away from the

central police station at which bail hearings were being held, reported:
There were policemen at the door demanding credentials before they would
allow anyone to come in. A young policeman stopped me and asked me where I
was going. I gave him one of my cards identifying me as a lawyer.... So another
young policeman stepped up and said "What is your business here?" I said I
told you before that I am a lawyer and there is a court hearing going on in
there and my license says that I am a member of that court and I want to go
in now. I was not in the mood to be kicked around . . . and I told him to go
in and get somebody that he could take directions from to find out whether he
really had the authority to keep me out of the building. At that point he said,
"Well, go on in." Platt Report 5.
435 See AUSTIN ComairrE

REPORT 86.
436 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 113(3)(b) (1967).
437 Ginsberg Testimony 190; Platt Report 5. It was not always in the defendant's

interest to choose his own attorney even when so permitted as the following bail hearing
transcript reveals:
The Court: Do you want the Public Defender here to defend you, or are you
going to get your own attorney?
The Defendant: I want my own attorney.
The Court: Allright. I will ask you [a Public Defender] to sit down. You don't
defend him. What does the State recommend?
The State's Attorney: $3000.00.
The Court: $3000.00 bond, Branch 47, April 15, 1968.
438 Remarks of a private defense attorney at a meeting of the Cook County Bar Association, April 16, 1968.
439 Platt Report 6; as the Austin Committee said: "The initial reaction of the magistrates and the public defender to the volunteers seems to have been one of discouraging
their appearance on behalf of arrestees in the bond hearings." AuSTIN CommrREPORT
90.
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the Public Defender, they helped to obtain information from the
arrestees relevant to the setting of bond. 440 In light of the general
disregard of individual circumstances in setting bail discussed in Section IV above, the significance of this volunteer assistance should
not be exaggerated. Legal Aid Lawyers also undertook the clerical
duties of bond clerks, however, and assisted relatives to locate arrestees and arrestees to contact relatives. As one observer has written: "The volunteer lawyers and law students saved the bail system
4 41
from complete chaos by helping at this stage."
Despite the Illinois statutory provisions permitting an arrestee to
communicate with an attorney and a member of his family,442 lawyers

and even Public Defenders were prohibited during the early riot
period from interviewing defendants in the bullpens before their
bail hearings and, on occasion, from interviewing defendants at the
44 3
County Jail; defendants were often unable to make phone calls.
TABLE 51
TYPE OF COUNSFL AT VARIOUS STAGES OF COURT PROCEEDINGS

Per Cent
Public Defender

Total
Number of
Hearings
of this type
(= 100%)

1

99

(1964)

First Bond
Reduction Hearing

8

92

(472)

Second Bond
Reduction Hearing

9

91

(74)

13

87

(2136)

13

87

(2120)

Court Appearance

Per Cent
Private Attorneya

Bail Hearing
(First Court Appearance)

Second Court
Appearance
Final Court
Appearanceb

a This column includes only those private attorneys who filed appearances.
b This data refers to the final court appearance in Municipal Court. It is probable
that a greater proportion of defendants against whom indictments were obtained, resulting in their transfer to the Criminal Court, had private representation in Criminal
Court.

In summary, the Public Defender assumed the representation of
almost all of the defendants at bail hearings-even the non-indigentand also represented the great majority of defendants at later stages
440 Platt Report 6; AUsrIN CoMMrrrEE REPORT 90; Ginsberg Testimony 192-3.
441 Platt Report 17; see AUSTIN Comhrrran REPORT 86, 90.
442 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 103-3, 103-4 (1967).
443 Platt Report 7-8; Ginsberg Testimony 190.
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. TABLE 52
TYPE OF COUNSEL BY SERIOUSNESS OF CHARGEa

Charge
Curfew
Disorderly Conduct
Resisting Arrest
Misdemeanors, Personal
Misdemeanors, Property
Feloniesb
Two or more Chargesb

Per Cent
Private Attorney

Per Cent
Public Defender

1
5
18
17
23

99
95
82
83
77

27

73

Number
of Cases
(= 100%)
(575)
(448)
(33)
(12)
(136)
(698)
(213)
(2115)

a The seriousness of the crimes charged was determined by ranking the charges according to the average amount of ball set for defendants charged with that crime.
b These categories are not examined in more detail because our data is only complete
through the last appearance in Municipal Court, and it is probable that many of those
charged with felonies who were not represented by private counsel in the Municipal
Court retained private counsel before disposition of their cases.

in the criminal proceedings, particularly those with less serious
charges. 444 (See Tables 51 and 52.) But the mere presence of the Public
Defender by no means assured effective representation for defendants.
On the contrary, at many bail hearings the Public Defender was not
responsive to the defendant's interests.
Analysis of our sample of 202 adult bond hearing transcripts reveals that the Public Defender made specific bond requests in only
15%/ of the cases and that in only 8%, did the court's bond determination reflect the influence of the Public Defender's recommendation.
The State's Attorney, however, made recommendations in 69%0 of
the cases, and his suggestion was accepted by the court in 43/%.
When the Public Defender took the initiative in questioning the
defendant, the amount of bond set by the court was less than that
recommended by the State's Attorney in nearly half the cases in
which the State's Attorney made a bond recommendation. When the
Public Defender failed to question the defendant, with the usual
result that the court itself undertook the questioning, the amount set
by the court was less than that recommended by the State's Attorney
in only 23% of the cases. Bond, then, was set at lower amounts
when the Public Defender questioned the defendant. Yet the Public
Defender led the questioning in only 42%, of the crises. In 37o the
444 Although Illinois law only requires appointment of the Public Defender in misdemeanor cases when the defendant is indigent, the Public Defender undertook to represent most defendants regardless of indigence. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 113-3(b) (1967).

1969]

Criminal Justice in Extremis

magistrate conducted most of the interrogation, and in 21% the de445
fendant was asked few, if any, questions.

The failure of the Public Defender to examine his clients in more
than half the cases is particularly egregious in light of the clear purpose of the bail hearing. Section 110-2 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure provides for release on recognizance "[w]hen from all
the circumstances the court is of the opinion that the accused will
appear as required."44 6 And Section 110-5 provides in part that the
amount of bail shall be "[c]onsiderate of the past criminal acts and
447
conduct [and] . .. the financial ability of the accused."

Even in those instances in which the Public Defender did question
a defendant, he often elicited responses unfavorable to his client for
the purposes of setting bail, revealing his lack of preparation. Twentynine per cent of the defendants who were asked by the Public Defender if they had prior arrest records answered affirmatively. Although
only five of the 41 defendants who were asked how long they had
resided in Chicago had lived in Chicago for less than three years, that
information was elicited from four of the five defendants by the
Public Defender. Forty-five per cent of the defendants questioned
as to their marital status were unmarried, yet in more than 50% of
those instances in which a Public Defender elicited marital status
information, the defendant was unmarried. And the same pattern
emerges from analysis of questions regarding family status. In short,
it is clear that the Public Defender made no inquiry into the individual circumstances of his clients before asking them questions which
may have adversely affected their bail determinations. 448 This finding supports the conclusion of the Mayor's Riot Study Committee
that:
...

the public defenders did not have or take the time to

interview or question the arrestees respecting ['the essential
factors necessary for setting bonds'] prior to their bond hearing appearances before the magistrate . ... 449
445 In one instance a Public Defender who had filed an appearance on behalf of 27
defendants failed to speak once while each of the 27 paraded before the bond magistrate
to have bail set. The failure of the Public Defenders to take the initiative in the questioning, however, may in part reflect deference to the known styles of particular magistrates.
448 ILL. Rrv. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-2 (1967).
447 ILL. Rr~v. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-5 (1967).
448 Cf. United States ex rel. DeMary v. Pate, 277 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Ill. 1967) in which
defendant's conviction was reversed on a finding of inadequate representation before and
during trial; counsel's examination of defendant at trial had elidted testimony which
prior consultation would have revealed was adverse.
449 AusriN ComirIrsE REPORT 89.
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Another indication of the ineffectiveness of the Public Defender
at the bail hearings is that despite his presence at almost all of the
hearings, two-thirds of the small sample of defendants whom we interviewed at length stated that they were not represented by counsel
at this stage of the proceedings.
It is apparent from our earlier discussion in Section IV that in
terms of the impact of the criminal process upon the individual defendant, ability or inability to secure adequate representation at the
earliest stage of this process is often vital. 450 For example, one defendant represented by the Public Defender was charged with burglary and
bond was set at $5,000. After a month of incarceration his bond was
reduced to $1,000, enabling his father to post bail. But as a result
of pretrial detention the defendant lost his job in a local restaurant
and was unable to secure employment for five months. If the time
at which a defendant's right to counsel matures is viewed in light
of his personal stake in the proceedings, the bond hearing or preliminary hearing must be a "critical stage." But even if "critical stage"
is defined in terms of the effect of the pretrial proceedings on the
ultimate disposition of the case, 451 our data suggest that the right
to counsel was constitutionally required in many of the preliminary
hearings we reviewed. Despite contrary statutory provisions, in 55
of the 202 sample bond hearing transcripts, or 27% of the cases,
45 2
defendants were required to enter a plea to the charges against them.

But the riot defendants may have had an enforceable right to
effective representation at their bail hearings even in the absence
of a constitutional or statutory right to counsel at that stage. As we
noted, volunteer counsel were excluded from the hearings largely
450 At least one court has recognized this. In reversing a narcotics conviction for absence of counsel at defendant's preliminary hearing, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals relied, in part, on the argument that defendant might have been free
on bail if he had been provided with counsel at that stage. Dancy v. United States, 361
F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
451 See text at note 418 supra.
452 The statute does not require that defendants plead to the charges prior to the
arraignment. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-1 (preliminary hearing), § 113-1 (arraignment)
(1967); but in. practice the arraignment and preliminary hearing are often combined in
misdemeanor cases at the initial court appearance. See OAKS & LErHMAN 38. In felony
cases it is apparent that defendants need not plead to the charges before a probable cause
hearing. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 109-3(a) (1967). In light of the fact that a felony defendant has a right to a probable cause determination at the preliminary hearing, it can
be argued that this is a "critical stage" since successful challenge to the probable cause
for arrest could result in immediate release. Moreover, defense counsel can force the
prosecution to reveal the evidence on which the charge is based. See Gramenos, Investigation and Discovery in a Criminal Case, 49 CHI. BAR Ass'N REc. 386 (1968); OAKS &
LEHMAN 115-6; see generally ATroRNEY GENERAL'S CoammrrEE 44.
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because the Public Defender's office claimed it could represent all
the defendants. Many defendants who otherwise might have secured
private counsel were thus forced to rely on the assistance of the
Public Defender. Assuming that many of the volunteer attorneys who
were turned away would have been responsive to the personal interests of the defendants, it is arguable that the defendants were "substantially prejudiced" by ineffective representation by the Public
Defender's office.
The importance of the presence of counsel at the bail hearing
is underscored by the absence of effective remedies for excessive
bond determinations. 453 In practice, as our data indicate, the constitutional right to reasonable bail may be "irretrievably" lost if unprotected by provision for the presence of effective defense counsel
at the bail hearing.
2. Later Proceedings. Eighty-seven per cent of those riot defendants
brought before magistrates in the Municipal Court subsequent to
their bail hearings were represented by the Public Defender. Only
10% of the defendants made written defense motions. Of the 221
defendants who made a third court appearance in the Municipal
Court, 57% made defense motions.
TABLE 53
DISPOSITION OF DEFENSE MOTIONS MADE AT SECOND AND THIRD COURT APPEARANCES

Second Court Appearance

Third Court Appearance

Motion

Total Number
Made

%
Granted
J

Total Number
Made

Stay of Mittimus
Suppression of Evidence

(111)
(41)

98
66

(31)
-

(15)

100

-

(18)

6

(30)

3

(13)
(9)

92
0

(52)
-

98
-

(26)

-

(12)

Advance Court Date
Vacate Judgment
Vacate Bond Forfeiture
Judgement
Demand Trial
Other Motions

(233)

%
Granted
J
10
-

-

(125)

As Table 53 indicates, when defense motions were made, they
were generally limited to one of only five types of motions at the
second court appearance and to one of only three types of motions
at the third court appearance. Other motions which might have
453 See Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944
(1965); text at notes 303-10 supra.
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been advantageous to individual defendants, including motions to
dismiss, for discovery, for writ of habeas corpus, to strike the complaint, and for a bill of particulars were rarely if ever made. Motions
to advance the court date and stay mittimus were almost always
granted, at least at the second court appearance. The failure of the
Public Defender to make greater use of such motions to protect his
clients from long pretrial incarceration is unexplained.
The ineffectiveness of the Public Defender's representation of riot
defendants in later stages is also reflected in the pattern of disposition
of misdemeanor cases. (See Tables 54 and 55.) Only 27% of the misTABLE 54 °
DIsPosITIoN OF ALL MISEm-ANoRS BY TYPE OF CoUsS.L

Private Attorney
Per Cent Convicted
Plea of Guilty
Convicted at Trial

13
14

Per Cent Released
Pretrial Dismissal
Discharge at Trial

57
16

Public Defender

27%

54%
24
30

73

Total
Number of Cases

46
31
15

100%

100%

(97)

(1189)

TABLE 55
DISPOSITION OF SERIOUS MISDEMEANORS BY TYPE OF COUNSEL

Private Attorney
Per Cent Convicted
Plea of Guilty
Convicted at trial

5
7

Per Cent Released
Pre-trial Dismissal
Discharged at trial

75
13

Total
Number of cases

Public Defender

12%

35%
22
13

88

65
60
5

100%

100%

(41)

(174)

demeanants represented by private attorneys were convicted, but twice
that percentage, or 54%, of misdemeanants represented by the Public
Defender were convicted.
Not only were the misdemeanants represented by private counsel
much less likely to be convicted, but, significantly, their cases were
likely to be dismissed earlier in the criminal process. While 57%
of private counsel cases were dismissed prior to trial, only 31% of
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Public Defender cases were dismissed before trial. The Public Defender was also more likely to plead his defendant guilty and more
likely to go to trial with his case.
It might be suggested that these differences reflect the types of
cases handled by private attorneys and the Public Defender, since
a greater proportion of the cases handled by private attorneys
involved serious charges, and these were likely to be disposed of
earlier and more favorably to the defendant. We examined this
possibility by analyzing the dispositions of those charged with "serious"
misdemeanors-misdemeanors against the person or property. Our
findings generally refute this hypothesis. Indeed, the overall conviction
rate of serious misdemeanants represented by the Public Defender
was almost three times as great as the rate in private counsel cases.
The private attorney was far more successful at trial than the Public
Defender, who was much more likely to settle for a plea of guilty.
In short, the defendant represented by a Public Defender received
less effective legal representation than the defendant represented by a
private attorney. The representation afforded riot defendants by the
Public Defender was no more effective at later stages than it was
during the earlier proceedings.
C. The Public Defender and Effective Representation
Based on its study of the civil disorders of 1967, the Kerner Commission concluded: "Most prominent in the major outbreaks was
the shortage of skilled defense lawyers to handle the influx of cases
in any fashion approximating individual representation. . . . The
need for prompt, individual legal counsel is particularly acute in
riot situations. . . . The services of counsel at the earliest stage,
' '4 4
preferably at the precinct station, are essential. 5
Illinois statutes permit implementation of the Kerner Commission
recommendations by providing for appointment of public or private
counsel at the initial court appearance of any indigent who desires
counsel in all misdemeanor and felony cases in Cook County.455 And
in fact most of the persons arrested during the April 1968 disorders
were represented by counsel. As we have seen, virtually all the riot
defendants were represented by the Public Defender at early stages
in the criminal proceedings, and most of those with less serious
charges were represented by the Public Defender throughout their
prosecution. 4 6 But the Kerner Commission also wrote that "[t]he
454 KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 186.
455 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 109-1(b)(2),

456 See Tables 51, 52

supra.

113-3(b) (1967).
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right to counsel is a right to effective counsel." 457 We noted earlier
that the Public Defender, in many instances, was ineffective in representing riot defendants at their bail hearings. Our data also showed
that misdemeanor defendants represented by the Public Defender
were more likely to plead guilty and to be convicted after trial, and
less likely to have their cases dismissed at pretrial stages, than their
counterparts represented by private atorneys. It is important to note
that the Public Defender has a similar record under "normal" circumstances, although the disparity of performance is perhaps less
extreme. 45s
Perhaps the variations we have found in the effectiveness of representation in Cook County could be attributed to the relative ability
of counsel. 459 But more significant in an analysis of the representation afforded riot defendants is the purpose and function of a Public
Defender's office. The most insistent criticism of public defenders
is that they lack independence from other officials of the criminal
system 4" ° both because of their continuous working relationship with
prosecutors and judges and because of the organizational set-up of
public defenders' offices. Cook County public defenders are assigned
to particular courts and must take all assigned cases in that courtroom. In addition, a judge or magistrate can pressure the Public
457 KERNER COMIISSION REPORT 854.
458 In 1964 the Cook County Public Defender was less likely than retained attorneys

to get cases against felony defendants dismissed before trial and more likely to represent
defendants pleading guilty, but had an overall conviction record roughly equivalent to
that of retained lawyers. OAKs & LEHmAN 155-63. But analysis of a sample of 1965 felony
cases in Cook County reveals that defendants represented by the Public Defender were
more likely to be convicted than defendants represented by retained attorneys. Banfield
& Anderson, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts, 35 U. Cni. L. RFv. 259,
303 Table 11 (1968). Lee Silverstein has offered evidence that a defendant represented by
the Cook County Public Defender is more likely to plead guilty than a defendant represented by retained lawyers. L. SiLvERasmwIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR 54 (1965). The Silverstein survey includes a similar comparison of public defenders and retained counsel on
a nationwide basis. Supra at 53-56.
The University of Chicago Law Review continuances study also indicates that 80% of
the indicted felons in the sample represented by retained attorneys were released on
bail, as opposed to 38% of those represented by the Public Defender. Banfield & Anderson, supra at 304, Table 15. Data from the same study also show that retained attorneys
filed over twice as many motions on behalf of defendants as the Public Defender. Supra
at 309 Table 22.
459 Oaks and Lehman suggest, for example, that the variations in effectiveness of representation in.Cook County are attributable to four factors: "ability of counsel, type of
crimes, difficulty of cases, and irascibility of defendants." OAKS & LEHMAN 154-5.
460 Silverstein, supra note 458, at 50. See also OAKS & LEHMAN 153. Even a federal
judge has asserted that the public defender reflects "the creation of a police state where
the government, when it prosecutes a man, purports also to defend him." Dimoch, The
Public Defender: A Step Towards a Police State? 42 A.B.AJ. 219, 220 (1956).
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Defender's office to substitute one Assistant Public Defender for another. Public Defenders are appointed by, and serve at the pleasure
of, a majority of the Judges of the Circuit Court.
In fact the Cook County Public Defender's office was not created
and is not maintained for the primary purpose of providing effective
representation for indigent criminal defendants. From its beginning
the public defender movement in the United States was based as
much on the needs of judicial economy as on humanitarian considerations. 4

1

Indeed, when a committee of the Chicago Bar Association

(CBA) summarized the advantages of the recently established Cook
County Public Defender in 1931, it emphasized the expeditious
handling of court matters. 4 2 The Cook County Board of Commissioners continually stresses the fiscal economies of the public defender
system in its Annual Reports; 0 3 the present Public Defender of Cook
County has reaffirmed the view that his office has remedied "a chaotic
464
situation in the administration and disposition of cases."

The effectiveness of the Public Defender, then, is more likely to
be measured, at least among court officials, by his success in efficiently
handling heavy caseloads thah by his success in representing an
indigent defendant. In short, the Cook County Public Defender is
forced to serve as a functionary of the court. 40 5 The significance of
his role is highlighted by the exceptional unassertiveness of the
466
State's Attorney's office in the early screening of cases.
461 As one of the early leaders in the public defender movement said in arguing for
a public defender system in New York: "No law could be more economical-none more
humane." A. GOLDMAN, THE PUBLIC DEFENDER (1917).
402 The committee listed as advantages of the Public Defender's office: (1) If the defendant "has no case" he is advised to plead guilty in order to avoid unnecessary trials;
(2) if he has "a good case" he is given an adequate defense; (3) jury trials are often
waived; (4) cases are tried promptly, not continued "time after time"; (5) cases are tried
expertly and the time of the court is not "wasted by needlessly protracted trials"; (6)
"vast economies are effected"; (7) judges rely upon the Public Defender's opinion in sentencing; (8) unethical practices are eliminated; and (9) there are "less chances for a miscarriage of justice." Mishkin, The Public Defender, 14 CHI. BtR Ass'N REC. 98, 106 (1931).
463 Working Paper 26. The Public Defender is appointed by a majority vote of the
Judges of the Circuit Court and his budget is determined by the Circuit Court, but the
budget of the Circuit Court is controlled by the County Board of Commissioners. See
Working Paper 26-27; Harrington & Getty, The Public Defender: A Progressive Step To-

wards Justice, 42 A.BA.J. 1139, 1140 (1956).
404 Harrington 8: Getty, supra note 463, at 1141.
465 "While the assistants did not see themselves as bureaucratic functionaries and did
not act as such, both the clients and the courtroom personnel did see them as bureaucratic functionaries. Many judges and much of the rest of the courtroom personnel conceived of the most important Public Defender function as expediting court business and
'efficiency' as the primary goal." Working Paper 105.
466 See text at note 61 supra. In 1931 the Wickersham Commission, noting that the
one advantage of a public defender system "which seems best established is that . . .
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The effectiveness of the Public Defender in representing his clients'
interests, under conditions of civil disorder as well as under normal
circumstances, is best understood in light of the policies and goals of
the criminal system. Under normal conditions the criminal system
aims at attaining maximum efficiency in the application of "appropriate sanctions" consistent with due process. Under conditions of civil
disorder the policy of the Cook County courts differs from this goal
primarily in the redefinition of "appropriate sanctions" to include
467
preventive detention.
Thus the Public Defender's policy of representing all riot defendants at the initial bail hearings-regardless of indigency, and despite
overload and the presence of volunteer attorneys-can best be explained
in terms of the goals of the criminal system. Indeed, this "monopoly"
policy has since been institutionalized by a mass arrest contingency
plan of the Cook County Circuit Court.40 8 The plan delegates the
coordination of private defense efforts to the CBA in cases in which
the defendant requests counsel other than the Public Defender, and
is apparently designed to maintain the primary role of the Public
Defender in supervising defense efforts. 469 By utilizing the services
of the CBA the Public Defender is able to avoid direct contact with
more aggressive and independent legal groups such as the ACLU, the
Cook County Bar Association, and legal aid organizations, and thereby
protect the courts' interests in efficient administration. As one official
from the Public Defender's office described the situation during the
April riots:
[T]he ACLU or their ittorneys would take no directions
from me. Now, they all wanted to do the same job, but it was
only the Chicago Bar Association that said 'how many lawyers
do you want; we'll send them there the hour you want; and
470
you direct them.'
[the system] involves economy," withheld general approval of a public defender system
because it believed the chief advantage could equally be obtained through proper performance of the "preliminary sifting" function by prosecutors. U.S. NATIONAL COMMISSION
ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 33

(1931).

467 See text at notes 395-8 supra.
468 General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook County No. 18 (1968). The Order provides, in part:
E. If the defendant is without counsel, the Court shall appoint the Public Defender of Cook County to defend him.
F. If the defendant requests counsel other than the Public Defender of Cook

County, the Court shall appoint a member of the Chicago Bar Association Volunteer Lawyers Committee to represent the defendant.
Id., § 18.8,
E, F.
469 See Cawley Testimony at 220.
470 Id. at 225-6.
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We noted earlier in this section that the Public Defender often
failed to make bond recommendations and to elicit relevant information from riot defendants at the bail hearings, despite apparent evidence that a more forthright defense would have effectively represented the defendants' interests. To some extent, perhaps, our findings are attributable to the energies and motivations of Public
Defender personnel. Much more significant, however, was the policy
of the criminal system to discourage individualized and detailed bail
hearings. It is likely that even if volunteer attorneys had been
allowed to participate actively in the defense effort at early stages,
the results would not have been substantially different. The policies
of the Cook County courts under conditions of civil disorder may
tolerate the aberration of a few privately represented defendants at
bail hearings, but it is doubtful that the system would permit the
mass participation of aggressive private attorneys.
In this light, however, the increased participation by private counsel at later stages in the criminal proceedings is particularly significant.
Once the riot had subsided, and the desire to detain arrestees and
safeguard administrative efficiency had moderated, representation by
more aggressive private attorneys became less incompatible with the
47 1
policies of the criminal system.
The function of the Public Defender's office to regulate the administration of the courts and safeguard the attainment of efficiency
and economy, particularly under conditions when those goals are
most in jeopardy, results in a conflict of interest with serious implications for the operation of the criminal justice system.47 2 And as we
noted earlier, appellate relief may not be available, thus highlighting
the necessity for a stern reevaluation of the effectiveness of current
forms of defense representation in protecting the interests of indigent
defendants.
471

Despite the experience of April 1968, the First Assistant Public Defender has

claimed that the Public Defender's office can in the future handle up to three thousand
riot defendants at initial bail hearings. The office's contingency plans expressly anticipate

that few private volunteers will "come in" at initial bail hearings. Volunteers will be
encouraged to join the defense effort at later stages both as interviewers and as regular
counsel. Id. at 234.
472 In cases involving private appointed counsel at least, such conflict of interest may
be grounds for automatic reversal. See People v. Stoval, 40 111. 2d 109, 239 NXE.2d 441
(1968), where the fact that appointed counsel had once represented the plaintiff, and
that his firm was still retained by plaintiff, was held sufficient to grant a new trial. "This
situation is too fraught with the dangers of prejudice, prejudice which the cold record

might not indicate, that the mere existence of the conflict is sufficient to constitute a
violation of relator's rights whether or not it in fact influences the attorney or the outcome of the case." 40 Ill. 2d at 113, 239 N.E.2d at 443.

CONCLUSION

Civil disorders pose a special threat to any criminal justice system.
They bring a massive influx of cases into already overtaxed courts.
In the absence of preparation, as the Kerner Commission warned,
the result may be recurring breakdowns in the administration of
justice. 473 This study has indicated that Chicago had a virtually complete plan-predicated in part on the earlier experiences of Chicago
and other cities and on Kerner Commission recommendations-for
474
handling mass arrest cases.
The contingency plan put into effect in April 1968 emphasized
the goal of economy in judicial administration and the role of the
State's Attorney and Public Defender in safeguarding the achievement
of that goal. The State's Attorney relied heavily on misdemeanor
rather than felony charges; he also relied on curfew, disorderly conduct, and burglary charges, rather than mob action and looting,
which would have involved more difficult evidentiary burdens. Form
complaints were used. Preliminary hearings were avoided in most
felony cases, and automatic continuances were granted in. virtually
all misdemeanor cases. Bail was generally set at uniform amounts
based on the State's Attorney's recommendations and the nature of
the offense charged. 475 Defense lawyers were not allowed to participate
in the post-arrest screening process and were unable to interview
prisoners individually in precourt detention facilities. 476 Volunteer
attorneys, law students, and interviewers were not deployed effective473 KERNER COMrISSION REPORT 184.
474 The Austin Committee also concluded that the Cook County judiciary "was
not without an emergency plan during the April riots." Ausrmi CoAfrrrra REPORT 88.
Moreover, future mass arrest situations in Chicago will probably be handled in much
the same manner as the April 1968 riot cases. After the April disorder, Chief Judge Boyle
remarked: "I've been a lawyer for 42 years and this is the finest example of processing
in mass arrests I have ever seen." Chicago Tribune, April 13, 1968, at 6. The Administrative Assistant to the Chief Judge said, "we were very pleased with the extreme efficiency with which these plans worked." Los Angeles Times, May 27, 1968, § 1, at 7.
Both the Chicago Police Department and Cook County Circuit Court issued orders
after April 1968 establishing procedures for the processing of mass arrests defendants.
See AusTIN CoManrTTE REPORT app. D; General Order of the Circuit Court of Cook
County No. 18 (1968). The new court plan does not differ significantly from the procedures employed in April 1968. There is, in particular, no indication that the policy of
pretrial detention will be abandoned. In briefing magistrates for duty during the August
1968 disturbances which surrounded the Democratic National Convention, Chief Judge
Boyle made it dear that high bonds would be an effective way to keep "violent persons"
off the streets. Chicago Sun-Times, August 20, 1968, at 7.
475 See KERNER COAr.,SsbON REPORT 191-2.
476 See KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 192.

610

Criminal Justice in Extremis

611

477

ly.
Bond reduction hearings were delayed for many defendants
until well after the riot had ended. By representing virtually all riot
arrestees at the bail hearing regardless of indigency, and most riot
defendants at later stages, and by failing to request early bond reduction hearings, the Public Defender contributed to judicial efficiency.
The goal of judicial economy, however, is significant not so much as
a bureaucratic-administrative ideal but as a potential means of assuring due process. When the Kerner Commission lamented recurring breakdowns in judicial administration during civil disorders it
hoped to provide an impetus for protecting defendants' rights. Indeed, contingency planning for civil disorders is important primarily
because it affords a means of avoiding abuses of due process. 478 But
in Chicago, judicial efficiency was perceived mostly in terms of system
goals other than due process. Insofar as the goal of efficient administration resulted in the availability of facilities and personnel to
process arrestees, it worked toward both administrative ends and
due process. But more often the administrative goal impeded attainment of due process, as is evidenced, for example, by uniform bond
amounts, avoidance of preliminary hearings, delay of bond reduction
hearings, and the role of the Public Defender. In short, the Chicago
plan achieved efficient administration but without achieving the end
of due process which judicial economy was presumably intended to
serve.
Moreover, the Cook County criminal system apparently sacrificed
measures of efficiency when necessary to the attainment of other
goals. Some Kerner Commission recommendations which would have
expedited judicial processing were rejected. No use was made of summons in lieu of arrest, or preset bail schedules for which Illinois
statutes provided and which the Commission endorsed.4 7 9
477 See KERNER COMMISSION REPORT 193.

478 See Open Meeting Before the Illinois State Advisory Committee to the United
States Commission on Civil Rights 156-7 (June 12, 1968) (Testimony of Harvey Friedman). See also Vance, The Administration of Justice in Civil Disorders, 51 J. AM. JUt.
Soc'y 326 (1968). Riot contingency recommendations regarding the administration of justice are numerous. See, e.g., AMEuRICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION ON CRIMINAL LAw, BAR
LEADERSHIP AND CiviL DISORDERS (1968); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATrTORNEYS ASSOCIATION, GUIDELINES FOR PROSECUTING CRIMINAL CASES DURING CIviL DISORDERS (1968); R. GOLDFARB, THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN 'WASHINGTON, D.C., DURING THE DISORDER OF APRIL 1968, at
58-74. A special subcommittee of the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights is active in

assisting local communities to develop contingency plans for the administration of justice
during civil disorders. Testimony of Harvey Friedman, supra at 148-50. Such plans have
been adopted in many cities including New York, Washington, and Baltimore. Testimony
of Harvey Friedman, supra at 151-5.
479 See KERNER COMISSION REPORT 189-91. The summons in lieu of arrest procedure
is authorized by ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, § 107-12 (1967).
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That fact as well as deliberate and inefficient police processing of
riot arrestees, and the absence of facilities which would have permitted immediate posting of cash bail, suggest that some inefficiencies
were tolerated and perhaps designed in order to achieve other goals,
such as pretrial detention. This study has highlighted the importance
of each discretionary determination by police, prosecutor, public
defender, and magistrate resulting in temporary detention of riot
arrestees. Predictable breakdowns in the handling of riot arrestees at
detention facilites did not result in the abandonment of the policy
of pretrial detention. Indeed, rather than abandon that policy some
previously convicted prisoners were released.
The use of pretrial detention is significant not only as a reflection
of the desire to avoid inefficiencies of formal adjudication at trial
but also because it achieves other goals of the criminal system. Pretrial
detention is thought to be an effective form of punishment and a
measure of general deterrence. It is also conducive to attaining high
conviction rates480 which constitute a public record of effective punishment of rioters. Its use perhaps reflects the inadequacy of formal
criminal processes in achieving the deterrent purposes of the criminal law. In effect, pretrial detention accelerates the impact of criminal sanctions through informal and discretionary processes. Formal
adjudication, findings of guilt, and sentencing are, for many, a mere
formality. The hurried judgments and unarticulated policies of police and national guard officers become critical, result in the unjustified inconvenience for many of multiple court appearances, and
are, in practice, not subject to review.
The use of pretrial detention for deterrent purposes during riots
is particularly suspect in light of the fact that, at least in Chicago,
it was not the initial rioters or looters who were arrested but what
one Cook County official called the "mopes and gawkers" who took
advantage of the breakdown in law enforcement. More important, the
tendency to rely on informal pretrial criminal sanctions raises serious
doubts about the prevailing rule that there is no constitutional or
statutory right to a preliminary hearing, in the absence of a showing
of actual prejudice at the formal disposition of a defendant's case.
It may not be accidental that the locus of informal criminal sanctions
is at early stages of criminal prosecution where a defendant's rights
480 Although the Kerner Commission expressly rejected use of preventive detention it
encouraged the "conviction of those who riot, incite to riot or have committed acts of
physical violence or caused substantial property damage," and criticized low conviction
rates among Detroit, Newark, and Los Angeles riot arrestees. Krsar-m COMMISSION REPoRT
184, 186-7.
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and ability to take himself out of the criminal process are most
tenuous.
Riot contingency planning is an inadequate response to civil disturbances, then, not only because it offers little assurance of due process, but also because it fails sufficiently to recognize that there are
goals of the criminal system during civil disorders which are in tension with the requirements of both efficiency and due process. Furthermore, for most urban criminal systems, contingency plans would
require the adoption under extraordinary circumstances of policies
and procedures presently unattained under ordinary conditions.
Perhaps the most distressing implication of the study is that the
quality of justice dispensed during civil disorders is in many respects
only a reflection of the reality of criminal administration under normal conditions. Riots and the ensuing responses of criminal systems
are highly visible and politically volatile phenomena. It is not the
administration of criminal justice, but society's concern about the
criminal justice system which is altered most radically during civil
disorders.481 The overwhelmingly urgent task is to sustain from dayto-day the critical attention focused on our cities and lower criminal
courts in the aftermath of civil disorders. 48 2 Only basic social and

judicial reforms will ultimately secure fair and effective administration of criminal justice in urban America.
481 Many private attorneys who were shocked by the operation of the criminal process
in April 1968 were not familiar with its normal operation. The First Assistant Public
Defender has remarked that many of the volunteer lawyers who complained about conditions on the riot weekend had no experience in Cook County courts. They had nothing
against which to gauge what they saw. Los Angeles Times, May 27, 1968, § 1, at 7.
482 Urban America, Inc. and the Urban Coalition have recently completed an assessment of the nation's response to the crisis described by the Kerner Commission. In regard to the lower criminal courts the study concluded only that "the significant thing
about the last year, is that nothing can be pointed to." URBAN Asuuic.A, INC. & URBAN
COALITION, ONn YEAR LATER 77 (1969).

